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
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EXTRACT DECLARATION OF TRUST.

MARCH 1, 1862.

I, WILLIAM BINNY WEBSTER, late Surgeon in the H. E. I. C. S., presently residing in Edinburgh,—Considering that I feel deeply interested in the success of the Free Church College, Edinburgh, and am desirous of advancing the Theological Literature of Scotland, and for this end to establish a Lectureship similar to those of a like kind connected with the Church of England and the Congregational body in England, and that I have made over to the General Trustees of the Free Church of Scotland the sum of £2000 sterling, in trust, for the purpose of founding a Lectureship in memory of the late Reverend William Cunningham, D.D., Principal of the Free Church College, Edinburgh, and Professor of Divinity and Church History therein, and under the following conditions, namely,—*First*, The Lectureship shall bear the name, and be called, ‘The Cunningham Lectureship.’ *Second*, The Lecturer shall be a minister or Professor of the Free Church of Scotland, and shall hold the appointment for not less than two years, nor more than three years, and be entitled for the period of his holding the appointment to the income of the endowment as declared by the General Trustees, it being understood that the Council after referred to may occasionally appoint a Minister or Professor from other denominations, provided this be approved of by not fewer than Eight Members of the Council, and it being further understood that the Council are to regulate the terms of payment of the Lecturer. *Third*, The Lecturer shall be at liberty to choose his own subject within the range of Apologetical, Doctrinal, Controversial, Exegetical, Pastoral, or Historical Theology, including what bears on Missions, Home and Foreign, subject to the consent of the Council. *Fourth*, The Lecturer shall be bound to deliver publicly at Edinburgh a Course of Lectures on the subjects thus chosen at some time immediately preceding the expiry of his appointment, and during the Session of the New College, Edinburgh; the Lectures to be not fewer than six in number, and to be delivered in presence of the Professors and Students under such arrangements as the Council may appoint; the Lecturer shall be bound also to print and publish, at his own risk, not fewer than 750 copies of the Lectures within a year after their delivery, and to deposit three copies of the same in the Library of the New College; the form of the publication shall be regulated by the Council. *Fifth*, A Council shall be constituted, consisting of (first) Two Members of their own body, to be chosen annually in the month of March, by the Senatus of the New College, other than the Principal; (second) Five Members to be chosen annually by the General Assembly, in addition to the Moderator of the said Free Church of Scotland; together with (third) the Principal of the said New College for the time being, the Moderator of the said General Assembly for the time being, the Procurator or Law Adviser of the Church, and myself the said William Binny Webster, or such person as I may nominate to be my successor: the Principal of the said College to be Convener of the Council, and any Five Members duly convened to be entitled to act notwithstanding the non-election of others. *Sixth*, The duties of the Council shall be the following:—(first), To appoint the Lecturer and determine the period of his holding the appointment, the appointment to be made before the close of the Session of College immediately preceding the termination of the previous Lecturer’s engagement; (second), To arrange details as to the delivery of the Lectures, and to take charge of any additional income and expenditure of an incidental kind that may be connected therewith, it being understood that the obligation upon the Lecturer is simply to deliver the Course of Lectures free of expense to himself. *Seventh*, The Council shall be at liberty, on the expiry of five years, to make any alteration that experience may suggest as desirable in the details of this plan, provided such alterations shall be approved of by not fewer than Eight Members of the Council.

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AND PROVIDENCE

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THE DIVINE WORKER

IN

CREATION AND PROVIDENCE

The Twenty-first Series of Cunningham Lectures

BY
J. OSWALD DYKES, M.A., D.D.

κατὰ πρόθεσιν τοῦ τὰ πάντα ἐνεργοῦντος
κατὰ τὴν βουλὴν τοῦ θελήματος αὐτοῦ

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PREFACE



THE subject of these Lectures, it must be owned, is a well-worn one. Lying as it does on the borderland between science and religion, it has long enough been a debatable territory.

My purpose, however, was not at all controversial. To re-shape the traditional doctrine of Creation and Providence under the light cast upon both Nature and History since last century opened fresh avenues for study in the ways of God, is, I think, one of the tasks at present laid upon theology. It is as a humble contribution towards this task that these pages are offered.

It appeared to me that an attempt simply to re-state familiar Christian teaching on Divine relations to Man as a creature and to the World whose latest and foremost inhabitant he is, provided it were carried out with frank acceptance of whatever has been learnt with assurance, or at least with high probability, on the methods of the Divine workmanship, might prove helpful to not

a few. Most thoughtful and religious persons in our time take an interest, more or less, in the subject ; and those who have given to it the best attention will be the most alive to its unresolved difficulties.

Like the series to which it belongs, this book is one of theology, not of science. If, in my frequent references to scientific results and hypotheses, I have succeeded in escaping what a scientific expert would recognise as blunders, I shall count myself fortunate.

Except that they have undergone revision, and for the reader's convenience have been divided into chapters, the Lectures are printed substantially as they were delivered.

My best thanks are due to Professor Alexander Macalister, F.R.S., for his kindness in looking over sheets of the work in proof.

To Mr. D. Oswald Dykes, LL.B., I am likewise indebted for assistance in revising the proofs and in the preparation of the Index.

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THE DIVINE WORKER IN CREATION AND PROVIDENCE



CHAPTER I

IN CONTACT WITH SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

The Subject stated—not peculiar to Christianity—nor even to religion—Science independent in its own domain—of caution in the use of hypotheses—Theology a practical discipline—differs from Philosophy in aim and method—ought not to ally itself with speculative systems—its negative attitude to some of them—its positive indebtedness to Philosophy—how far limited.

THE subject which I propose to treat in the following chapters embraces two connected doctrines known in Christian theology as “Creation” and “Providence”; or, more broadly stated, what the Christian Religion has to teach concerning the relations of God to the world and to Man considered as a part of it.

Obviously these tenets are neither central in the Christian Faith, nor peculiar to it. As the

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religion of redemption from sin, Christianity encloses a group of characteristic mysteries, revealed, as it believes, through a series of supernatural events, in the Person and Work of Jesus Christ. Chief among these are three: The Triunity of God; the Incarnation; and the Atonement, with its experienced consequences. These constitute the sacred central possession of our faith—its Holy of Holies. On these it claims to be practically the sole witness. Here no rival religion has any independent message of its own to give, nor can science or philosophy rank itself alongside of theology, as if it could add any substantial contribution to our knowledge of these arcana of the Christian Religion.

It is very different with the doctrines we are about to consider. The relations which God sustains to us as our Maker, Sustainer, and Provider are in substance common to Christian experience with all religious experience whatsoever. They lie in a forecourt of the nations, open to all the faiths of humanity, trodden therefore by the feet of the devout in every age or race of men. For they concern us, not primarily as we are the objects of Christ's redemption, but simply as a portion of the world which we inhabit. They are relations which the Christian

shares, not only with all men, but even in a large measure with every creature.

Here, therefore, Christian theology can claim no exclusive right to speak. Not only has every other religion a teaching of its own on the subject, but both natural science and philosophy are here as much at home as religion. Each of these lines of inquiry into the origin and destiny of the world and of man sets before itself its own distinct aim which it prosecutes by its proper methods. And while none of the three, theology, science, or philosophy, can well be indifferent to the conclusions of the others, it is probably best that for the present each be left as free as may be to pursue its own investigations to their legitimate results. It may be premature, and therefore unwise, to essay a blend or syncretism of what religion teaches regarding creation in its relations to the Divine, either with science on the one hand, in its efforts to determine and classify natural phenomena, physical or mental, or on the other with the speculative attempts of thinkers to reach the ultimate reality in which thought and being are one—although that ultimate reality may be indistinguishable from what divines call God. For, if the results of all three are ever to be harmonised, that is most likely to be achieved by suffering each to work independently along

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its own line : philosophy by the intuitions of the reason, science by observation of nature and experiments upon it, theology by the experiences of the devout life. It may be well, therefore, to devote a few words in this preliminary chapter to the bearing upon theology of these other great departments of human thought.

So far as the natural sciences are concerned, the matter is simple. Although their rapid progress during last century has overspread the intellectual world of to-day, with the result of overshadowing philosophy for the time being, and, in the apprehension of many, of threatening theology ; yet they really occupy a field of their own, secure enough, though limited, within the well-fenced boundaries of which neither of the other two can intermeddle. Their task, as nowadays recognised by their best representatives, is simply to observe, register, and measure all changes open to the observation of our senses, which take place, or have in the past taken place, in the world ; to ascertain as far as possible their conditions and invariable sequences ; in short, to investigate, so as to be able accurately to describe, the processes or methods by which observed phenomena are brought about and succeed one another : reducing in this way their multiplicity

to the simplicity of law or order. No more than this is the function of the sciences of nature. With the origin of things themselves, or with any purpose they may serve, or with their end-results, science as such takes nothing to do. Not even with things themselves as substances or entities apart from their observed appearances, nor with causes, save as invariable antecedents. Not even, strictly speaking, with force or forces operating change, save as convenient symbols to sum up the groups into which phenomena sort themselves. For all the ideas which we express by such words as "cause," "force," "substance," "purpose"—however freely these terms occur in scientific writings—transcend the phenomena of change observed by the scientist. They are borrowed only, for the sake of their convenience, from a different region, the region of thought with its supersensible data.

In order to assist scientists, in part to describe large groups of facts, but still more to start fresh investigation along promising lines, they allow themselves to frame hypotheses, which go beyond what can as yet be called ascertained results. Sometimes brilliant and often helpful, these hypotheses may receive confirmation as research advances, till they acquire a high, or even the highest, degree of probability. In other cases

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they may be discredited, and in the end superseded by newer theories. The past history of every natural science is strewn with such superseded conjectures, such as phlogiston or the corpuscular theory of light. Speaking of mechanical physics in particular, Mr. Hicks testified over a dozen years ago that "the wreckage of rejected theories is appalling."¹ So long as such an unproved hypothesis is in vogue, there is always a risk that both the scientist himself and the general public may take it for something more than it is, or even that it may be exploited in the interest of some particular philosophy of the universe. They may thus beget a rash dogmatism which the unwary accept for scientific certainty. It needs, therefore, to be steadily borne in mind that science can speak with full confidence only of phenomena which have been observed, tested as reliable, and classified, and of nothing beyond.

When its field is thus straitly defined, it becomes apparent that science is perfectly justified in declining the intrusion of religious dogma into its sphere; and it would be well if it held itself equally aloof from systems of philosophy. Of the noumena which may lie behind the

¹ Address to British Association in 1895; see *Nature*, vol. lii. p. 472.

phenomenal, as, for example, of the power which initiates the orderly changes of matter, or of the world's beginning, or of its final end or purpose, if it has any—of all such questions with which both philosophy and theology are bound to concern themselves, the natural sciences as such are equally bound to be silent.

Theology, on the other hand, in constructing its own doctrine of creation on the basis of Christian faith, must accept at the hands of science whatever has been ascertained on adequate evidence regarding the methods of nature and the facts of the world. On such matters science alone speaks with authority; and of its certain results, so far as they are relevant, divines are bound to take account, for the purpose of giving, not its substance to Christian faith, but form to Christian doctrine. When faith affirms a Divine Creator and Worker, as an implicate essential to the religious life, it occupies a region of its own where science has nothing to say. Just as the results of science inform us as to the methods of His making and working,—methods of which religion has nothing to tell us,—so, conversely, religious experience lies equally aloof from the domain of science. The interest which faith cherishes centres elsewhere, not in the methods of Divine operation, but in the Divine Worker behind

the methods: in the Divine origination of all things, and in the contemplated end-result of the Divine plan: all of them matters which lie outside the ken of science. "The ulterior and ultimate question, touching the origin and cause of natural causes, is one which," in the words of the late Mr. Romanes, "lies without the whole sphere of such causation itself; therefore it lies beyond any possible intrusion by science."¹ So long as religious faith and scientific research are content to remain faithful, each to its proper aim and methods, it is impossible that their legitimate results should really clash. But while our religious faith in God as Creator and Provider lies beyond science, the doctrines in which theologians strive to give form to faith's intellectual content have always been, and must be, affected to some extent by what men know, or suppose they know, about the facts of the world. Here the theologian ought to have no preconceptions, but be willing with an open mind to learn from science all that it discovers about the mechanism of the universe, its past transformations, and its present working.

Between philosophy and theology the links are a good deal closer and less easy to define. At

¹ *Darwin and after Darwin*, i. 413.

many points their fields overlap. In a sense their aims may be said to coincide. For, if we suppose them both to have attained completeness, each would have reached a unity in thought covering the whole of being. What each of them seeks to reduce under one whole of thought, is no less than the entire contents, if not of the universe, at least of the portion of it known to us—man's world, that is, and man's history. Were that practicable, their results, however arrived at, would necessarily agree; for both would be true, and truth must harmonise with itself.

Even then, however, it would not follow that their results, although harmonious in substance, must be identical in form. For while both are striving after an intellectual apprehension in its unity of the whole of being, they do it under the influence of different motives and with the aid to some extent of different instruments. With philosophy the motive is purely intellectual, and its organ of inquiry the pure reason. Certain knowledge for its own sake is its one concern. When it has verified its theory of knowledge and reached reality, or the unity of thought with existence, its work is done and its interest exhausted. Theology, on the contrary, is a practical discipline. Its purpose is to serve the ends of the religious and moral life. It is the

handmaid, as well as the interpreter to itself, of the religious consciousness, that is, of devout experience. It starts, therefore, not from pure thought or its necessary laws, but from that vast domain of human life, rich in emotion and in ethical action as well as in thought, which we only cover at its broadest when we conjoin the two words, religion and morals. If theology be nothing less than the exact interpretation and reduction to unity of the intellectual elements in this complex experience of man's higher life; if its task be, first to disentangle from the ethico-religious experience of humanity as it culminates in Christianity the truths which form its implicit contents, then to study their postulates in the reason, and finally to exhibit their harmony with all other truth gathered from any quarter:—still it undertakes this intellectual task simply on the basis of religious experience as a concrete fact, the greatest in the history of our race, and with a strictly practical intention, namely, to clarify, to educate, and to strengthen the religious life itself.

The past history of theology has, I think, made it apparent that it cannot ally itself closely with any dominant system of philosophic thought, as it has at all times tended to do, without some risk to its own independence or injury to its proper aims. So far, therefore, it is impossible not

to feel a certain sympathy with the recent attempt of the Ritschlian school to shake off the influence of metaphysics altogether, and remodel Christian theology on independent lines. On a few Christian doctrines, such as I have described as the peculiar arcana of Christian revelation, this can be safely, perhaps profitably, attempted with a good measure of success. On these topics the borrowings of theology from philosophy in the past have not proved an unmixed gain. The doctrine of the Holy Trinity, for instance, has reaped a doubtful profit from the concepts which it early borrowed from Greek metaphysics.¹ At least it has had a heavy toll to pay for the loan; and there are a good many who would say pretty much the same about the debt which the doctrine of our Lord's Person has owed to the same source. It is otherwise, as I conceive, with the subject before us. Here a cleavage between theology and philosophy cannot be trenchantly carried through, any more than in the fundamental doctrine *de Deo* on which ultimately our view both of creation and of providence must repose. No doubt, both on the doctrine of God and on His relations to man's world, Christianity

¹ From speculative attempts in the West since Augustine to illustrate it by philosophical parallels, theology has profited still less.

has a teaching of its own to build up, drawn out of its own twofold source—I mean, historical revelation in Christ and the Christian consciousness. Nevertheless there is a double attitude towards philosophy which theology cannot escape. The one is an attitude of self-defence, the other one of friendly collaboration. The one is the posture proper to Christian apologetics, the other to Christian dogmatics.

1. Among current systems of philosophy there are those with which no theology can live, because they cut away the fundamental postulates of religion itself. The aim of every religion being either to bring about or to express an intercourse of some sort between man and the Supreme Being, wherein each of these two factors takes a share conditioned upon the action of the other, it simply expires whenever this interaction of the two Spirits, the Divine and human, is supplanted by a monistic philosophy which either denies free spiritual existences altogether, or at least denies to the Divine any power of acting upon man, or to man any sphere of free activity over against the Divine. Forms of materialistic or of pantheistic monism, for example, which involve consequences like these, are bound to encounter a life and death antagonism from the Christian apologist. To the numerous defences against these which

for a generation divines have been producing in abundance,—especially against that mechanical theory of the universe which not only finds no room for either spirit or spontaneity, but denies that either can exist,—I have no intention to attempt any addition. My aim is not apologetic, but doctrinal.¹

2. Beyond this negative or purely defensive attitude to systems which make religious life unthinkable, it is less easy to define what positive relations a Christian dogmatic ought to hold with speculative thought. That it cannot accept dictation from whatever system of philosophy chances to be in favour, so as to subject to its scheme of thought the contents of the Christian Faith, is obvious. Nor do I think theology even needs to favour any particular tenet on the problems of philosophy which is not actually called for by the implicates of the faith. There are questions much discussed and variously answered in different systems of speculation with which it seems to me questionable how far the theologian as such needs to occupy himself. For instance, when even Ritschl would place every theologian

¹ Among well-known works of this class, I need only to name as examples, Prof. Flint's two sets of *Baird Lectures* (Theism and Antitheistic Theories); the late James Martineau's writings; Prof. Orr's *Christian View of God and the World*; Ward's *Naturalism and Agnosticism* (1899); and Murphy's *Scientific Basis of Faith* (1873).

under obligation, not merely "to act on a definite theory of knowledge," but to prove the validity of the epistemology on which he proceeds, does he not lay on theologians an unreasonable burden?¹ Whether, for example, the appearances of things which reach us through the senses reveal either directly or by reliable inference the objective existence of a material world, is a question to which, so far as I can see, both religion and its doctrinal interpretation can afford to rest completely indifferent. Berkeleian idealism may or may not be an error in epistemology, but it is at all events no theological heresy.² So with numerous other questions in debate among metaphysicians. Wherever, indeed, it is possible with safety to keep our theology clear of complication with purely philosophical debate, it seems to me wise to do so.

But it is not always possible, as the results of the Ritschlian experiment itself appear to me to

¹ *Theologie und Metaphysik*, 2nd ed., pp. 40, 41.

² This attitude of detachment does not extend, however, to the reality of the human spirit, as an essence distinct from the Divine. That religion presupposes. If our consciousness of personality be a delusion and our spirit-life nothing more than a mode in which God exists and acts, clearly free will as a source of action must go, and with it responsibility, and morality, and sin, and the need for reconciliation with God. Then no such real interaction between persons is possible as religion implies. At this point, therefore, pantheism becomes fatal to religion. But it is just at this point also that pantheism must always fail to justify itself as a theory of Being. On our experience of our personal power to originate moral acts and of our responsibility for doing so, pantheism is shattered.

show. Christian beliefs, as they reach us first from the historical revelation in Jesus, and as they are verified to us in personal experience, may perhaps be described in Ritschlian language as "judgments of value": meaning by that, that the Christian believer affirms them to be true because they are intellectually involved in what carries to him the highest certainty, namely, his own spiritual experience. But if the religious man may content himself with such a subjective "judgment," the theologian cannot. For theology is born of the irrepressible impulse of the mind to verify; that is, to test religious belief by its congruence with all the light or evidence which can be got from any other source, so as to give it the highest attainable validity. In other words, we are driven on as thinkers from the assurance of personal faith to seek, what is not indeed a higher degree of certainty than that, but a different kind of it, the certainty, so far as it can be reached, of scientific knowledge.

Since, therefore, there are ultimate presuppositions of our Christian faith which fall, as every ultimate truth must fall, within the sphere which philosophy claims for its own, the theologian must hear what philosophy has to say on these, and borrow from it whatever light it has to give. It is not from data of the reason that the theologian derives in

the first instance his acquaintance with God or with God's relations to the world as its original source of being or as the orderer of its final end. These things come to him first as data of religion, involved in experiences of the religious life. Yet any doctrine which he frames of origins or of purposed ends must involve certain propositions which are either ultimate truths of the reason or laws of thought, or which at least touch on transcendental problems that he cannot escape. Examples are plentiful. They concern the Divine existence itself—its modes of activity—its absoluteness—its personality—its relation to space and time, and its relation as First Cause to secondary causes. Or they concern the separate place and rights of the finite creature in its relation to the Divine, such as the freedom of human choice and its consistency with Divine determinism. All such implicates of religious faith, the theologian is bound to bring into harmony, if he can, with the results of sound philosophy. I do not know that as a theologian he can be required to do more than that. He is not called upon to fashion for himself a coherent or complete system of philosophy. It is enough for his purpose if he can claim that Christian doctrine is at no point contradicted by any assured truth of the reason, any more than by any assured fact of science.

CHAPTER II

GERM OF THE DOCTRINE

Theology as the science of Religion bears its own witness—no definition of Religion satisfactory—avenues to it from every part of human life—it seeks intercourse with the Unseen—which must be supposed possible—sense of dependence a primary fact in religious experience—what this implies—core of the doctrine is personal—its analogue in philosophy—Post-reformation form of the doctrine threefold—Origin and Maintenance causal relations—Control a teleological one—need for its re-casting—and for relating it to Christian Redemption—a reversion to the second century.

LEAVING on one side for the present both physical science and philosophy, with whatever aid they may afford to the theologian, let us ask what claims theology itself, as the scientific formulation of the Christian religion, can advance to make any contribution of its own towards a knowledge of Divine relations with the world and with man as a part of it. The boast of the Christian, that his is the absolute or perfect religion for man, need not here be discussed. It is enough that students of comparative religion, throughout Christendom at least, see in Christianity the highest form of religion yet known; so that,

whatever right religion in general as a vast department of human experience, widespread as man and more ancient than history, may have to witness to these relations, Christianity may be reckoned on to yield that witness in its best and most mature form.

A definition of Religion, compendious and at the same time completely satisfactory, though often essayed, is yet to seek. It is too large a phenomenon in human experience, too complex, keeping pace under countless shifting shapes with every stage in human progress, and entering as its most considerable factor into the life of every society, to be easily summarised in a definition. For this, one reason seems to be that Religion is a product, not of any single element in the manifold nature of man, but of every part of his being as a spiritual personality. If you must trace its origin to a need inherent in him (as its universal presence seems to attest), then that need is not only present in every man, it is the need of every part of him, not one need but many. Men have found their way to their religion along a crowd of avenues, approaching it from many sides. At one time through the sheer sense of feebleness or dread for the unknown, as a defence against the powers of nature, ghostly presences, or hostile tribes; at another in their need of support under

the shock of suffering, or of solace before the mystery of death. Now to satisfy a purely intellectual craving for some stable reality behind evanescent appearances ; again to answer their inborn sense of moral responsibility, lend superhuman sanction to duty, or vindicate outraged justice. If the failure of earthly goods to satisfy the heart has made some men religious, guilty tremblings have impelled others to propitiate an unseen Witness of their crime. In short, there lies an open road to this transcendent need of mankind from every side of human experience, lower or higher ; while, in its higher and highest forms, religion gives an answer to all his deeper wants, and sets its crown upon his whole experience of life.

One aim we surely can trace through all its manifestations, lending them unity. It is the hope, the endeavour, to establish intercourse with an Unseen Power, higher than himself, in Whose hands it lies to ban or bless man's life. One or manifold the Power may be supposed to be ; capricious or fateful ; friendly or malign. But the end remains the same under every cult, at every shrine—to come into direct and helpful relations with a Power superior to environing nature, a Power from which the utmost may be hoped or feared as the case may be, because from

it other things proceeded, or by it at least other things are controlled.

It is true that it is only in Christianity that a supreme conviction can be said to be reached by experience or to be verified on reliable grounds of reason and conscience, that this ancient aim of religious endeavour has at last been fully realised. The union of Divinity with Humanity, always sought after, has become complete, since God, partially known before, is beheld in the Incarnate, and man's trust in God has been raised by a new birth to filial assurance. But, although it is with the ultimate religion of Jesus that we must now deal if we would explore the relations between God and man's world, seeing it is idle to hark back from the best to inferior stages in the religious life of humanity ; yet even these, as comparative religion studies them, have their own conjoint testimony to bear. A fact of history, so enormous and significant as Religion, cannot be left out by any serious student of truth, or ignored in any inquiry into the supernatural behind nature or into any relations it may sustain, whether to natural phenomena or to the earthly life of man. To borrow some words from Herbert Spencer : "The universality of religious ideas, their independent evolution among different primitive races, and their great vitality, unite in showing that their

source must be deep-seated instead of superficial. In other words, we are obliged to admit that, if not supernaturally derived, as the majority contend, they must be derived out of human experiences, slowly accumulated and organised.”¹

No doubt in the forms which religion has assumed, it is not with Divine relations to man that we are directly dealing, or at first hand. It is with the other side of the intercourse betwixt those two—the outgoing of man’s life toward God. But then that would be impossible did he not first believe in an outgoing of God towards him. No religion on our side is thinkable, at least as a permanent phenomenon, save in response to a manifestation of Himself, real or supposed, on the side of God. The worshipper’s approach to the Divine in quest of satisfaction for his human need, be it higher or lower, is meaningless, unless there is supposed to be possible some access to man on the Divine side which may bring to the worshipper what he craves. And since the worshipper must contemplate some practical return on the part of God, and yet no form of religion has ever confessed itself mistaken (else would not men have ceased to be religious?), it is probable at least that on the whole men have found their invincible expectation to be justified.

¹ *First Principles*, 3rd ed., London, 1870, pp. 14, 15.

It is, of course, open to allege that in placing with such pathetic persistence their hope in a Superior Power, men have everywhere and always been the victims of a delusion. They may have counted on an imaginary Being as a factor in their earthly life—a Being who either did not exist at all, or did not in the least influence them in any way. In that case there would certainly lie no inference from what men have always believed about God to any actual relationship betwixt Him and them. But, in saying this, it must be remembered that you are pronouncing the complex wants of our whole nature out of which religion has grown, to be that most pathetic of all things—a colossal want for which the universe affords no supply. Man, the chief of creatures known to us, will be the only one left stranded in this bankruptcy of his deepest life. And what has lent to him his supremacy, and lifted him to his uttermost nobility, and proved the strongest of all forces in his social and moral progress, must be pronounced worse than an empty dream—a cruel delusion. Unless one is prepared to turn the highest aspects of human life in this way into mockery, it must be reasonable to conclude that some relationships exist on God's part towards man, such as are presupposed by the whole religious experience

of the human race from its rudest to its most mature development. From what men everywhere have believed to be a relationship of the Supreme to themselves, acting upon that relationship, and building on it their own religious attitude towards Him with the whole fabric of their worship—from that we are entitled to deduce affirmations concerning the Being behind nature and providence: a positive theology reposing on its own legitimate basis of faith and believing experience, and owing nothing at this stage either to philosophy or to natural science.

Nor do we need to travel far—a single step only—into the broad facts of religious faith and experience, before we encounter such a doctrine, or the germ at least of such a doctrine, concerning Creation and Providence. Among states of mind that can be termed religious at all, the most fundamental, and therefore the most frequent, is what Schleiermacher called “a sense of utter dependence” upon God (*das schlechthinige Abhängigkeitsgefühl*). It lies at the basis of every other pious act or state—this simple feeling of dependence. Nay, it is found in multitudes who betray scarcely another trace of religion. The rudest soul, at moments when a man realises his own feebleness, owns that in the last resort

his life lies in the hand of the Almighty. To that Unknown Power he turns in his extremity. In the pious whose habitual mood is summed up by the ancient verse: "He only is my Rock and my Salvation: my Defence; I shall not be moved"¹—in them this rudimentary feeling rises as occasion serves into a crowd of emotions:—gratitude for God's gifts, adoration of His goodness, submission to His appointments, reliance on His succour, devotion to His service, prayer for His guidance, hope in His mercy: variants every one of them on this keynote of entire dependence, yet together ranging the gamut of religious experience. Rudimentary at first, as I have called it, may be this mere sense of dependence, nevertheless it carries in its bosom "the promise and the potency" of a life hid in God that draws out of the Unseen its whole strength and blessedness.

Now, if this basal attitude of man's soul toward the Unseen Power is to be intellectually justified, what elementary relationship must God sustain to man and to man's world? It is not difficult to say. For higher reaches of spiritual experience, indeed, for such a confidential indwelling of man with God as devout Christians enjoy, closer and dearer relationships need to enter,

¹ Ps. lxii. 6.

such as Christianity itself has alone disclosed. But to sustain and warrant this primitive note common to men in every age, to justify their dependence upon a Superior Power for the utmost they can either hope for or fear at every serious conjuncture of their mortal existence, two truths at least are indispensable as presuppositions, and perhaps no more than two :

First, that of man himself, and of all else in his environing world which can affect him, the ultimate determining cause must be found in the power and will of One above him.

Second, that for man's future, be it what it may, his Maker must have a purpose which He is both able and willing to bring to pass ; so that in the light of His plan, nothing which befalls a man can be indifferent to the Author of his being.

A creature made for his Creator's ends, in short. No other form of dependence can be conceived so absolute as that. If in the past man, with the world of which he forms a member, has had in whole or in part any other Author than God, coming into being under the operation of forces which He did not initiate or could not control ; or if, being here, man drifts now like a thing of chance towards no fixed goal contemplated by his Maker, or is driven by a blind fate under

the play of powers which his Maker does not overrule: in either event his innate feeling of utter dependence on his God is a manifest delusion. The whole religious value, then, of the doctrine of Creation and Providence roots itself in this, that it furnishes a rational foundation for that sense of creaturely dependence which is itself fundamental in all religious experience. So read, Herder's words cease to be at all an exaggeration: "The thought of the Creator of the world is the most fruitful of all ideas in human life."¹

Here, then, lies deep in the religious instincts of man, the core of the related doctrines we are dealing with.

Since it is from this basal feeling theology sets out—of absolute personal dependence (or, in the best types of piety, of absolute personal reliance) upon the Almighty, it results that these two relationships on God's part, as it first discovers them, are no less personal. That is to say, they are, to begin with, relations of God to *me*. If on Him I depend, it is primarily because He is the Author and the Orderer of my own life. He made me; He is guiding me: these are what lie next to my experience; and only because the world is the environment of my little life, the terrible whole of which I form so tiny a portion,

¹ *Geist der hebräischen Poesie*, ii. 142.

and by whose urgent pitiless pressure upon me on every side I am incessantly affected, does it concern me as a religious being to know or to believe that He is no less the Maker and Orderer of the heavens and the earth.

There is, I think, some advantage in starting our doctrine here. Not with man considered as a mere part of the cosmos, or its product; but with each man as a personal spirit conscious of himself as distinct from nature and leading an inner life of thought, affection, and desire where he can come into contact with the unseen. That means, at any rate, to begin with what is nearest to us and most certain. For no one can be so sure of anything else as of his own personal existence. It is the one bit of reality about which no one can be sceptical. And it is with this inner self, so intimately and certainly known, that each man's sense of the Divine, of Another greater than himself, is ultimately wrapt up.

None the less, however, must that Other's relation to me as the Source and Guide of my inner experience broaden out under reflection till it covers the whole of nature. For from the outer world my personal experiences cannot for one moment be disentangled. Not even in thought can I lead a separate existence, since consciousness, as we know it, is inseparable from

the mechanism of the brain. Only through his organs of sense or of movement is a man able either to receive impressions or to execute volitions. Nor is it a small world only with which he has relations. From the whole of nature, not mundane merely, but out as far as to the remotest visible star, influences may at any moment reach him, which, whether they enter into consciousness or not, do at least affect his life, were it only to an infinitesimal degree. If, therefore, for mere private being and well-being one is to be dependent upon God alone, then must He be the Author and Controller of our whole world, nay, of the universe. If religion demands a doctrine of creation and providence at all, it cannot rest satisfied with any narrower or more provincial limits.

Let us recall for a moment, as we pass on, what form philosophy gives to this religious doctrine of the dependence of all things on God. It simply springs out of the familiar inability of the reason to rest in any contingent or mutable form of existence: its demand for the abiding or self-existent behind whatever is transitory—the unchangeable, behind all change. With the logical validity or value of the old inference *e contingentia mundi* as a proof for the Divine existence, or with the criticism to which from that point of

view it has been subjected, I am not here concerned. For my present purpose, it is sufficient that under the law of causation the mind is compelled to refer evanescent appearances to some Reality that endures. In the world as we know it, all is change and flux : nothing abides. Not we only, in the emergence, succession, and disappearance of our conscious life, but the ever varying world we inhabit, needs, if rational thought is to be satisfied, some Being that is and abides without beginning or end, because holding within itself the ground, not only of its own, but of every other existence. That enduring Reality behind phenomena which as a thinker man postulates, man as a religious being rests his trust upon and calls it God.

Not that, as a matter of fact, men have ever reached their earliest idea of God along any such process of speculative reasoning. But having once been taught to believe in Him by daily experience—its needs or its instincts—they come at a later stage, by reflecting upon their religious faith, to recognise in Him Whom they trust just that unchangeable and self-existent Reality which thought demands. Thus Christian theology reaches its doctrine of the Divine aseity and solity. God alone exists *a Se ipso*. He alone possesses absolute, necessary, and eternal Being. In this

doctrine of God the theologian finds the intellectual support which he needs for the religious man's conscious dependence on the Unseen. For since he, like all else that is not God, is ascertained to be contingent, mutable, and transient, it must follow that he derives his being ultimately from the sole self-existent One, finds in Him the ground or reason for his own existence, and cannot but hang from hour to hour dependent on His pleasure.

By post-reformation theologians this root-idea of dependence, given in religious experience, was developed under three particulars.¹

There was first dependence in respect of origin. In whatever way anything came into its actual state, its coming into being was ascribed to the will and power of God. But it was at once evident that this doctrine of origin assumed two shapes according to two methods of origination: creation which is immediate, out of nothing previously existing save God Himself; and creation by the refashioning, it may be after many intermediate stages, of what did in some form exist already. *Creatio prima* and *secunda* the schoolmen had called them: creation out of nothing or by *fiat* and creation by process, we

¹ See Note A, "The Protestant Doctrine of Creation."

may say. Of the latter alone have we any experience, and with it science deals. Of modern science it has been the task to discover such formative processes in ever wider fields and to push them ever farther back into the remote beginnings of our globe and even of the sidereal heavens; so that we are driven to ask what, if anything, is left that has not come into being by evolution? Had anything a temporal origin out of non-existence before evolution began? if so, what? And, because intellectual difficulties have always been felt to attend the temporal origin of matter, even when it was a dogma most surely believed, the modern theologian must further ask: Does religion need a doctrine of *ex nihilo* creation at all? As for the other method about which we have learnt so much, creation by process, the problem when we come to it will be, how to conceive of the relation of the Ultimate Cause that religion postulates to intermediate factors in the process?

The second relation of dependence affirmed by the older theology was that of conservation, maintenance, or upholding. The existence of the creature from moment to moment being, like its origin, contingent, not self-caused, must find the ground or reason for its continuance in the same will-power of God to which it owed its beginning.¹

¹ See Note E, "Continued Creation."

This involves, in opposition to philosophical deism, a ceaseless immanence in nature of the Divine Power. So understood it became a commonplace in Protestant theology, and even found a place, though in the briefest form, in most of the Protestant confessions of faith. Of recent years this doctrine of maintenance has gained a fresh content from the range which science gives to evolution. Divines who lived before the rise of the natural sciences and read the opening chapter of their Bible literally, understood the "six days" of creation to have embraced the entire creative process; so that what followed upon that could amount to nothing more than a bare upholding of the already created. On this point our view has been revolutionised within the last hundred years. While the origin of the world, if it had any, has receded behind our ken into an illimitably remote past, the work of fashioning our globe and peopling it with flora and fauna in a myriad successive forms has been a process, not of days, but of periods of incalculable duration; so that the upholding of it has meant at the same time its creation stage by stage. The power that has indwelt in Nature to sustain it in existence has been its gradual producer as well, originating fresh forms of existence all along its immeasurable history.

Nor has the maintenance doctrine gained in content only ; it has gained in importance. For with the acceptance by science of evolution through natural processes, there has not unnaturally come a revival of what I have named above "philosophical deism." It is what Calvin in his day termed the "frigid and jejune" conception of Nature as a machine set agoing long ago, but left ever since to go on to its end by its own inherent energy.¹ Such an abstract theory of the universe and of its relation to the Divine Being has been held at different periods by various schools of thought. It is consistent with a theistic faith in the origination of matter and in its original endowment with a sum of self-acting forces, in virtue of which it pursues its appointed course under the operation of second causes. But it calls for no further action of the First Cause. On this view there is at least a complete severance between Nature and the Divine Will during the world's history. It is by way of reaction against this practical elimination of God from His world that recent theology has had to lay increasing emphasis on the Divine Immanence in Nature as at once an Upholding and an Evolving Power.

The two relationships now spoken of—origin and maintenance—lie very close together, for

¹ *Institutio*, i. 16. 1.

they both fall under the common category of causation ; whereas the last to be named (although usually bracketed by older divines with the second) really belongs to a different category altogether, that of teleology. That the Creator had a purpose when He created man, and that He in some way directs or disposes all that happens so that His purpose shall at last be attained : this is teaching which, in spite of difficulties which envelop it, is so urgent a demand of faith in God that it is impossible to conceive of religion without it. But our modern knowledge of the world forbids us to take so limited or so fragmentary a view of the Divine plan as often contented our fathers. The providence we must make room for in our theology did not commence at the advent of man, for it is the carrying through of a purpose contemplated and prepared for since the origin of our globe, in the light of which all its pre-human changes need to be interpreted. Nor can it be restricted to specially important conjunctures in the individual life. For betwixt the most widely sundered facts and forces of the world, the greatest and the least alike, science has established an interaction so intimate that if any intended result whatever is to be attained, nothing must be overlooked, however minute, by the guiding Mind and purposive Will.

Many things, therefore, seem to summon us to a re-study of these familiar topics in traditional dogmatics. But perhaps the point at which the need for this has of late been most keenly felt is the interpretation of both creation and providence in the light of Christ's redemption. To some of us it seems as if the shape in which both these *loci* emerged from the hands of post-reformation divines went very little beyond that kernel of teaching which is common to every religious faith. The teaching of the New Testament, that it was through the Divine Word as the personal Revealer of Godhead all things were made, and that in the Incarnate Christ they subsist, and find both their point of union and their destined aim, ought to have more light to shed upon this difficult field than traditional theology discovered.

It is only of late that serious attempts have been made to christianize in this way our belief in God as Maker and Ruler of all, by linking it to our faith in Jesus Christ as man's Redeemer ; that so nature and history and redemption may be read as through and through one vast whole, the master light of which is Christ. Yet such a line of advance, though recent, does no more after all than resume after a long interval what the earliest generation of Christian thinkers began. It is curious to recall how the young faith of the Church

was confronted in the very infancy of its theology with an attempt, most unlike in form indeed, yet substantially akin to that of our own age, to hold asunder the work of world-formation from the Christian hope, as two things which have nothing to do with one another. It came in the second century.¹ The primitive Church had begun by taking over from its Hebrew cradle the Old Testament revelation, strange in the ears alike of popular polytheism and of Greek speculation, that one Father of all, unbeginning and self-existent, had for man's sake created all things out of nothing. To this great heritage from Jewish theology it had added only one new thought, namely, that the mediating link in creation had been no other than the Christ—Son and Word of the Father, Who for man's sake had also become Man. But we know how soon Christian thinkers were called to wage war in defence of this item in their still fluid creed, against speculations which under the name of "science" (gnosis) tore asunder both Christology and Soteriology from a spurious cosmogony. Some thanks at least we owe to the Gnostics that they first set the example of a scheme of the universe in which the course of cosmic development was summed up in a single aim, and in which that aim was the

¹ See Note B, "Gnosticism."

deliverance of souls from evil. Really it was from them, although it was through combat with them, that the early Fathers reached that profound and novel conception. But what rendered the Gnostic *Weltanschauung* intolerable to Christian thought was just its denial that the world owed its formation to the same supremely good Father of all to whom its deliverance by the Christ is due. About the Demiurge theory there was, it may be admitted, a superficial attractiveness. Was it not a temptation which we of the present day can understand, to cut the Christian hope clear at a stroke from all the difficulties which burden creation, especially from the shadow of imperfection and suffering that lies so heavy upon nature? Or have we no modern problems which might tempt us still to keep in separate compartments, if we could, our faith in science and our faith in the Gospel? Yet it will be remembered how energetically the Christian consciousness of the second century shook this temptation aside. Not simply because the Gnostic solution of the problem of evil contradicted reason or natural religion. No; but mainly because it severed the first creation from the second, robbed the Incarnate Son of His honour as Maker of all, and mutilated His saving work as the world's Restorer to its Divine ideal, the Consummator of its original

destiny. Gnosticism has been long since forgotten ; but we ought not to forget how their polemic against it led divines at that early date to discern the first outlines of a Christian interpretation of the cosmos—one which linked Creation, Providence, and Redemption into one whole of thought of which Christ is the Centre. That early conception theology has still to work out in so far as it can be worked out ; making clearer to us under the light of modern science the all-embracing counsel of Divine love and wisdom which opened when the morning stars sang together, and shall close only in the final triumph of the Kingdom of God.

CHAPTER III

TEMPORAL ORIGIN OF MATTER

Creation of matter *ex nihilo*—not learnt from science—finds support from philosophy—but not derived from it—either in West or East—came late in Hebrew theology—not taught in Genesis i.—later than Old Testament canon—accepted by the Church—Two difficulties—(1) Divine inaction previous to temporal creation—relief found in the doctrine of the Trinity—but eternal creation also a possible outlet—not an advisable one—(2) difficult to conceive of origin *ex nihilo*—not difficult to believe it—Divine will a real cause—and a sufficient one.

THAT what lay behind all cosmogonic or formative processes was neither an eternal matter nor a shapeless chaos, but an initial act of Divine Power, giving being to the substance of the universe with its essential properties, has long been an established tenet of Christian belief. But it is not a tenet easy of acceptance, nor was it easy to come by. Our first business, therefore, is to ask, Whence did the Church derive its belief in the temporal origin of matter as a creation out of nothing?

It was not learned, in the first instance, either from natural science or from philosophy.

Certainly not from science; for of the origin

of matter, it is hardly necessary to say, we can have no direct knowledge. Every thing we observe in the universe, organic or inorganic, has come into its actual condition through a very long series of past changes. These, as we have seen, it is the business of science to decipher and describe. When it shall have succeeded, if it ever do succeed, in tracing all changes back to the point where the series began, then it ought to have something reliable to tell us about the earliest or primary state of the physical universe, at least of our own globe. And already physicists have started theories respecting the origin of our solar system, and the constitution of matter itself, of which I shall have something to say in the next chapter. But of origins, strictly speaking, the sciences of observation and experiment can never tell us anything.

The case is different with philosophy. Ever since theologians undertook to set forth the rational thought which underlies a Christian's belief in this first article of his creed—the Divine origination of all things, they have been ready to borrow from philosophy its teaching on the fundamental contrast between God and the world as the contrast of self-existent and necessary Being with what is dependent or contingent. We learn from it, to begin with, that, if anything

whatever exists, reason requires us to say that Something must exist of itself, that is, must have within itself the ground or reason for its own un-originated being. What thus exists of itself must exist of necessity and eternally. And, since the ancient theory of dualism died out, it has been judged unphilosophical to postulate two self-existents where one will suffice. We are consequently driven to choose between eternal spirit or eternal matter as the ultimate ground of all existence; unless we imagine an unknown Something of which both the material and the spiritual alike can be assumed to be the un-originated forms or properties. But in the latter case, the monism we have reached would appear to be only apparent, concealing under it a real dualism. Practically, therefore, the choice for modern thinkers has lain between God and Matter.

When the materialist, therefore, affirms the eternity of matter alone, he must be understood to affirm of it, whether consciously or not, necessary self-existence. And when he goes on to find in it, or to deduce from it, the ground or reason for all that is, he must end by clothing it with some power of thought and of causation, that is, with rational and purposive will. Matter, in short, he ought in reason to endow with just such

attributes as the theist assigns to God as the Author of nature. But here he encounters this well-known difficulty, that the very conception which we must form of matter, with its relations both to space and to time, forbids our ascribing to it either infinity in the sense of boundlessness, or eternity in the sense of unchangeableness.

(a) As to the former ; in so far as the universe is material, it is extended in space, because it is made up of parts which lie outside or alongside one another. But whatever occupies space must be thought of as bounded. The universe known to the astronomer has indeed stretched so far beyond "the Heavens and the Earth" of the Hebrews, or the *τὰ πάντα* of Hellenistic writers, as to look in comparison like an infinity. Yet already some *savants* begin to speak of the sidereal universe as but an island after all in the abyss of space—a definitely bounded and numerable congeries of stars with their attendant planets, beyond the limits of which nothing is known to exist. Even if that be so, it does not follow that we have thus reached the limits of the material. Beyond this sidereal universe explored by our instruments, any number of similar universes may be imagined, one beyond another without end. No, not without end. Conceive of the material as indefinitely vast you may ; but

never as without limits, never as filling infinite space. Whereas spirit, which we do not conceive of as occupying space at all, cannot be contained in or bounded by it. The relation of the Infinite Spirit to space must simply be a negation of it as any limit to His dynamical presence; so that wherever matter is, there the power of His will is present: there, but also beyond it.

(*b*) In the next place, we know nothing of matter save as the seat of physical forces, and therefore as in incessant movement or change. Its successive states consequently lie outside of or alongside one another in time; are, in fact, what give us, not the measure only, but the very conception of time itself. Whereas of the self-existent our reason affirms eternity, meaning that of its being neither change nor succession can be predicated. Whatever carries within itself its own whole and sole cause of being must be thought of as at rest in immutable self-identity. God has no history from the standpoint of philosophy. Nevertheless, just as His creative action must relate itself to the "here" and "there" of space, so also to the "now" and "then" of time. With the hopeless problem thus created, how to connect this unchangeableness of the Divine self-existence with the vicissitudes of the creature, I am not here called upon to occupy

myself; except to recall that theology long ago took refuge for practical reasons in a single all-including will-act of the Eternal Mind, taking effect in time no doubt, yet embracing in one ceaseless, changeless moment, every creature with all their changeful history from end to end of the space they occupy and from end to end of the time they endure.

By metaphysical arguments of this sort theology may essay to vindicate before the bar of reason our religious confidence that the substance of the world took its origin in time from the will of God. But whatever support theology may legitimately borrow in this way from metaphysics, it was not from that source that religion first drew this belief. The dogma never sprang up in any school of philosophic thought, either of East or West. No Western thinker reached the conception of an absolute commencement for the world. "In Greek theology," to borrow the words of Mr. Farnell,¹ "the universe was not the work of a pre-existing divinity; but rather the divinities were themselves evolved out of the universe, or out of some physical element wrought upon by some physical impulse." From this entanglement of the gods with pre-existent matter no Greek thinker was quite able to liberate

¹ *Cults of Greek States*, i. 48, 49.

himself. Neither Plato nor Aristotle taught creation out of nothing. It followed that in Greece religious thought could never rise, as the Old Testament did, to the transcendence of the Divine Being over all that is not God, or to His perfect freedom in His dealings with the world. Something there always persisted as the pre-supposition of the cosmos ; something which the gods, not having created, could never wholly control.

Nor was Eastern speculation more friendly to a free and voluntary act of creation than the Greek, although its difficulty took a different shape. The favourite Oriental form of world-production has been emanation out of Absolute Being, but an emanation involuntary, or, at the least, inevitable. No doubt the dependence of the material world, for mere existence, on the Absolute Spirit is here recognised as it never was by Greek thinkers. Yet when the infinite depths of the Divine fulness are conceived to give forth by a necessary overflow all those successive forms of existence which people the universe,—each self-evolution of the Divine destined in the end to be re-absorbed in the nameless, unknown abyss from which it issued,—we are still as far as ever, if not from a transcendent Deity, at least from One Who freely

creates. The analogy which suggests this school of thought is probably at bottom a physical one. It pictures the Absolute Substance as streaming forth in nature after a material fashion ; not as acting voluntarily after a spiritual manner to give origin to what is not itself. Neither, therefore, in Eastern nor in Western speculation was there anything to anticipate or to parallel the Hebræo-Christian belief in a free personal Spirit by Whose self-moved act of will heaven and earth were called into being.

Neither, on the other hand, was this a spontaneous or invariable dictate of religious faith. Some doctrine of creation, indeed, some belief in a Framer and Orderer of the world, was involved, as I tried to show in last chapter, even in the most elementary feeling of religious dependence. And it may fairly be argued that men's dependence on the Object of their worship never could become quite complete or absolute, so long as they did not trace to one Almighty Hand the origin, not less than the fashioning, of all things. For that reason it might have been expected that the doctrine of creation, growing with the growth of religion itself, would arrive sooner or later at the absolute origination of all things, even of matter. It never did so, however, in any ethnic faith, as the history of religions shows. Left to

itself, no heathen religion, any more than any heathen philosophy, taught an origin *ex nihilo* by the mere will of God. It was on the soil of revelation alone that this new teaching sprang up. The result was that by neither Oriental nor Occidental faiths of the pagan type could man's religious sense of dependence upon the Creator be fully satisfied. Only in that highest type of religion which craves on man's part ethical union with the absolute Will on the basis of free, confident and loving fellowship with a Personal Father of our spirits, could the need arise for a Creator Who in His creative work has been likewise ethical and free.

Nor did even this need give rise to an explicit doctrine of creation out of nothing until the religion of revelation had reached an advanced stage. It came late even in Hebrew thought. Probably the majority of uncritical readers of the Old Testament have taken its opening sentence to teach the doctrine. But this never was a very secure exegesis of the famous words: "In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth." For one thing, even their grammatical relation to what succeeds is uncertain. Some have read them as protasis to the third verse, and rendered: "When God created the heavens and the earth . . . He said." Others suggest that

they may serve for a mere title, summing up the contents of the document. And even when we read them, as our version does, as a substantive affirmation (which on the whole is perhaps to be preferred), the Hebrew verb here used for creation does not require us to understand "out of nothing." It is often elsewhere employed of things which God originates from pre-existing materials.¹ Perhaps the strongest suggestion of absolute origin comes from the phrase with which the statement opens: "In the beginning"; yet a comparison with the parallel use of that phrase in such a passage as Isa. xlv. 10² warns us that it need not mean more than the moment when any subsequent history opened: in this case, opened with the cosmogony now to be described. At any rate the light recently shed on the first document of Genesis³ from Babylonian cosmogony satisfies modern scholars that its priestly author was not thinking of creation out of nothing. He has purged popular cosmogonic materials, indeed, of what was polytheistic and unhebraic; but he has not risen above—on the contrary, he begins with—the ancient assumption

¹ See, *e.g.*, Isa. xliii. 1, lxv. 18; Amos iv. 13.

² "I am God, and there is none like Me; declaring the end *from the beginning*, and from ancient times things that are not yet done."

³ Gen. i. 1–ii. 3.

of a primitive chaos of dark and waste waters over which brooded the Divine Breath to evolve this fair world we dwell in.

If the first verse of Genesis had expressly taught *ex nihilo* creation, it would have stood alone in that respect in the Old Testament. Gunkel has pointed out that in pre-exilian literature the doctrine of creation plays no great part in the religious consciousness of Israel, indeed next to no part at all. But our Genesis document is probably post-exilic, and it is true that during the Exile the creatorship of Jehovah did come to the front. Mainly it would seem through the great poet-prophet of that period, creation as a witness to the sole Deity of Jehovah became important in a monotheistic interest, and the doctrine grew immensely in its religious value.¹ It is true also that Isaiah's language, like that of Job and of the Nature-Psalms,² favours the idea that the origin, no less than the order and the maintenance, of the world, is rooted in the Divine will. It is in that full sense at least that we now read these passages. Still, even then the tenet of creation out of nothing nowhere receives express statement ; and it seems

¹ Isaiah, chiefly chaps. xl. and xlv. *passim* ; but cf. also xlii. 5, xlv. 24, xlviii. 13, li. 13, lxvi. 2.

² See Pss. viii. xxxiii. xcv. civ. cxlvii. cxlviii. Cf. Job xxxviii. 4 ff.

probable that this question of the eternity or non-eternity of matter had never clearly presented itself to the Hebrew mind till the second century before Christ. At all events the *ex nihilo* origin of all things first occurs quite unequivocally in Hebrew literature in the Second Book of Maccabees;¹ and at that late date it certainly was not yet accepted by all Jews, for the Book of Wisdom still gives us the old account of creation as wrought ἐξ ἀμόρφου ὕλης.² Even Philo did not accept the new view. In the New Testament it is taught by one writer,³ not in identical, but I think in equivalent phraseology, as a thing to be received by faith; and the author of the Apocalypse⁴ ascribes the mere existence of all things to the Divine will. It was in the Christian Church that it was to find its best welcome. Although there were exceptions even there, Athenagoras, for instance, and probably Justin,⁵ due to the influence of Greek thought, yet the majority of early Fathers and Apologists took over the idea of a beginning of matter by

¹ vii. 28 : γινῶναι ὅτι ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων ἐποίησα αὐτὰ ὁ θεός.

² xi. 18.

³ Heb. xi. 3.

⁴ Rev. iv. 11 : "for Thy pleasure they are and were created."

⁵ See Athenag. *Legatio*, cc. 10, 15, and 19; Justin, *Apol.* i. c. 59. If the *Cohortatio* be Justin's work, his own belief as a Christian must have gone further than he does in the *Apology*; as Semisch, Neander, and others thought (against Möller in his *Geschichte der Kosmologie*, etc., Halle, 1860).

Divine power,¹ till at length it became accepted teaching in the Church. So much so, that even Origen's speculation, not that matter is uncreated, but that creation itself is eternal, passed in the end for heretical.

The Christian Church has ever since understood our faith in God as requiring us to affirm that the original substance of all things was called into being out of nothing; but there are two difficulties which have haunted theological thought in its attempt to conceive of this doctrine.

1. The first of these which early began to trouble Christian thinkers concerned the temporal origin of the world. Men asked, What occupied Divine activity in the eternity that went before, or was God inactive till He made the world? Some, like Irenæus, with his sober and devout temper, put the question aside as rash, if not irreverent.² "The answer" (said he) "lies with God Himself." By the Reformers, too, the inquiry was castigated as an impious desire to transcend the limits of knowledge appointed for our profit. Thus Calvin quotes from Augustine

¹ Cf., for example, the words of Hermas : *ποίησας ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ εἶναι τὰ πάντα* (ii. 1). And Theophilus in sending to his friend Autolycus an account of the Mosaic creation, opens it by saying : "God made all things of nothing ; for nothing was coeval with God" (*Ad Autol.* c. 10).

² *Contra Hæres.* ii. 28. 3.

with approval the reply of a certain good old man who answered some that asked what God was doing before He made the world: "Preparing a hell for the inquisitive."¹ With this one may compare the scornful jest with which Luther is said to have brushed aside the same inquiry: "He was in the birch-wood, cutting a rod for impertinent questions." More speculative minds, however, like Origen's had long faced the question; and it led him to assume an eternal or unbeginning activity of God in creating successive worlds, on the ground that the Divine nature must be eternally self-determined to create for the manifestation of its own perfections.² In the eleventh book of the *De Civitate*, Augustine discusses Origen's solution, and rejects it in favour of his own theory that time has no existence apart from the succession of changes in things created.³ So long as this speculation obtained, as it did with the bulk of the Schoolmen, the difficulty ceased to trouble.

But Christian theology hardly needs to take refuge from an unprofitable inquiry in questionable metaphysics. Granting that we cannot think of the Eternal as ever inactive as to His will any more than as to His thought, we have

¹ *Institutio*, I. xiv. 1.

² *De Princ.* iii. 5. 3.

³ *De Civitate Dei*, xi. 4-6.

no need to assume an eternal activity at world-making in order to supply an object for the ceaseless outflow of Divine volition. The Christian revelation of a mysterious fellowship within the Divine Being Itself, leaves no blank eternity of inaction, such as a theist has upon his hands. No outside universe is called for to furnish an object either for Divine thought or Divine love. Heavy as the burden is which is laid on dogmatics by the mystery of the Holy Trinity, and little as we are yet able to construe a consciousness in God which is triple and yet one, it does render the Divine Life ere the world was more intelligible than the naked monotheism of Judaism or of Islam. For it no longer sets before us an absolute solitude. The threefold life can be reverently believed to be adequate for itself. An immobile self-contemplating ego might well appear, in the absence of all creatures, to lack the conditions requisite for the highest intellectual and moral life. But if the Most High essentially exists in eternal differentiation from Himself by immanent processes, then even when alone He has never been simply single. The created can be no necessity for Him. Thought can circulate through an undivided Three Who share each other's consciousness ; and the Breath of love can pass to and fro.

What ineffable satisfaction may lie in such Divine interchange of blissful communion cannot even be conjectured; only one's mind rests in such interaction as in a fellowship of intelligence, affection, and volition sufficient for itself, while as yet there was nothing save the Triune alone.

Should this mode of relief be set aside, as, of course, it must be by all who reject the Christian Trinity, and should the old difficulty which Theism finds in a sudden and (as it seems) an unmotivated interruption at a given date to the everlasting solitude of Deity be felt by any to be insuperable, I am not aware that an eternal act of creation necessarily contradicts either Scripture or the religious consciousness. It was perceived by some medieval thinkers that the kernel of the creation doctrine is independent of time altogether. Everything which can be called essential for religious faith in the Creator is this: that the existence of whatever is and is not God has its sole cause or ground of being in God. Grant that, and the pious sense of entire dependence upon the Almighty is justified. Now, that is secured equally well by an eternal act of will as by a temporal beginning. Whether the will of the Eternal has been thus eternally active or not, producing an eternally existent creation, is a

question which, as Thomas Aquinas said, reason cannot decide. "Mundum incoepisse est credibile, non autem demonstrabile vel scibile."¹ In the present attitude of physical science this may not be without its importance. Some physicists of our time are pushing what is termed the "indestructibility of matter" backwards as well as forwards, alleging that, although the processes of evolution and dissolution now in progress, whether in our solar system or elsewhere in the stellar universe, probably had a beginning and seem destined to have an end, yet the mere matter of the universe never came into being, nor can ever pass out of it. Such a sweeping affirmation obviously goes beyond science. It may at bottom be intended to say no more than this, that physical science is aware of no cause in nature competent either to originate or to terminate the existence of a single atom—adding to or subtracting from the mass of matter in the known universe. So much at least science is within its rights in affirming; it is no more indeed than a confession of ignorance; and the so-called "indestructibility of matter" ought not to be taken to imply more. For, of any other cause, above nature or beyond it, adequate either to begin or to close the existence of anything, it

¹ *Summa*, B. I. Q. 46, art. 2.

is obvious that science, having no experience of it, can affirm or deny nothing. Still, if the supposition, sometimes rashly asserted in the name of science, should be true, that there is no time limit to the existence of the universe, either before or after, religion could receive such teaching with equanimity, so long as the ground for the world's eternal existence were not ascribed to the world itself. A self-made or self-caused universe of matter would, probably, either be quite independent of the will of the Deity, or at the very least would prescribe to Him the conditions and the manner of His acting upon it. That would infringe on the absoluteness of our religious trust in Him. But the religious consciousness is not impaired by an unbeginning world which has always found in His will the source and the ground of its derived and contingent existence.

Nevertheless we shall do well, I think, to cling till better advised to the old-fashioned doctrine of our creed that all things did have a beginning ; that there was a time when nothing was save God. For, if the temporal origin of matter be not essential to faith, yet it is, as Aquinas made haste to add, highly helpful to it : “ *Id credere maxime expedit.* ” The reason is that to most men the alternative of an eternal creation imperils their sense of the Divine freedom in creating. What

is eternal we instinctively associate with necessary being. It is quite true that these are not logical correlates. We should not be compelled to think of a creative will in God as necessary, even if we supposed it to be eternally operative. Yet it certainly would make it less easy for the mind to hold fast its sense of the Creator's absolute freedom ; whereas when we conceive of the Divine Power in the usual way as not always exerted to create, but as choosing (as we put it) its own time to act, calling into being at a given moment what was not there before, we do get rid of every suggestion of unfreedom. The creative act stands out then before our thought as a deed of wonder-working power wrought at the mere pleasure or free choice of the Almighty Worker. With less than this the Christian consciousness of God in His relationship to us cannot content itself. To be our God in the full Christian sense, He must be, and must remain, Lord of us and of all things. In order to sustain a religious attitude of absolute dependence, what divines term Divine Sovereignty is indispensable. And sovereign He is, first and last, only if He was not constrained to create at all, any more than to create what He did, either by anything outside of Himself, or even by anything within Himself ; but acted then, as

always, at His own sole and free choice, for reasons to be sought (if we dare seek for them at all) within His own nature and purposes. Nor can He remain sovereign if anything that is made lays any fetter upon Him. The same religious need requires us to believe that what He freely made at first, He freely upholds from moment to moment, retaining unlesened the power to unmake or to alter and remake. He must remain Master over His own handiwork. True : the nature which He has chosen to confer upon any creature, He is bound, as we reverently say, by His own perfection to respect, so long as He keeps it in being. But such a limitation is self-chosen—prescribed to Himself by Himself. None the less, for the maintenance or for the unmaking of the creature, just as for its making at the first, does His will remain free—moved only by His own perfect wisdom and love.

2. This doctrine of temporal origin by a free act of will brings sharply into view the second difficulty to which I referred. It is the difficulty which the mind experiences in conceiving how anything can begin to be where nothing was before. This has been a peculiarly persistent difficulty. I dwelt upon the history of our doctrine to show how persistent it has been.

The late appearance of the Hebræo-Christian doctrine, together with the efforts of earlier thinkers to escape from the idea of absolute commencement,—witness, for example, the watery chaos of primitive cosmogonies, the derivation of all things by Greek sages from the elements of water or fire, the atomic theory of Democritus, the *ἕλη* of Plato,—all prove how reluctant the human mind has been to admit an origin for the substance of the world. Even in the Christian schools of the Middle Ages this intellectual difficulty was still felt. Pressed by the time-worn axiom, *ex nihilo nihil fit*, Schoolmen fastened on the ambiguity in the phrase *ex nihilo*. They had recourse to the refinement of a sense of *nihil* which fell short of absolute nonentity. *Nihil privativum* they called it: that which is not in any proper sense a “thing,” endued with qualities like actual matter, yet for all that has being of a sort. Their refinement recalls the Platonic *ἕλη*; but there can be no such standing-ground between something and nothing.

Are we, then, entitled to say, reviving the old difficulty — that the beginning of matter is “unthinkable”? It is certainly true that of such an origin, as of all origins whatever, we can frame no mental representation, simply because we have had no experience of it. In that sense

it is "inconceivable." But a new occurrence, which we have never observed, is neither unthinkable nor incredible so long as we know of a possible cause for it which is both true and sufficient to produce it. Were creation an absolute and uncaused commencement of being, it would be unthinkable. It is very far from that. If we are compelled (as Herbert Spencer allows) to trace every change to a First Cause which precedes all change and is independent of it, then we can very well think of creation in terms of reason, although we cannot represent it to our imagination in terms of experience. It has its precedent Cause. It is, in fact, merely the emergence into actuality of what must always have lain in the Eternal Mind as to its idea, and, as to its potentiality, in the Eternal Purpose.

In ascribing the origin of matter to a Divine act of will, we are certainly not taking refuge in any unreal or imaginary cause. Personal will is not only a *vera causa*—it is the only cause we know. Most recent thinkers, with Mr. Spencer himself,¹ concede that we derive our conception of power—in other words, of any effective cause—solely from the conscious exertion of our own will. By volition alone do we find ourselves able to do anything—that is, to initiate any change,

¹ *First Principles*, p. 186.

whether in our own mental states of attention or in the muscles of our bodies. The very idea of "force" seems to be given us by our experience of effects wrought through the effort of our will to overcome resistance. It follows that we cannot so much as conceive of any absolute commencement of change save as due to the act of some one's will. The laws which limit our thinking, therefore, constrain us to refer the furthest back beginning of all change in the universe to the will of a self-acting Cause which we call God.

This alleged cause of creation *ex nihilo* is then a true cause : is it likewise a sufficient one? May we reasonably credit a spiritual act of will with power to call things out of nothingness? The mode in which mind acts by volition upon matter so as to originate change in it, is indeed an ultimate mystery : but it is no whit less unknown in our own case, of which we are conscious, than in the supposed case of the Divine Mind. We understand just as little how we contract a muscle by willing to do so, as how the Almighty can will a world into existence. Only we do know by experience that we can do the one ; and we infer that it is not impossible He should do the other. The analogy, however, breaks down at one point ; and it is precisely the point where creation out of nothing presents the peculiar difficulty we are

considering. Any physical effect which we can produce by our own will-power alters merely the arrangement of existent matter or the direction of its forces. That we can do this makes it less hard to imagine the Divine Will likewise setting in motion the masses, or letting loose the forces, of a world already there. But our experience furnishes not the faintest analogy that will assist us to imagine how Divine volition operated upon nothingness, to call into being what was not there before. This is precisely where our want of experience has always operated to make creation out of nothing, intellectually inconceivable. Theologians have consequently owned that no other act which we ascribe to the Almighty is so entirely His unshared prerogative, none oppresses our mind with such a feeling of amazement, as the origination of a new being. Nevertheless, it cannot be irrational to credit the Infinite with such a power. For the very conception which we frame of infinity begins by stripping off those limitations of which we are aware in ourselves. Here must those words apply which Jesus Himself once used in another connection: "The things which are impossible with men are possible with God."¹ Theology can push its teaching on this subject no further

¹ Luke xviii. 27.

back than to its own revealed doctrine of God. God it knows in Christ, not as the Absolute Being of some philosophies, naked and sterile, an abstraction empty of attributes and out of all relationship, immobile therefore, and inactive; but, on the contrary, as absolute Life, the fulness of all possible potencies and potential energies, which He is at all times free to put forth in action or to withhold from acting, at the pleasure of His sovereign wisdom and love. There is a sense indeed in which we may speak in Neoplatonic language of an abyss of Being, transcending thought, a profound and unsearchable background of existence from which all things proceed: only, instead of viewing it, like the Neoplatonists, as a blank vacuity of mere Being of which nothing save that it exists can be predicated, the Christian faith thinks of it as the intensive infinity of such Personal or Spiritual Life as we possess some small experience of in ourselves. Even to us as personal beings, gifted with volition, are some few things possible. With Him are all the possibilities of being; and to the possible He hath given, wherever it hath pleased Him, but only there, a real existence.

CHAPTER IV

MATTER IN ITS PRIMITIVE STATE

A question for the physicist—three hypotheses in debate—
(1) Nebular theory—Spencer's use of it—mass and energy
already present—possibly successive worlds—(2) The Ether—
reason for assuming it—different from matter—its extent—
(3) Atomic theory—how far modified by recent discoveries—
Kinetic theory of matter—its relation to the ether—Kelvin's
vortex rings—energy antecedent to processes.

WHAT was it that God created out of nothing when the material universe, as we know it, first began to be evolved? Can we tell?

In that initial act by which primordial material was called into being, must not much more have been originated than bare existence? For it is not possible to think of existence at all save as the existence of something, or to conceive of substance as devoid of properties. Along with the creation of matter, therefore, we must assume certain properties, either essential to it, or requisite for the changes it was destined to undergo, to have been likewise created, or, as the Schoolmen preferred to say, "concreated." Can we then form any conception of that primi-

tive matter as it existed fresh from the creative *fiat*, before any thing known to us had been fashioned from it—previous, that is to say, to the beginning of that immeasurable process of change through which the universe has reached its present form? The question is one for science; for, although it cannot tell how primeval matter came to be, yet it may succeed, as I already remarked, in tracing the nature-process so far back towards its starting-point as to tell us something, either of the primitive condition of our own globe when its history opened, or of the constitution and properties essential to matter itself.

These are, in fact, questions with which physicists are at present keenly occupied. But that very circumstance, while it may inspire hope for the future, renders it extremely difficult as yet to draw from science the help one seeks on this subject. Research is still only at the stage of more or less probable hypotheses, rather than of ascertained results. And these hypotheses are themselves in debate, undergoing modification or correction almost from day to day. The utmost that at present science has to say on the subject we shall probably learn if we recall, as far as my imperfect knowledge permits me to do, three of its boldest and best-known

hypotheses :—the nebular origin of the solar system ; the theory of a luminiferous ether ; and the constitution of the atom, on which opinion has been undergoing modification since the recent discovery of radio-activity.

1. Among the numerous faintly luminous bodies which astronomers group under the general name of “nebulæ,” are some which, from their being thus far irresolvable into star-clusters, are presumed to be matter in a highly diffused or gaseous condition. This supposition long since lent itself to a fascinating hypothesis as to the formation of our solar system. Suggested at first by Laplace in order to explain why the planets revolve in a uniform direction, it was later utilized by Sir William Herschel to account for the up-keep of the sun’s heat in spite of incessant radiation. The hypothesis, although probably insusceptible of proof either by calculation or by observation, is, we are assured, uncontradicted so far by any known fact. Hence it furnished Herbert Spencer with a welcome scientific point of departure in building up his scheme of inorganic evolution. Yet it did not go nearly far enough for his purpose. He was driven to imagine earlier stages in the differentiation of matter, preceding

its nebulous condition, going back ultimately to a state of mere homogeneity. But science, so far as I know, extends no encouragement to this modern Spencerian substitute for chaos; for it knows nothing of matter in a homogeneous or "indefinite" or undifferentiated condition.¹

Further back, then, in the history of world-formation than the nebula, science is at present unable to go. It leaves us with the matter of which sun and planets are now composed, volatilized indeed and undistributed as yet into solid globes, mere "fire-mist," incandescent dust or vapour, yet in respect of its mass and also of its sum of energy, practically what it still is. Mass and energy are the two things which physical science accepts as the unchanging factors in the universe; and both of these, so far as our system is concerned, were already there. Its sum of energy began mainly in the form of heat, but capable as it cooled of transformation under the known laws of thermodynamics. Gravitation was already acting under Newton's well-known laws, for that was requisite to explain the rotation of the nebulous mass around its centre of gravity, and the orbits

¹ Cf. Chapman, *Preorganic Evolution and the Biblical Conception of God*. Edinburgh, 1891.

described by the fragments successively thrown off. And the molecules which were destined to form elementary bodies or to combine into compound ones under molecular or chemical forces, must have already been present, if as yet uncombined. In short, if at this point in the far-off past we reach the original condition of the world we know, that behind which lay no creation by process, only by *fiat*, then we must say that the Almighty conferred on it at its very inception all those physical elements and forces and laws of motion and methods of change which we know to have made its subsequent evolution possible. The material is given; the stored-up energy is in action: with such data the work of world-building is ready to commence.

Let us not forget, however, that what we have reached, were this hypothesis correct, is not, as some suppose, the date of the world's creation, or any proof even that it ever had a beginning at all, but merely the formation of the present solar system to which our own globe belongs. We may be justified in saying that suns and planetary systems have their history, which opens when their store of heat is all unspent and must end when that has been wholly dissipated, as one day it must be. But astronomy can at least suggest

how a fresh store of energy may be generated in a worn-out world by the impact of mighty orbs. The theory of successive cycles of world-formation and world-dissolution is not merely a possible one—it may have some sidereal facts to suggest it. Matter may have entered into the composition of many worlds in the course of an immeasurable past. That it is not eternal does not therefore seem so assured a result of physical science as some have taken it to be. What appears to me a surer position is found, not in static, but in dynamic phenomena—in the constant presence of energy and movement; for of energy and movement we know no other cause, certainly no other ultimate or original cause, than the will of a Self-Existent and All-present Worker.

2. The next large hypothesis with which recent science operates is that of an elastic medium for the transmission of energy from one region of space to another. As its name of “Ether” is Greek, so from Greece came the earliest suggestion, under the impression that “nature abhors a vacuum,” that space is not a void but a *plenum*. The ether of modern science, however, has been assumed for a different reason, purely to serve the function of transmitting energy across space. No sooner had Newton discovered the universal

attraction which bodies have for one another, than the difficulty was felt of their exerting such a pull where they were not, across void intervening spaces.¹ This already led Newton himself to conjecture that there might be some subtler medium than air, pervading all bodies yet offering next to no resistance, by which both light and heat are conveyed.² But it was only after the long hesitation of scientists betwixt a corpuscular and an undulatory theory of light closed with the final victory of the latter, that some rare and elastic substance pervading space, by whose vibrations rays of light might travel, became an irresistible inference. Set in motion, by whatever means, as intermolecular undulations in the luminous body itself, we can only suppose light³ to be transmitted through corresponding undulations, occasioning stress in some elastic medium. More recently, the same, if not another, ether-medium has by some been burdened with the further task of conveying not only "the tremendous forces of gravitation," but likewise electro-

¹ That assumes, of course, that the "pull" is a real force inherent in matter itself and nowhere else : an assumption which, I should think, the best modern physicists would hesitate to make any use of as a premiss in argument.

² Quoted by Sir Oliver Lodge in the "Introduction" to his *Ether of Space* (London and New York, 1909).

³ "Light" means here, of course, not the sensation of vision, which we often call by that name, but the cause of the sensation.

magnetic movements, the speed of which is the same as that of light. The supposition that both light and electricity produce elastic strain in the same medium has, of course, stimulated research into the relations between the two, by raising the question whether light be not itself an electro-magnetic phenomenon. Into this field, however, it would only be safe for an expert to venture.¹

Although this unknown and hypothetical substance does not receive from scientists the name of "matter," because (*a*) it does not behave like ordinary matter in any of its recognised states; (*b*) because it is conceived to be imponderable, structureless, and uniform; because (*c*) it is everywhere where light can penetrate, pervading at least all transparent bodies, if not also opaque ones; and (*d*) because it is not known to impede the movement of the heavenly bodies;—yet, peculiar as its properties are, we can only speak of it as in some sort material, for it may have mass, as well as elasticity and inertia.

Remembering now the distances which divide us from the remotest of the fixed stars from which it brings us light, imagination is baffled by a substance of such inconceivable extent. Light travels at a speed of nearly 186,000 miles in a

¹ See Lodge, *op. cit.* pp. 5-12.

second; yet the distance which it takes a whole year to traverse—the so-called “light-year”—is a mere unit of measurement in the hands of the astronomer when he would compute the vast distances in our sidereal heavens. Nor need we limit the extension of ether even to the stellar universe, vast as it is. If the starry heaven we see be after all, as is suggested, but a single group of orbs with definite configuration and boundaries, it may not, as I have said, be the only one of the kind in existence. Let thought place itself, as in an instant it can do, at the remotest star whose ray has yet reached us, and at once thought must pass beyond to a remoter, undiscovered infinite of space, within whose depths other sidereal universes than ours may lie, and where, if there be light at all, we must suppose there still is ether to transmit it.¹ A *plenum* that is literally boundless, as some men of science are supposing, it is hard to credit. Yet, if there be anywhere an end to this ether-ocean at all, then, according to the late Lord Kelvin, science has to face the no less difficult alternative of supposing bounds set to it like an enclosing vessel.

¹ Sir Oliver Lodge takes ether to be “a perfect *continuum*, an absolute *plenum*,” of uniform and very great density everywhere, far greater than that of any matter, because it is “without break or intermittence of any kind; while the latter has gaps in it.” *Op. cit.* pp. 87-92.

This ether hypothesis, then, if it be established past question, presents us with a singular product of creative power, long unsuspected, one of the most important, as it may well have been one of the oldest. In Clerk Maxwell's words, interstellar ether is the "largest and probably most uniform body of which we have any knowledge." Compared to the space which it occupies, the whole matter in the known universe is in quantity, so we are told, almost infinitesimal. If anything material was original, it was. Yet, while science can assign to it neither limit nor origin, religious faith must count it, like every other material thing, for a creature of the Almighty's will, called into being, if not earlier, at least then when light first had its birth.

3. We come, lastly, upon an old problem to which at this moment the efforts of physicists are afresh directed—the ultimate constitution of matter. Recent years have modified profoundly the venerable theory called the "atomic"; the theory which goes back historically to Democritus and Epicurus, and of which the revival by Gassendi as a basis for nature-study became of supreme importance after it was made by Dalton the foundation of chemistry. Recent research, indeed, does not seem to have affected as yet the

inter-atomic combinations with which the chemist has to deal. If we take the points of the theory essential for his purposes to be these two,—first, that matter is neither continuous nor capable of indefinite division, but is built up of extremely minute discrete particles called “atoms”; and second, that each of the seventy or more elementary bodies by the combination of which in constant proportions of their weight, according to the known laws of chemical affinity, every compound substance is built up, possesses an atom of its own kind, differing from the rest in weight or other properties,—then so far the theory can still be said to hold its ground. What is changed is the view which science has lately been led to take of the internal constitution of the “atom” itself. We used to be told that it is a homogeneous unit, solid and impenetrable, which could neither be resolved nor destroyed. Such units might well appear to religious faith, as they did, for example, to Newton, to be a primary creation of God. None of these properties, however, is any longer ascribed to them. In each atom, science now bids us see a system of bodies very much smaller than itself, kept in intense and ceaseless movement by electric energy. “Electrons,”¹

¹ That is, extremely minute corpuscles carrying a negative charge and in constant vibration.

we are told, are incessantly revolving with great velocity within the atom, like so many planets in a miniature solar system. The "electron," therefore, a particle vastly more minute than the atom, becomes for science the unit of matter.

It is true that the kinetic or electrical theory of matter is as yet young and not fully worked out. When the physicist's acquaintance with positive charges of electricity shall be as far advanced as his acquaintance with negative ones already is, we may possibly understand better the interior movements and behaviour of the atom.¹ But one thing seems already clear. Such a system of electrically charged particles in energetic motion cannot be supposed to be as stable as the solid homogeneous atom used to be taken to be. Consequently one is not surprised to learn from the phenomena of radio-activity that some atoms at least are neither stable nor unalterable.² Most people are now aware of the general fact that a small group of elements are in a state of slow

¹ If the atom contain negative corpuscles in rapid motion, it must have an equal charge of positive ; but of this little if anything is yet known. Sir J. J. Thomson has suggested that the negative corpuscles may be in movement within a sphere of uniformly distributed positive electricity. Further light is to be looked for, from day to day.

² Mackower, *The Radio-active Substances*. Lond. 1908 (International Science Series). Solly, *The Interpretation of Radium*. London, 1909.

disintegration of their atoms. They are found spontaneously to expend prodigious energy in emitting streams of minute particles of their own substance which are charged with electricity. And, further, the same elements undergo actual transformation into other substances possessing a similar property.

This replacing of a static by a dynamic view of matter is sufficiently startling. But the problem which just now excites most interest is the obscure connection suspected to exist between matter and the ether. An impetus in this field of research was given by Lord Kelvin's well-known theory of ether vortices. Assuming the ether to be a perfect fluid in which separate centres of whirling motion were somehow set up, it was found that such rings or gyrating portions of an elastic fluid could acquire a stability of their own, distinct from the rest of the fluid. It has not yet been shown that all the usual properties of ponderable matter can be acquired in this way, but the line of investigation thus opened up is being prosecuted with vigour. Kelvin's suggestion of vortex-rings did not presuppose any electrical charge; but Sir Joseph Larmor of Cambridge, who defends an atomic view of electricity, infers that the ultimate atom of electricity is one aspect at least of the ultimate atom of matter, and would relate

both of them to centres of permanent strain pertaining to the ether.¹

In all this, of course, much remains to be cleared up, and the situation shifts almost from day to day. Meanwhile we may note the changed positions in which the present trend of physics is placing both matter (considered as "mass") and energy. These, of course, are the two data—besides ether the only two data—which science asks for in order to trace and describe every process of change in the inorganic world. These, therefore, as things stand, are all that religious faith is entitled to ascribe, not to creation by process, but prior to that, to an original creation out of nothing. Now, while the ultimate constitution of one of them, matter, has been afresh opened up for inquiry, and its possible origin is under investigation—it may even prove to be a product of the ether—the part played by energy on the other hand, I mean, by force in action doing measurable work, gains ever greater importance in the eyes of science. Everything, as Heraclitus said so long ago, is in motion; kinetic problems threaten to swallow up all others: and since the various forms of 'energy' are found to be convertible into one another, it

¹ Larmor, *Æther and Matter*. Cambr. 1900. See also Lodge, *op. cit.*

follows that the sum-total of energy in the universe admits of being regarded as one. Call it in its totality a single effect, and it is reasonable to ascribe it to a single cause. Refer it to the only kind of cause of which we have immediate experience—a personal Will: and what is there to forbid theology from describing the dawn of creation as simply the earliest moment when a Divine act of will began to set in movement that sum of energy which ever since, under various forms and according to fixed methods, has never ceased to move the whole of inorganic nature?

Whether, in some such way as this, the borderline between the first creation of matter out of nothing and all subsequent creations of the inorganic through evolutionary processes become a vanishing line or not, it is certain that what the first act of creation gives us is no more than a beginning of the Creator's work. Along this line we reach nothing more than a bare framework of matter, instinct with energies of various kinds—the material merely of a cosmos, and yet enclosing potentially all that is to be evolved from it. On this lowest stage or plane of being, atoms and molecules of elementary matter, the power of the Divine Worker was yet to rear higher storeys—of chemical combinations, of living

organisms, of sentient animals, of mind and self-conscious spirit, in ever ascending order. So far from being the whole of creation, what was first made was but its earliest commencement—the opening act in a mighty drama. Yet the point is to be noted here, that, so far as the history of our globe has yet gone, it is this material inorganic platform which has supported and conditioned all the rest. Other phenomena have entered in (as I shall have to say in next chapter), for which the energy of inorganic matter has not hitherto been found an adequate explanation; yet at no point, so far as we know, does the world in its advance escape from its base, or man himself throw off his close dependence on the material. Through all the after march of His working, whether through creative process, or moral providence, or redemptive grace, God has remained faithful to the things first called into being, employing matter and material energies in the service of higher, even of spiritual, results, and respecting, while He transcends them, the limitations set by His original act of creation.

If the earliest impression, therefore, which the pious mind receives from the opening act which we call “creation out of nothing,” be one of amazement at the Creator’s power, the second must be one of admiration at His wisdom. So

far, at least, as mechanical, chemical, electrical, forces go, every need of the future cosmos was foreseen and provided for in its first creation. That inchoate, as yet undeveloped, world of ether, matter, energy, physical science finds enough : a world ready to unfold into a cosmos ; furnished with its needful variety of elements, capable of the requisite permutations or combinations, and charged, to begin with, with hidden stores of energy sufficient to fashion through countless æons all the physical wonders of the cosmos that was to be. Although new forces might be added when called for, no abolition, no readjustment of the old has ever since been called for, so far as we are aware ; no addition to the sum either of matter or of energy, nor any abrogation of those laws which from the first imposed limits upon material change or prescribed its methods.

CHAPTER V

DYNAMIC UBIQUITY

Revolution wrought by natural science—methods of creation to be surrendered to it—First Document in Genesis—true canon for interpreting it and all Scripture—leaves its religious authority intact—The Bible teaches effective ubiquity of Divine Will—how it guards both transcendence and immanence—the Word and the Spirit—Alternative ways of relating Divine Will-Power to material forces—Recent tendency to emphasize the Will—Schopenhauer and Spencer.

IN the course of last century a revolution passed over men's thoughts on the subject of creation. It was so unexpected that it has wrought more widely and destructively upon religious faith than in sober logic it ought ever to have done. For the change really affected nothing more vital than the methods of the Creator's work. By lifting the veil which had concealed the past history of our globe, science revealed to us a creative process, vastly more prolonged, continuous, and comprehensive in its operation than any one had previously suspected. The manner of that process, physical and biological, it is obviously the proper task, as it is the boast, of

the natural sciences to investigate. If, therefore, devout faith in the Creator is to be intellectually justified, theology ought to begin by surrendering to science this whole field of creative methods, and by a frank acceptance of its revelations in that field. With the manner in which it has pleased the Author of nature to carry forward His activity, we have as theologians no direct concern, just as little as the scientist as such can have anything to say of a Power above nature. That the Worker Who hides Himself behind His works is to be approached and known along one line of human experience, and the manner of His working to be learnt along another line; that the one is for the theologian to study and the other for the scientist; and that these two, while friendly in collaboration and in the exchange of their results, can never, if true to their respective tasks, meet in hostile collision: these are propositions on which I trust we are all by this time agreed; for only by such a "riding of the marches" can their long unnatural feud be composed.

The misfortune was that centuries before the rise of a real science of nature, theologians had encroached upon the unoccupied domain. John of Damascus set an ill example, which Western divines followed, by treating under the head

“Of creation” the natures and properties of things created, sweeping, in fact, into the ample range of divinity things terrestrial as well as celestial. This obliteration of the frontier between religion and science placed under the sanction of the Church many inaccurate notions about the world entertained by unscientific observers : such, for example, as that the earth is flat, not globular ; or that round it as a centre the sun revolves. To preconceptions of this class inspired Scripture was believed to lend its unquestioned authority. So long as divines took the first chapter of Genesis for a literal history of creation which Moses had received by direct revelation from God, theology could not be free to receive the testimony of the young sciences when they began to reveal through what age-long processes the earth with its flora and fauna had been gradually brought into its actual condition. It was not surprising that none of the ingenious attempts made, over a generation ago, to establish agreement between the new-found facts and the document as so interpreted proved satisfactory. Of course, it is unreasonable to impute this to theologians for a reproach.¹ The traditional

¹ As was done forty years ago in elaborate works like Draper's *Conflict between Religion and Science* (1874), or White's *History of the Warfare of Science with Theology* (2 vols. 1876).

exegesis had been the obvious one at the time of its introduction, long prior to the beginnings of inductive science. No one at that date, theologian or naturalist, knew enough of the world we live in to correct so natural a reading of the inspired text. From this difficulty the acceptance by modern scholarship of a different origin for the document has freed the theologian. As the work of a comparatively late writer who made use of a traditional Semitic cosmogony which he found current in Israel for the purpose of teaching religious truth in a monotheistic interest, we no longer expect to find in it the result of nineteenth-century research, and our concern with it is limited to the religious ideas which it was the writer's purpose to convey.¹

This is in harmony with sound views as to revelation in general, its purpose and its growth, as these are now received by the best interpreters. We may lay it down as well understood that the design of Divine revelation never could have been to communicate scientific information in advance of what men had found out for themselves. The sacred writers were not ahead of their contemporaries in profane knowledge, nor did they need to be so. Writing for people in a

¹ See Note D, "Interpretation of Genesis i."

pre-scientific period, they were obliged, if they would be understood, to employ the conceptions and the language then current with respect to natural phenomena. All their references to such phenomena are therefore popular, not scientific. The one thing which they professed to do, and were exceptionally gifted with Divine illumination for doing, was to teach their countrymen religious truths, called for from time to time for the confirmation or the purifying of their faith in God.¹

In agreement with this accepted rule of revelation, there is no attempt in Genesis at a scientific classification of natural phenomena. The writer's standpoint is that of an untrained observer. The objects which went to make up his visible world are simply taken in their obvious order and by their obvious divisions. The contrasts with which the first three days deal, of daylight and darkness, of cloudy sky and earth's surface, of salt sea and green land, are just those which strike the most primitive spectator of natural landscape. Answering to these, the second three form a

¹ This canon for the interpretation of Scripture is far from new. Reusch in his *Bibel und Natur* (4 Aufl., Bonn, 1876) cited statements to the same effect from the Schoolmen. Peter Lombard, for example, says: "In Holy Writ man is not instructed about things of that sort [knowledge of natural objects], but about that knowledge of the soul which he lost by sin" (B. II. Dist. 23); and Aquinas, "Secundum opinionem populi loquitur Scriptura" (I. 2, Q. 98).

parallel series. The lights which by day or night cross the face of the overarching sky are treated as they serve man's use for illumination and for time-measures, with no thought of their astronomical character. The distribution into classes of both vegetables and animals is that simple arrangement by habitat and general appearance which is found in the speech of every people before the rise of science, "a common-sense classification," as Romanes observed, "having reference merely to external appearances and habits of life."¹

What the chapter offers us is in form an archaic geogony. To the Hebrew, as to the ancient world in general, the habitable earth with the tent-like sky overarching it, and the encircling sea, and the gloomy Hades lying beneath, formed the universe beyond which his thoughts did not travel. Its human interest as man's home was to him the predominant, almost the exclusive, one; and the religious scope of the document is to teach that it was God alone Who prepared the earth and peopled it to be a fit dwelling-place for man. On the question which science puts: by what steps it had been prepared for human habitation out of its primeval state, he had only traditional tales to tell, derived more or less

¹ *Darwin and after Darwin*, i. 23, 24.

remotely from very ancient sources mainly Babylonian. But as he possessed no better information, so he felt little concern. It is even with a certain surprise that one notes how already the method of creation by progressive stages was admitted. It had been usual for ancient cosmogonies on which he founded to represent the earth as reaching its present condition through a gradual process, receiving both its form and its occupants by successive acts of creation. The succession was viewed as on the whole one of advance from lower to higher organisms, man being always, of course, the highest as well as the latest. This strikes the modern as a curious anticipation of science. One is struck no less with the recognition by the sacred writer of the part played by secondary causes. Things already created are represented as giving rise—no doubt at the creative *fiat*—to new forms of life. Thus the earth brings forth grass and herbs; the waters swarm with marine creatures; and from the land also spring the beasts of the field. The distribution of this process into six days so as to connect the Divine Sabbath-keeping with the law of the seventh-day rest, is probably a Hebrew addition. For be the earlier stages what they might, the sacred writer's interest culminates in man, whose

alternate times of work and rest were regarded as a humble imitation or shadowing-forth of his Creator's own method. His motive is throughout a religious one, and his religious teaching centred in this, that every creature came into being by the will of God, and is, in its place and for its use, "good," because it fills the place and fulfils the use assigned to it in His mighty plan.

This Divine process of world-making which Hebrew thought, ignorant of nature, thus gathered up into half a dozen creative moments, comprised within a week, science has of late drawn out before our eyes into immeasurable ages. Only now have men begun to spell out its stages or its methods. But the ancient Hebrews with their Christian successors might be right for all that in saying that, while the process had its natural evolution of which they knew next to nothing, it had no less a supernatural origin, of which they professed to know a good deal. If it really had two sides—a Worker behind nature as well as a nature through which He worked, then their unavoidable ignorance of the one need not discredit what prophets and apostles said of the other. For the experiences of the religious life which, under exceptionally favourable conditions, that is, as we believe, under special inspiration of God, guided them to expert knowledge on the

one factor in the process, had nothing whatever in common with those observations and experiments which have given to the modern scientist his expert acquaintance with the other. Hence we are entirely within our rights, as I conceive, if, accepting the discoveries of science within its own province, as a study of Divine methods, we also embrace what Hebrew and Christian records affirm of Divine Authorship.

Now, when the evidence of both Testaments is considered, the kernel of their teaching must be found in the effective energy of the Divine Will as the ultimate force continually at work throughout the entire series of natural changes. That applies both to the introduction in the past of new forms of matter, organic or inorganic, and also to the incessant reproduction of life in the organic world by which fresh individuals are born. The doctrine is one which satisfies the religious instinct in the interest of which it is put forward; for it sets man's life, like all other life, in ceaseless contact with the life of God, leaves us in close dependence on His will, and so furnishes a reason for our worship in prayer and grateful praise. And it responds to the philosophic craving after unity, by resuming all forces under a single Force, or at least running back every nearer cause of

change—if such there be—into one ultimate Cause. But it can traverse no known fact of science; for in withdrawing from the observation of the scientist the Power behind the facts, it leaves the facts themselves exactly where science finds them.

What is important, however, for religion, is that this persistent activity of Divine Power in nature be so conceived as to safeguard the continued transcendence of God over the world, while recognising the immanence of His presence and of His action within it. Otherwise it is evident that this relation of immanence might drag us back, as it has often done, to the old pagan extreme which confounded the very life of Deity with the reproductive and self-evolving life of nature. For the religious value of the doctrine it is essential that justice be done to both — to a transcendence which shuts out pantheism as well as to an immanence which shuts out deism.

The mode by which the former is attained in Holy Writ is the anthropomorphic metaphor of God's Word or Speech. For this carries the idea of a free utterance of intelligent and purposive volition on the Creator's part. Language furnishes no other metaphor equally expressive when we would represent to thought the original calling of the material of the world out of non-existence.

It is therefore significant that it is repeated as often as any fresh step in the subsequent process is referred to. "God said: Let there be light." He also said: "Let the waters be gathered together"; "let the earth bring forth grass"; and so on. It is a standing formula to introduce each fresh act. That is to say, there is not a step in the process but is conceived as a result of free and intelligent volition. Pantheistic emanation or any unconscious and inevitable process is shut out. Other Scripture references to the subject lay frequent emphasis on the same idea, and in the same way. For example: "By the Word of the Lord were the heavens made";¹ "He commanded, and they were created."² It certainly never passed over into the Personal Word till we reach St. Paul or St. John; but it formed part of the long preparation for the Logos doctrine.

It is in connection, on the other hand, with the immanence of God, a connection almost equally close, that Scripture employs a second intermediary or instrument of the Divine Power. The "Spirit," that is, Breath or Wind, of God is a metaphor just as boldly anthropomorphic as His "Speech." Perhaps it was originally conceived of after human analogy as the actual seat of the

¹ Ps. xxxiii. 6.

² Ps. cxlviii. 5.

Divine life. At all events, it came to be by the forth-breathing of His own life-breath that Jehovah was described as communicating life, physical or mental, to the creatures. Not life only, however. Recall how, in the opening narrative of Genesis, it is introduced at the earliest inception of change from chaos to order; and in the fortieth chapter of Isaiah¹ we have an allusion—perhaps a unique one—to the “Spirit of Jehovah” in connection with the distribution of matter by measure and by weight. I do not know that in the New Testament any similar allusions occur to the Spirit’s action on creation. There that earlier office has been thrust back out of sight by the surpassing importance of the work of the Third Person in the “new creation” of the redeemed. But the abiding presence in the world of God’s immanent power which this figure expressed to the Hebrews had not been forgotten. Quite in the tone of ancient piety, St. Paul told the Athenians, in order to enforce his lesson of the nearness of God to man, that “in Him we live and move and have our being.”² It is the classic

¹ Vers. 12, 13: “Who hath measured the waters in the hollow of His hand, and meted out heaven with the span, and comprehended the dust of the earth in a measure, and weighed the mountains in scales, and the hills in a balance? Who hath directed the Spirit of the Lord, or being His counsellor hath taught Him?”

² Acts xvii. 28.

utterance on the subject. It does not say, or mean, that in us God lives and moves and has His being, as pantheism puts it; reducing the creature to a mode of Divine manifestation or self-realisation. Conversely rather, God is viewed as the environment, or life element, or (as Chrysostom expressed it, retaining the metaphor) the "atmosphere" in which human life moves and on which it is dependent.¹ What is thus affirmed of men must hold no less of whatever creature either lives or moves or even exists. Nor need we be deterred by the spectre of pantheism from doing justice to such teaching: since the transcendence of Him in Whom we have our being has been secured by the companion truth that He giveth "to all, life and breath and all things," and that He is no other than the Incarnate Son our Lord Who "bears up all things by the word of His power," and in Whom "all things consist."²

¹ Calvin's comment deserves to be read: "Atque ideo Sese a creaturis omnibus Deus Ipse nomine Jehovæ separat, ut sciamus propriè loquendo Ipsum esse solum; nos vero in Eo subsistere, quatenus Suo nos Spiritû vegetat et sustinet. Nam per omnes mundi partes diffusa est vis Spiritus, quæ tueatur eas in suo statu. Cœlo et terræ vigorem quem cernimus, animantium etiam motum suppetit. Non qualiter phrenetici homines deorum plena esse omnia nugantur—imo lapides esse deos. Sed quia admirabili Spiritûs Sui vigore et instinctu Deus quæcunque ex nihilo condidit, conservat."

² Heb. i. 3; Col. i. 17.

Here, then, we sum up the final teaching of Holy Writ on the relation of God to world-processes of every kind. It is a relation of dynamic ubiquity ; a ceaseless operative presence at every place in the universe. Its effectiveness is expressed on one side by His transcendent Word as a free utterance of His will-power ; on another, by His indwelling Spirit as an immanent life-giving energy.

The exact relation of this Divine will-power as ultimate cause of change to those so-called "forces" in nature which we think of as proximate or secondary causes, cannot be in every case the same. It is, no doubt, a characteristic, common to every instance of creation by process, that the new is produced by means of the old. That is to say, Divine power operates through nature in the production of fresh forms, by utilizing its forces and in harmony with its laws. Behind that veil its own working is concealed, to be believed in, not beheld. But when, in the course of its long history, the creative process advanced to ever higher stages, from dead matter to living organisms, from plant-life devoid of volition to animals that possess wills, conscious and motivated, yet not free, finally, to the human sphere of moral action

with deliberate choice betwixt good and evil,—it is obvious that the manner of the Divine co-operation must have varied, because at each step it will adapt itself to the nature and capacity of the creature.

Confining our attention for the present to the first case,—that of inorganic matter,—theology has two ways of conceiving of the relationship of Divine immanence to the material world from which to choose: either of which, so far as I can judge, religious faith may accept with safety.

1. It has been usual to suppose that matter was endued at its origin with inherent “forces,” not simply in the modern sense of “energy” as computed in terms of work done, but as actually effective causes, producing change. By such forces as mechanical attraction and repulsion, chemical affinity, heat, light, electricity, and so on, it has been common to account for the whole series of changes that has taken place in the substance of the globe since its first creation, and even in organized matter as the physical basis of life and of mind. On that assumption, these changes would be, not merely preceded by given ascertainable conditions as antecedents in a sequence, but really brought about by power inherent in matter itself. Of late scientists have

been realizing that this assumption, either of several correlated forces or of a single one into which they are convertible, is a metaphysical theory which goes beyond the scope of scientific investigation. The best representatives of science confess, I think, that of any such force or forces, they know, and can know, nothing at all. They are consequently avoiding as far as practicable the use of such phraseology in spite of its convenience. It does not follow, however, that such inherent powers may not have been conferred on matter, though we cannot observe them and may even experience a difficulty in conceiving of them. It is therefore open to the theologian, if he please, to continue to assume them as at least vehicles for the Divine causation or instruments by which God works; although in that case the immanent power would probably be restricted to maintaining these natural forces in their orderly operation. Given such maintenance only, or conservation, the rest would follow.¹

2. There is another alternative, however. Rejecting the theory of any causative power bestowed on matter, we may simplify the doctrine by at once referring all motion and change of motion among its molecules and its

¹ See Note J, "Second Causes."

masses to an immediate exertion of the Divine will-power. This would, of course, obviate the difficulty which the mind experiences in its effort to think of dead atoms and masses as charged with any real power of causation. It would refer every change to the only kind of cause of which we have personal experience, namely, the will of a personal agent. And it would respect the law of parsimony by eliminating secondary causes as really uncalled for. The result would be the same as on the ordinary view, since the Divine Worker must be supposed to observe in His working the uniform methods and sequences which He Himself has laid down for the order of nature. He acts, on that theory, precisely as the forces of nature are supposed to act. Only He Himself takes their place. He *is* the force of nature. It is this alternative to which James Martineau gave expression in these words: "However wide the sweep and durable the continuance of the laws of physical change, they are entrusted with no causality of their own, but are only the modes of the Divine action. The whole external universe, then (external, I mean, to self-conscious beings), we unreservedly surrender to the indwelling will of which it is the organised expression."

It does not seem, as I have said, to make any difference to our religious dependence upon God which theory theology adopts, a mediate or an immediate action of the Divine Will upon nature. Taken either way, this doctrine of an omnipresent Will operative in every part of the world, as in the one case the ultimate, in the other the sole, cause of all its changes, falls in with a recent trend in speculative thought. The notable attempt of Schopenhauer¹ to interpret the unknown force in terms of will, as a blind inevitable striving, not necessarily guided, according to him, by conscious motives, yet found obscurely in all nature wherever forces act, was significant, I think, of a wider tendency to lay greater stress than heretofore upon the practical or conative element in human nature. There has been a disposition to transfer to will some of the emphasis which previous philosophies down to Hegel had been laying almost exclusively upon pure thought. Schopenhauer's mistake in holding idea and will apart, his failure, in other words, "to grasp the rationality of the will that is in the universe,"² was corrected by his follower, von Hartmann.³

¹ *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*. English translation by Haldane and Kemp, 4th edition, London, 1896.

² Caldwell, *Schopenhauer's System in its philosophical Significance*, 1896, p. 431.

³ *Philosophie des Unbewussten*. English translation by Coupland, London, 1884.

But by adhering to the root theory of a will which, though it realizes a rational purpose, remains blind and unconscious, because devoid of personality, von Hartmann was still unfaithful to that side of human experience from which both these thinkers professed to set out. If it be from our own experience as willing subjects that we are to set out in trying to interpret the Power that works behind all things, then let us be true to our own best and highest experience as willing subjects. And that is certainly not blind unconscious striving after unknown results, not "purposive action without consciousness of the purpose," which is von Hartmann's definition of animal instinct. Granting that in man, as in other animals, there are instinctive volitions, yet those are not what is properly characteristic of the human will. What we really know of our own will is that it is conscious as well as rational, foreseeing as well as purposive, free and guided in its deliberation by motives, appreciative of ethical values and morally bound to choose the best. If we are to reason from what is in our own nature at all in hope to construe the Absolute Subject That wills the universe, then it is reasonable to reason, not from what we have in common with the brutes, but from what is best and highest in our experi-

ence. In a truncated anthropomorphism like von Hartmann's, which borrows from our spiritual experience a rational will, yet refuses to take along with that either personal consciousness or freedom of choice, although both of these are given to us in the same experience, it is impossible that thought can rest satisfied.

Herbert Spencer's system is very unlike that of the pessimistic school just referred to ; yet he also may be cited as a thinker who finds will as the force at the heart of nature. Although the epistemology which he learnt from Hamilton and Mansel obliged him to pronounce the ultimate Power in the universe to be "unknowable" in the strict sense of knowledge, meaning by that, inconceivable under the limitations of the human mind, yet he held its existence to be a necessary datum of consciousness ; and he deduced it from our own volition as the only force of which we possess immediate knowledge. As theologians, therefore, we shall be in the line of much modern speculation if we hold the immanent will of the Supreme, or His dynamic ubiquity, to have been the ultimate cause of every formative process in the evolution of the inorganic world.

CHAPTER VI

LIFE AND SENTIENT LIFE

Three breaks in creative process—I. Life not accounted for by dead matter—can we assume immediate action of Divine Power?—no new substance or energy discoverable in living matter—new phenomena—The hypothesis of Organic Evolution—its difficulties—how Darwin's "continuous variation" theory affected design—more recent study in variations—design not dependent on Divine methods—II. Sentience—Frontier between plant and animal—consciousness in animals difficult to study—the animal "soul"—its origin unknown—how far involved in nature.

THERE are, so far as I am aware, three moments and no more in the long ascent of creation by process, where science encounters, not a gap, rather a break, a sudden rise of level, across which the process of change cannot at present be traced. In each instance, phenomena of a new order enter, which existing material forces are, so far as known, inadequate to account for. From the point of view of Christian faith, this means that the personal Will, which we believe to be the true cause behind all phenomena, began at this point to operate in a new way, either by fresh forces, or, at any rate, along a fresh method—thus

interrupting the process only to lift it up to a higher plane on which it was thereafter to proceed.

These moments are the first appearance (1) of organized life, (2) of sentient life, and (3) of personal life.

I. When from inorganic we pass to organic nature, we encounter, along with new sets of phenomena, fresh problems. Chief among these are two: the origin of life itself, and the origin of living species. To these the Will which we believe to be immanent in the world can be conceived to relate itself somewhat differently.

(a) As to the former, few words may suffice. Life has existed on the globe ever since the deposition of the Cambrian rocks, yet its origin remains for science an unsolved mystery. Every attempt to derive living from non-living matter, which has been tested, has been discredited. So far as I am aware, Huxley's words still express the opinion of biologists: "The present state of knowledge furnishes us with no link between the living and the not-living."¹ Nor has the suggestion of its importation from other worlds fared better: neither Lord Kelvin's suggestion that a meteorite might have carried a germ, nor the

¹ Art. "Biology," in *Ency. Brit.*, 9th ed.

more recent one advocated by Arrhenius of Stockholm, that minute seeds may be projected beyond the attraction of their native planet and retain their vitality across interstellar spaces.¹ Either, were it possible, would but push the problem of origin further back.

The biologist having thus to accept a beginning which he confesses himself at present unable to account for, the theologian is entitled to assume, at least provisionally, that here the Divine will acted immediately, not mediately, to initiate something new. Only he has, I think, to bear two things in mind. For one thing, he has to keep an open mind to the possibility that fresh research may some day succeed in discovering a process through which Divine power may have acted. That is to say, the new may have been introduced by way of process, although we have failed so far to detect the manner of its introduction. And next he must remember that, even if the act of power was really an immediate one, it was not a creation of any new entity out of nothing. The creative process has moved upward to a higher plane, but it has not forsaken the old. The same substance and the same energy are still present. Every living creature is a mechanism or structure

¹ *Worlds in the Making*, by Svante Arrhenius. New York, 1908. Chap. viii.

built up of the same elements as inorganic objects. The chemist can imitate in his laboratory the exact composition of protoplasm, although he cannot make it live. Moreover, the same forces, both mechanical and chemical, continue in operation in living as in dead matter; and no fresh forms of energy can be detected. Hence biologists, as a rule, refuse any longer to speak of a "vital force," because, when life ceases, there is no peculiar or otherwise unknown form of energy found to remain that can be resolved into other modes of action. If, then, neither substance nor energy has been created, additional to what existed before, what is it that has begun to be? Simply a complex group of new changes which are never found in inorganic or dead matter.¹ The unique chemical composition of protoplasm, for example; the formation, division, and differentiation of cells; the phenomena of nutrition by assimilation of foreign substances; the elimination of waste products; strangest of all, the propagation of life by giving off portions of the living which in their turn run an independent existence through the same cycle of changes.

¹ "The growth of the embryo from the fertilized cell is a process of chemical and physical forces, but so co-ordinated, regulated, and adaptive, that no analogue is found in inanimate nature" (J. Arthur Thomson, *Heredity*, chap. xiii.).

There is much more than this, of course; but these are specimens of phenomena accompanying what we term "life" that are characteristic and invariable, hitherto unexplained. They demand some effective producing cause; and that we are at liberty to find, in the absence of any imaginary force called "life," in the immanent will of the Author of life.

(b) Once living matter has been somehow brought into existence, the modern hypothesis of "organic evolution" bids us assume that every form of plant or animal has been derived from it through one or more long series of generations according to a law of uninterrupted descent. In other words, the theologian is asked to see in them all, not immediate, but mediate creation, just as in the evolution of the inorganic world. I do not see why he need scruple, in the interests of religion, to do so. This fundamental assumption has been accepted as a postulate by biologists since Darwin, not because it has been thoroughly demonstrated, for it is probably incapable of strict proof, but because it is a highly probable inference from a large number of observed facts, and is receiving growing confirmation from advancing knowledge. That is all that any scientific hypothesis requires in order to be provisionally

accepted as a guide to further research. It has therefore displaced for the present, and probably for ever, the former theory of a separate creation for each species, the limits of which were believed to be divided by impassible barriers. Science is here so completely on its own ground and within its rights, that theologians are bound, as I conceive, to accept at its hands the new view, as once they accepted the old.

At the same time this does not imply, either that there are no unresolved difficulties outstanding, or that the way in which species originate has been exhaustively ascertained. Difficulties remain which from the first were obvious: like the missing links in the geologic record, or the usual infertility of hybrids, or the extreme rarity with which, if at all, the rise of a species can be observed, or the stability of certain very ancient forms of life. These difficulties are said to be gradually losing their weight; and that is as much as need be claimed for any hypothesis. But the inquiries of science into the problem are so far from finished that they may be said to be only beginning. Lineal descent through an ancestry going back to the origin of life, turns on two contrasted groups of facts in heredity: the one—that on the whole “like tends to beget like”; the other, that within limits variation

constantly occurs in the offspring. But the latter group at least has received as yet scant attention ; and the whole question of heredity bristles with rival theories. Fresh schools of opinion are constantly being started. All this, of course, is a matter for the scientist. The theologian can do no more than stand by to take note of results ; in particular, of the increasing number of ascertained results into which the hypothesis will fit, so as to justify biologists, as time goes on, in proceeding upon it with added confidence as a "true hypothesis." It certainly need awaken no misgiving in any one who believes in a Divine activity behind nature, that its processes in the evolution of organisms, as in other departments, should turn out to have been slow and gradual, or brought about by natural methods.

It is quite another question, on which opinions greatly differ, whether natural selection through survival of the fittest be the sole cause for this rise of new species, or even play the preponderant part in the process which the earlier Darwinians assigned to it. Now, what most closely touched theology half a century ago when Darwinism was young, was its alleged bearing on those evidences for design which it had been customary to draw from the adaptation of living creatures to their functions and environment. The old belief of

the naturalist in a special creation of each species, with its adaptation to its habitat and mode of life, so to say, ready-made, had rendered it easy for the apologist of theism in the eighteenth century to read on every hand, as we all know he did, marks of creative purpose. What seemed now to substitute chance for design was not the central doctrine of a continuous descent of life; it was the way in which, in the course of that descent, new forms were supposed to have come about. Mr. Darwin assumed that individual variations in the offspring were indefinitely numerous in every direction, were all accidental or fortuitous, and for the most part were quite minute; so that out of the total number those only were suffered to persist and to accumulate which happened to favour their possessor in the struggle for existence. It was an assumption which greatly handicapped the theory of evolution. For it not only asked for an enormous length of time; it was met by two serious objections. The one, that during the whole time which any favourable minute variation took to attain such a degree of perfection as rendered it of material service for survival, it could afford the creature little or no advantage over its competitors. The other was the difficulty of explaining a harmonious variation in those different parts

of an organism which need to combine or be co-adapted in order to yield any effective or helpful change of structure.¹ But the assumption itself was made because, as Darwin himself said, "our ignorance of the laws of variation is profound." It is only since his day that the subject has been seriously attacked. The nature and limits of variation as it actually occurs in nature have begun to be carefully observed; and a school, represented by Mr. William Bateson,² De Vries, and others, is discrediting the "continuous variation" to which Darwin trusted, in favour of the abrupt occurrence of "discontinuous variations," which at once or at a leap confer on the individual a better chance, and tend at once to become stable. This view is also favoured, I believe, by one of the most recent exponents of heredity—Professor J. A. Thomson.³ Why there should be in certain organisms a predisposition to such sudden "mutations" or "sports," we do not know; nor what laws, if any, determine their occurrence. Their chance of persistence also is undetermined.

¹ Both difficulties were urged by Herbert Spencer in his articles in the *Contemporary Review* for February and March 1893.

² Wm. Bateson, *Materials for the Study of Variation*, 1894. Also his more recent work, *Mendel's Principles of Heredity*, Cambridge, 1909.

³ *Heredity*, by J. Arthur Thomson. London, 1908. (Progressive Science Series.)

On the one hand, Abbot Mendel's experiments on the crossing of contrasted variations have suggested a reason why when they occur they should persist, and not be at once swamped (as Darwin supposed they would be) by intercrossing. But, on the other hand, statistics on human variation point, according to Mr. Galton, to a rule of "regression" in a generation or two to the normal type. In the meantime, biologists are still sharply divided over the larger question which August Weismann brought to the front, whether (as Lamarck supposed) permanent individual modifications during the lifetime, either acquired by use and disuse of organs or induced by altered environment, can or can not act upon the germ-cells so as to modify inheritance. The issue of this question also must, of course, materially affect the bearing of variations upon descent. So materially, that Spencer did not hesitate to say: "Either there has been inheritance of acquired characters, or there has been no evolution."¹ If it be true, therefore, that in "variation" lies the secret of the origin of species, then its laws have still to be sought for. While the investigation proceeds, it is premature to conclude that every variation is either fortuitous

¹ *Contemporary Review* for March 1893 (see Weismann's reply in the September number).

or inevitable, lying in either case beyond the adjustments of a purposive Will.¹

But the truth is that our confidence in a purpose pervading and guiding creation throughout its incalculable eras, is not dependent on any particular method of the Creator's working. As little would it be threatened should it turn out that special instances of adaptation, such as those to which the older apologists restricted their attention, had been brought about through the operation of natural causes. It is an inference to which the mind is led by the course of nature as a whole; as one linked and coherent scheme, all whose parts fit together and hang upon one another, a scheme which is on the whole progressive and governed everywhere by order and law. Modern study of nature has enormously strengthened this general conclusion by making the cosmos in all its parts more intelligible to the human mind, by emphasizing its tendency to culminate in a rational and worthy result, and by binding all its parts through their long history into a unity. To this result evolution has been a powerful contributor. The effect of its teaching that almost certainly things were not separately created in groups or unconnected parcels, but

¹ Cf. F. C. S. Schiller, art. "Darwinism and Design," in *Contemporary Review* for June 1897.

were evolved out of one another by a discoverable process, has simply been to compel us to take a wider survey of the plan as a whole. The intention to accomplish in the end a rational result is not made less, but more, impressive, when we find that it had to be reached through many intermediate steps. A human contriver, who in taking the first step toward his design is making a second possible, and then a third, or a great number, all equally called for as conducive to the end-result, displays intention no less than if he accomplished it at a single stroke ; he only displays skill and foresight more. When science, therefore, is able to demonstrate the need there was for each link in the vast chain of being if the cosmos was to be evolved, it suggests purpose far more strikingly than the former atomistic kind of special design could do. So much the vaster becomes the range of the Worker Who through almost endless æons has caused to unfold from furthest-off beginnings a single coherent system. By so much is its testimony more emphatic to His all-embracing intelligence, the long foresight of His plan, the patient persistency of His operations, and the simplicity and harmony of His methods. Every day we are learning at the lips of science how leisurely and tenacious our God is as a Worker, as well as how methodical ;

sparing, too, in the use of means; doing little *per saltum*, and nothing by a sheer word of might which can be effected through a wise employment of the creature. This is the lesson of creation by process.

II. The first appearance of organic life upon the globe was probably surpassed, if not for the wonder of it, at least for its ultimate issues, by the next step upward in creation: I mean the advent of sentient life. For that was the earliest dawn of conscious mind. A beginning was made which, after slow ages and as the close of a very long series, was to lead up to the advent of Man.

All origins are nature's secret. Here also the secret was well kept. The frontier between plant and animal, it is well known, has long been wearing thinner and less distinct to the eye of the naturalist. Some recent botanists have proposed to overstep it altogether by the suggestion that certain phenomena of plant life bear so striking an analogy to psychic phenomena, such as association, memory, and habit, that (in Mr. Francis Darwin's words from the chair of the British Association last year) there may exist in plants also "a faint copy of what we know as consciousness in our-

selves.”¹ Were this startling suggestion carried out to the full, its result would be that all life is sentient, and the origin of mind coincident with the origin of organization. Such an extension of infra-conscious psychic action downwards to the plant, is at least more in the line of recent speculation than when a purely mechanical theory of life is extended upwards to the animal. You may, indeed, obliterate the frontier either way. You may deny mental action to the lowest forms of animal by explaining whatever looks like sensation or spontaneous movement solely by the reflex action of irritable matter on the application of an external stimulus. But in that case it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to draw the line in the upward evolution, where such unconscious reflex action merges in the higher animals into true sentience, or responsive movements into instinct, or instinct in its turn into purposive volition, conscious of its purpose. Fine transitions may certainly be looked for under any system of evolution ; and in the study of animal psychology we are working under specially heavy disabilities. Not only are we unable to observe the consciousness of the

¹ British Association for the Advancement of Science ; Dublin, 1908 : “Address by Francis Darwin, M.A., Ph.D., LL.D., F.R.S., President.”

animal from the inside (which is no more, of course, than is true of our fellow-men), but even the inferences which we deduce from their behaviour when it resembles our own become less and less reliable as the creature is further and further removed from our own place in creation. One feels this difficulty strongly even in studying those wonderful habits which are instinctive in the ant or the bee, psychically the highest developed of invertebrates. It is really not till we reach the long series of cerebral developments which are found among warm-blooded vertebrates, and mainly in the highest among mammals, that we can with confidence affirm a mental life resembling our own. Even in their case we run the risk of misinterpreting the source of actions which would in ourselves have a different, because a higher, mental origin. Besides, accurate observers in this department of study have hitherto been few, skilled experimenters fewer still.

What can scarcely be questioned, however, is that consciousness in the higher animals, though simpler than in man, is founded like his on sensible experience. It takes the same threefold form (1) of sensations, (2) of emotions of pleasure or pain similar to our own, and (3) of active or volitional impulses resulting

from them. By experience these creatures learn as we do to select among their automatic actions and to control them. In this way genuine habits are formed, distinct from the very large class of actions which, being inherited and unvarying, we call instinctive. But the limitations of this mental life of theirs, it is less easy to fix. Probably their strictly intelligent activity is limited to the association of impressions received through individual experience, and to the representation of these in memory. Any evidence that they recognise relations between objects or between ideas, or that they form general concepts by abstraction, or draw conclusions from premisses, or guide their actions by what we term "ideals," is either absent or unreliable because capable of a different interpretation.¹

The limits of mental action in the higher animals are, no doubt, most obscure. But we have no reason to believe that any of them can disengage itself, consciously or even actually, from what may be called the universal life of nature, so as to attain a free or self-conscious spirit-life like our own. Each individual specimen of its kind remains a product of inherited generic

¹ See such works as C. Lloyd Morgan, *An Introduction to Comparative Psychology* (London, 1894), and Romanes, *Animal Intelligence* (London, 1882), and *Mental Evolution*.

forces and no more : a creature of the influences which play upon it, whether from within or from without its own organism.¹ An intelligence limited in this way seems adequate to explain most of the phenomena of animal life. But not all. The large class of actions which we term instinctive are not to be so explained. They do not seem to obey any intelligent purpose on the creature's part. At least they involve a regard to remoter results, often of great consequence for the ends of nature, which transcend any intention we can ascribe to the animal itself. Whose fore thought, then, guides its action? When an irrational creature is found thus acting much better and more wisely than it knows, blindly following an unerring impulse to some end of which it is not aware and which it is quite incapable of designing, is it the voice of piety alone which refers its behaviour to a wisdom higher than its own?²

But what is to be said of the conscious subject

¹ I presume it is for this reason that the tenet of animal immortality has found few to profess it. The inference that the brutes cannot survive dissolution of the animal structure may be a just one, or it may not. In either case it furnishes no argument of weight against the survival of the human being ; since with the advent of Man we ascend to a plane of personal life which lies far above any earlier member of the series of which nevertheless he is the apex.

² Cf. Job xxxix. 26, "Doth the hawk soar by thy wisdom, and stretch her wings toward the south?"

itself—of what used to be spoken of as the “animal soul”? Modern psychology, being a natural science confining itself to observed phenomena, abstains from any metaphysical assumptions. It is therefore unable to assign any cause whatever for what we take to be consciousness in the animal. For while the psychologist, in concert with the physiologist, has demonstrated a strict step by step concomitancy between conscious states in man and definite molecular changes in the nerve centres, he has done nothing whatever to establish, or even to suggest, between these two parallel series any causal nexus. Nor as a mere observer of phenomena has he any business to do so. Just as little right has he to affirm for the lower animals an unknown entity, called a “soul,” behind the facts which he observes. Yet, unless we are allowed to postulate some being, unknown by us, as the subject of every conscious state and the cause of every voluntary act, you leave such acts uncaused and such states with nothing to experience them. It is not natural science which can help us here, nor phenomenal psychology as a branch of natural science. It is philosophy, interpreting the laws of thought, which compels us to assign every mental state in an animal, as in ourselves, to an immaterial

subject which is conscious of them all, though not necessarily conscious of itself as the subject of them. For such an immaterial entity behind consciousness, there can be no objection to retain the old term "soul." Of the origin and nature of animal souls, however, we are utterly in the dark. That each is a separate creation is hardly credible, remembering what part heredity plays in determining their specific and individual qualities. That the souls of animals are wholly derived from parents to offspring, and all of them, of course, ultimately from a single original, is an alternative almost equally difficult of acceptance. Yet for religion, no less than for science, the problem has interest from its connection with the case of man, who stands latest in the line of animal succession, and who, however highly distinguished above his humbler fellow-creatures, is held by evolutionists to derive from an animal ancestry the lower side at least, if not the whole, of his complex constitution.

CHAPTER VII

MAN: HIS NATURE AND ORIGIN

III. Third rise of level to a new type of life—evolution of Man as an animal not yet fully established—but may be—his links to the animal world recognised in Scripture—Characteristics which lift him above brutes to spiritual life—self-consciousness—introspection—reason—moral judgments—sense of duty—free choice—His personal life analogous to the Divine—yet dissimilar—Fichte's objection to absolute personality—differences between Divine and human in personality—in knowledge—and in will—nearest approach is in moral likeness—Can Natural Evolution account for these spiritual characteristics?—Two difficulties suggested—(a) absence of intermediate links—(b) it leaves the highest morality unexplained—a new act of Divine Power called for.

III. THE latest rise of level in the process of creation has been the most remarkable of all. Its result has been, not merely that Man excels the nearest to him in the animal world, corporeally and still more psychically, true as that is; but that he has been lifted into an order of life which can no longer be called "animal" at all, but spiritual, because it differs from the animal in kind rather than in degree, and is in some sense akin to what we believe to be the life of the Eternal Spirit Himself. So far as we have

any means of knowing, an incarnate spirit, such as we take ourselves to be, constituted a unique type in the universe. But this is the mystery of man that, being the highest of earthly mammals, he is also "a son of God."

That human nature is thus dual in a sense peculiar to itself has been a persistent belief among philosophers, as well as among divines, on grounds no less of reason than of religion. But it is only with the higher or spiritual nature of man that theology is vitally concerned, because it is that alone which makes him a religious being. His animal side belongs to the biological sciences, and the theologian will be well advised, as I conceive, if he leave it to their investigation. I do not assume, however, that the evolution even of man's bodily structure, still less of his mental powers, by unbroken descent from an animal ancestor must at present be accepted as a sure result of science. The gap is too wide to be accounted for in the absence of transitional forms, which, though eagerly sought for, have not as yet been found. The chief difficulty for the naturalist, I imagine, does not lie in man's erect posture or facial angle, or in the change from a prehensile foot, with the abandonment of arboreal habits. So far as anatomical structure is concerned, it lies in the great and suddenly

increased bulk, weight, and convolutions of the human brain, especially of the cerebrum, as compared with any earlier species. But it lies much more in the immeasurable and no less sudden stride in mental power which has accompanied this increase of brain. Even if we set aside for the moment the so-called "spiritual" or super-animal factor, there remains in the "homo" of the zoologist distinctively human features of brain structure and mental capacity for the appearance of which evolutionists are as yet at a loss to account. But then, if every other organism in the animal world has been evolved by physical inheritance, as the current hypothesis assumes, it will be hard to convince students of science that the human body alone had a different origin. Intermediate links may still be "missing," but their existence will be presumed and their discovery expected. Now, so soon as science shall be able to assure us on a safe warrant of fact that the line of descent from a remote simian ancestor has been traced, we may with composure, if not with thankfulness, accept its testimony. For it will only reveal to us the steps by which it may have pleased the Divine Worker to bring about what already we know so well: I mean those innumerable analogies, not anatomical only, but psychical,

which connect us at a thousand points with our irrational fellow-creatures.

How such resembling features had come about the Hebrews certainly did not know; but many of them have always been obvious enough without science; and in the second document of Genesis¹ a sacred writer has clearly recognised, and in his primitive fashion has described, the earthly origin of man's body in such a way as to imply his essential connection as an animal with the system of nature. In simple concrete language we are told that Adam was moulded (like quadrupeds and birds) out of the "dust," the arable soil, that is, or pulverised earth, upon which plant life first, and by means of it animal life as well, depend.² That writer's mental image may have been anthropomorphic enough. He may have pictured the Deity to himself as literally modelling an earthen or clay figure to receive the quickening breath. Job is represented as describing his own formation in parallel terms.³ The pessimistic writer to whom we owe the Book of Ecclesiastes goes so far as to identify man's lot with that of the beasts both in origin and in dissolution: "Man hath no

¹ Gen. ii. 4-iii. 24.

² Gen. ii. 7 and 19. Cf. "all flesh is grass," Isa. xl. 6.

³ Job xxxiii. 6; cf. x. 8-9, xxxii. 8.

pre-eminence above the beasts : for all is vanity. All go unto one place ; all are of the dust, and all turn to dust again.”¹ And St. Paul has summed up in three words the sense of all this, where he pronounces the first man to have been ἐκ γῆς χοϊκός,² “out of the earth,” or “earth-born.”

Nor are man's psychic affinities with the animals less striking than his physical ones. He is as dependent as they upon his senses for all his knowledge of the outer world. His involuntary movements react on stimulation of the sensory nerves just as theirs do. He has no fewer instincts than they, and those which he has wear a similar character. His animal appetites crave the same gratification and serve the same ends of self-preservation and perpetuation of his kind. To passions, like fear or rage, he is equally subject ; nor is it the savage alone who, by impulses of his lower nature which he fails to control, betrays his kindred with the tiger and the ape. When human beings descend in their morals to the level of the beasts, we are shocked ; but the best of us share with them vulgar needs and harmless enjoyments of the flesh of which we have no need to be ashamed. By so frankly owning this earth-born, earth-nurtured side of

¹ Eccles. iii. 19-20, R.V.

² 1 Cor. xv. 47.

humanity, Scripture condemned beforehand that one-sided exaggeration of the spiritual which has widely infected like a disease the religious life of Christendom. The Manichæan's repugnance to matter as an evil thing, with the ascetic's renunciation of corporeal instincts and desires as in themselves degrading, were alike effectually cut off. A morality of unnatural self-repression, therefore, never found congenial soil in Jewish religion. Christian theology, above all, has still less excuse if it harbour any haunting sense of humiliation at the lowly origin or the mean attendants of that nature which He stooped to share Who was "born of a woman."

From the animal in man let us turn to the other side of his twofold being. Difficult questions connected with the origin of his higher nature and with its relation to his lower, must be postponed till we first make it clear to ourselves, if we can, in what his difference from the inferior animals actually consists. Why do we call man a spiritual being and all other animals not? The answer is not easily given in few words; for, when we attempt to sum up those features characteristic of human life which lift it out of the rank of the brute into kinship with the Divine, we find that they fall into

various groups : intellectual, moral, and religious. Let me attempt a list as brief as I can make it.

(1) Fundamental, because it underlies the whole of our experience, is what we call our consciousness of ourselves. We have no reason to believe that any other animal possesses the power either of making its own mental states an object of knowledge, or of discriminating itself from them as the subject of them. True : this knowledge of one's self as a "me" in distinction from the "not-me" is not given us save by experience, in connection with neural sensations and impressions from the outside world such as every sentient being shares. Yet, once it is given, it is a quite peculiar and unmistakable form of consciousness, which thenceforward accompanies every other mental act. By linking to self as its subject each of our successive conscious states, it binds the life-long stream of such states, which make up our waking experience, into one whole. Together they form the experience of the single person I call "myself," held apart as "mine" from the experience of every other mind.

(2) The first result of this is that an inner life of introspection becomes possible. Each man dwells alone, and leads a secret life of reflection ; with power to analyse his own

feelings and impressions, to abstract the qualities and relations of things from themselves, to compare and classify the objects of his knowledge, to form general concepts and fix them in vocables, to reason from such concepts as premisses, to forecast the future with its probable requirements and learn from the past how to discover or invent new means for the attainment of his ends. This whole group of ratiocinative processes is either peculiar to man or at most finds in a few of the higher animals extremely faint and dubious rudiments. It constitutes the intellectual prerequisite for his unique gift of language, with its abstract vocabulary and logical syntax. Yet among human endowments it is far from being the highest.

(3) A superior group is entered when among other conscious states, subjected by such inner reflection to analysis and interpretation, are our own motives for action. For then we do more than analyse or interpret, we pass moral judgment on them ; and that implies an estimate or valuation of the ethically good and bad. Possibly it pertains to the very idea of a personal spirit to be such a moral being, since personality involves freedom of conscious choice betwixt alternatives which present themselves as

in some sense either good or bad. So far as we know, at all events, every person is a moral being, conscious of ethical values, able therefore to appraise his own conduct as deserving of censure or of commendation. This goes beyond the reasoning powers. By ratiocination we attain to no more than an intellectual acquaintance with things in their relations or in their antecedents. But the intuitions of the pure reason by which we apprehend absolute truth, those which appreciate the beautiful, and those, above all, of the moral sense by which we feel the supreme worth of virtue for its own sake, are judgments of a totally different order. They open our way into another world from the phenomenal, into the noumenal world of eternal realities. When for the first time a creature was found on earth appreciative of ethical values and therefore competent to judge of action or the motives for action by a standard of moral goodness, it was not simply a fresh range that had been added to his knowledge—it was a vast and superior department that was added to life.

(4) What is even more striking is, that along with this coming of moral ideals, however imperfect, there always comes to man a mysterious but irresistible conviction that to them he ought

to conform his conduct on pain of being shamed and blamed for falling beneath the best he knows. This sense of duty, imposing its imperative on conduct, is, of course, quite separable in idea from the ethical beauty or excellence discerned in the good act itself, although it invariably follows upon that. It is a distinct phenomenon of consciousness, no less original and inexplicable. Be a man's standard of judgment what it may, it defines not merely what is judged to be in itself good or bad, but what is felt to be for him right or wrong ; laying upon him an obligation of a peculiar kind, which he may, indeed, disregard at his peril, but which he has no power to cast off.

(5) This startling novelty in human life is not fully evident until we add another element of pre-eminence over the brutes which is involved in it—I mean the freedom of man's deliberate choice. Some of their actions, like the loyalty of a dog to its master, or the devotion of the mother-bird for her brood, exhibit a certain analogy at least with human virtues. But there is no conclusive evidence that any of the lower animals feels drawn to choose what is dutiful or noble in behaviour for its own sake, under a sense, deliberately obeyed, of moral obligation. The strongest impulse prevails. As

a rule, no interval is to be observed between the impulse and the act. There may at times be a conflict of impulses, such as lends to their behaviour an air of indecision which looks like deliberation. But what marks man off is not the fact that he oscillates between conflicting motives, but, first, that he is conscious of a power to check impulse, to weigh considerations, and to determine his own choice; and, next, that he feels himself to be responsible for choosing well—a fit subject, therefore, for praise or blame, reward or penalty. So defined, free-will becomes one more mark of the ethical personality. It makes man not the shuttle-cock of irresponsible impulse, but the master of himself. It brings his life within the region of the supernatural, the region of the free.

It is obvious that all the factors which I have named as differentiating man as we know him from any earlier animal, play into one another. They are co-factors in a life where he finds no comrade upon earth.¹ They combine to constitute that single whole—a rational and ethical personality; and it is here that we must look for that “image” of God in which,

¹ Cf. Gen. ii. 20, R.V.: “For Man there was not found an help meet for him.”

according to Scripture, man was made. In spite of the exceptional stress laid on this Divine resemblance by the author of the first chapter of Genesis,¹ the rest of Holy Writ makes few allusions to it, and leaves us with very meagre data for determining what or how much the phrase was taken to cover. Later theology occupied itself mainly with what are termed "amissible" features: either "original righteousness," or a supposed *donum superadditum* of heavenly grace. Into these we are not called to enter here; for, since the Divine image is represented as having survived the Fall,² it must be supposed to have at least an indestructible basis proper to man simply as a creature, to forfeit which would be to forfeit manhood. That can only have lain in his possession of a personal life in some sense corresponding to the Divine. Certainly we need to underscore the word "likeness" or "image"; for it can be nothing more, even in its operations, not to say in its essence. The modes of the Divine activity, while they must ever remain unsearchable by us, cannot but differ greatly from those of human minds. A creature akin to its Creator:—this is but one aspect of the recurrent problem common to philosophy and

¹ Vers. 26 and 27.

² Gen. v. 1–3, ix. 6.

theology, soluble by neither: how to find common terms in thought for the relationship of finite to infinite being. Religion is the fact in our experience which starts this problem by practically proving it to be soluble. For religion does bring into communion the finite creature and the infinite Self-existent, forming ties between them; which could not be unless the two bore to one another a kinship, if not of nature, at least of life. Reduce this kinship to the lowest terms that will make religion possible, and you must say: Man is like God in this at least, that he is a person, capable of knowledge of the truth, of free-will, and of love for goodness.¹

Yet in each of these features, the likeness which I believe we can trace underlies wide dissimilarities.

Take personality, for example. The well-known argument, adduced by Fichte at the close of the eighteenth century,² and often repeated since, to prove that personality cannot be

¹ See Note G, "*Imago Dei*."

² See his article "Ueber den Grund unsers Glaubens an eine göttliche Weltregierung," 1798. Cf. also his *Idee der Persönlichkeit*. In theology the difficulty was specially pressed by Strauss in his *Glaubenslehre*. In fact, as Dörner observes, personality was the point connected with the doctrine of God which received most discussion during the first half of the nineteenth century.

predicated of Absolute Being, turned wholly on the mode in which we finite persons grow conscious of ourselves. In our case, as I had occasion already to remark, self-consciousness is gained through experience, for it is conditioned on the contrast of self as subject with another that is not self as object. But this mode of acquiring a consciousness of our own personality is no more than a defect of our finitude. As creatures in time, portions of a world out of relationship with which we never exist, all knowledge, self-knowledge included, has to begin and to grow as our experience in contact with the world grows. But the self-knowledge of an eternal and self-existent Being, Who is no part of the world, cannot be so acquired, and does not need to be. It must be eternal as Himself, inherent in His own essence, independent, therefore, of any other existence to educe or to beget it. He knows Himself as He is, eternally Subject and Object in one, in the absoluteness of His solitary self-existence; knows Himself perfectly, therefore, and unchangeably.¹ But this is simply the ideal archetype or model, after which our

¹ Against Biedermann, *e.g.*, who thinks personality must presuppose a material organism, as if no unincarnate spirit could be personal: see his *Dogmatik*, ii. 541.

derived personality is fashioned. It is a model towards which we may even approximate. Many have pointed out¹ that however dependent our self-consciousness may be on the outer world for its origin and growth, yet the more fully a sense of personality develops in man, the more independent does it become of any external object. The adult thinker, though never in this life detached from his material organ of thought, can yet to a large extent detach his consciousness from external sensations, and is never more sure of his own self-centred inner life as a personal spirit than when he can isolate his thinking from the world, or even think the world away altogether. Rapt inward self contemplation probably comes nearest of all human experiences to the personal self-consciousness possessed by a pure or disembodied spirit.

A similar relation between Divine and human may be traced in all other knowledge. Ours is a fragmentary and partial knowledge that has to be learned by experience, picked up with pains through observation and inference, at the best uncertain, never complete in any of its parts, and closely girdled round by boundless ignorance. The all-knowledge of God we conceive of as the

¹ Richard Rothe, for example, Bruch, and others.

ceaseless presence to His thought both of all that is unchangeably or necessarily true, and of whatever else either is or shall be true in fact, exactly as it is and in all its relations. He never learns and never forgets. Yet, immense as is the interval betwixt His knowing and ours, ours too, so far as it goes and agrees with reality, is knowledge likewise. Nay, one sort of it there is—the few intuitions, I mean, which we are suffered to have into ultimate or necessary truth—which may even assist us to represent to ourselves how the Divine Mind can at once and always behold the truth of all things, without effort to recall, or hesitation, or uncertainty, or any admixture of error.

No less is our will a real, albeit a far-off, suggestion of the Divine. Our freedom to choose is real, though not with the freedom of God, for it involves deliberation and is straitly limited in its power. We can initiate change, even in matter ; although we do so (like other animals) at one point only in space—that spot, I mean, in our own organism whence impulses are transmitted to the muscles through the motor nerves. Whereas every point in space is such a point to the will-power of God. In each case there is power exerted. Only ours comes very quickly to its limit ; with the concentration, let us say, of

our mind's attention, or the contraction of our own muscles. Whereas whatever it hath pleased Him, He hath done;¹ and behind all that He hath done there stretches an infinitude of possible doing in His undisclosed depths—manifestations of Himself as yet unrealized. It is this undiscovered remainder of potentialities in the Almighty's will which justifies the confident hope of the saint in His word of promise, as well as guarantees to the insatiable intellect of the student endless revelations in the life to come. And yet, to be in any measure, however humble, a free willer and doer like God, sets a Divine stamp on man. He also has been granted a sphere of activity, straitly bounded, yet all his own, for which he alone stands responsible, face to face with his Maker: capable either of obedient imitation or of rebellious self-assertion.

Those operations, then, of our intellect and of our will which lie at the farthest remove from animal life, do resemble the Divine, as we conceive of it, a great deal closer at least than anything to be found elsewhere. Nevertheless it is not through them, I think, but through the love of moral goodness, that the nearest approach to the Divine likeness has been made possible for man. Indestructible under all degradation of

¹ Ps. cxv. 3, cxxxv. 6.

character, lies this spark of the Divine—a remnant of good and of esteem for goodness, even an effort after it, however ineffectual, or a claim to retain it, however desperate. “Ah!” wrote Louis Stevenson, “if I could show you this! if I could show you these men and women, all the world over, in every stage of history, under every abuse of error, under every circumstance of failure, without hope, without help, without thanks, still obscurely fighting the lost fight of virtue, still clinging, in the brothel or on the scaffold, to some rag of honour, the poor jewel of their souls!”¹ If the worst reveal in this way a relic of the Divine image, to how near a resemblance may not the best attain? Is it not the case that the interval which separates human life from the Divine affects their common quality of moral excellence less than it affects their activities either of intellect or of will? The scale is infinitely unequal, and consequently their modes of manifesting the good are most dissimilar. Nevertheless, their ethical quality may remain a constant one. Goodness is goodness in the lowliest as in the supreme. It is possible, as the human character of Jesus has proved, for the virtues of a man to be modelled, feature by feature,

¹ “Pulvis et Umbra” in *Across the Plains, with other Memories and Essays*.

upon the Best of all, so as to represent Him with entire fidelity. Possible, therefore, for a finite personality to know, and when he knows to love, and loving to desire and choose, the same ideal goodness as any other moral person, though it were the Infinitely Good Himself; finding thus a sure road of access to the All-holy along this humble path of sympathy and meek obedience. By this, above all, can we rise as spiritual beings to a religious fellowship of love with the great Father of all spirits. It is the pure in heart who see God; and the shrine of a pure heart's devotion is the holy spot where the spirit made in His image beholds and worships the Father. A finite spirit indeed, derived and dependent, is man, immeasurably far-off and in many ways unlike his awful Original; incarnated, too, in this earth-born organism as his sole medium of either thought or action; yet for all that possessing a hidden life, mental, but before all, moral, whose activities offer some resemblance in kind, though never in degree, to the ground-activities of that Absolute Spirit Who created us.

Of the origin of a creature so far in advance of any earlier one known to us, what account is to be given?

Even a list so bare and scanty as I have given

of new characteristics which entered the world with man suggests the question : Can they be explained on the theory of natural evolution? Did small and casual variations which gave to some early primate, such as the gorilla, a better chance of survival over its fellows, build up slowly in the course of generations a reasonable, moral and religious personality? Or must we assent to the opinion of Mr. Russell Wallace, August Weismann, and other authorities, that there is something in man which involved the intervention of a new spiritual force, because it could not be derived like his body from his animal progenitors? ¹ Some Darwinians, equally thoroughgoing with Darwin himself, not all of them materialists, have been consistent enough to attempt a natural solution even of this problem. A moment came, they have said, when slight psychical superiorities counted for much more than physical ones in the battle of life ; and then mental advance became rapid. Man's difference from the mind of an ape, it is true, came in the end to be qualitative, not merely quantitative ; but then " evolution regards differences in kind as due to gradual accumulation of differences in degree." A longer infancy, with the definite family ties which that induced, substituted by degrees an altruistic standard of

¹ Wallace, *Darwinism*. London, 1889. Chap. xv.

behaviour in the room of strength or craft selfishly employed, and replaced the primitive fierceness of a wild animal by humaner habits. From a hunter fighting with his rivals over an insufficient supply of his prey, man learned by peaceful pasturage or tillage to provide for the growing numbers of his tribe an ampler sustenance. Thus little by little has his history been one long working out of salvation from the brute inheritance with which he started.¹

The picture is not without its attractiveness, nor even, from the point of view of savage life, without its verisimilitude. Although it differs widely from the view, suggested by religion and revelation, which has so long been traditional in Christendom, yet, were it proved correct, it would by no means shut out from the process of human origins a Divine operation. It would only make man's immaterial part, equally with his material, the product of a very slow series of creative changes, like so much else in nature. But at present there are serious, and, as I think, fatal difficulties in the way. In the main, two which I will name: one from the side of natural science itself, the other from the side of moral science.

¹ Mr. John Fiske's essay, *Man's Destiny* (London, 1890), is a favourable specimen in short compass of this class of works.

From the side of natural science we have as yet no shred of evidence for this alleged line of intellectual and moral descent. If it be an objection, as I said in a previous chapter, to the evolution of the human body from an arboreal ape, that the interval is nowhere bridged by intermediate links, this difficulty becomes enormously increased in the case of the human mind or soul. For the interval is vastly greater. The number of generations that would be called for to evolve reason, conscience, and religion out of a brute, baffles calculation. Even supposing (what is far from certain) that the geological time at the disposal of natural selection were sufficient, the utter disappearance from the long record of the faintest trace of any midway creature, half-brute, half-man, would still be quite inexplicable. The earliest fossil evidence goes back to the glacial or inter-glacial, or even possibly pre-glacial, age, but it does not take us (says Huxley¹) appreciably nearer to the ancestral ape.² Why there are no traces of the

¹ Quoted by Wallace, *op. cit.*

² Speaking of the "Javanese Man," the late A. H. Keane remarked: "In this 'first man,' as he has been designated, the erect position, shown by the perfectly human thigh-bone, implies a perfectly prehensile (grasping) hand, with opposable thumb, the chief instrument of human progress" (*The World's Peoples*, 1908, p. 4. Cf. the same author's *Man Past and Present*).

long intervening process of change, no one knows. We are now able, thanks to recent archæology, to follow the main stream of *Kulturgeschichte*, by sure historical monuments, back as far as some four or five thousand years before the Christian era. But those early communities whose jurisprudence Hammurabi codified were even then organized commercial states, evidently with long annals behind them. Beyond them, where history at present leaves off, an inferior witness begins. The traditions of Babylonia, preserved in its own epic or in the early chapters of Genesis, tell of the rise of cities, inhabited by a civilized population which at some unrecorded date suffered an epoch-making cataclysm. Civilization neither perished with the Deluge nor began after it. Deep into a prediluvial world, tradition bids us travel before we reach the rise of nomadic and of agricultural life, or the invention of the arts, the working of metals, and the origin of music. Last of all, it is only at the back of this old-world history of culture that Scripture sets a dawn of childlike innocence, ignorant of evil, when the first pair, with the possibilities of new-made manhood before them, took a fatal turn which forced the whole unfolding of the young race to follow an abnormal path—a path of spiritual and moral degeneracy.

What the chronological relation of all this may be to the Stone Ages in other portions of the globe, there are no materials at present, so far as I know, for determining. But I do not see why this old-fashioned line of approach to human origins, by stepping-stones to guide us up the main current, first of history and then of tradition, should not promise as good results as the fashionable quest for relics of palæolithic man among the caves and gravels of tertiary Europe, or in Somaliland, or in India. These offer at least no safer guidance for chronology. Savages have no annals. Stone-age men are to be found on the earth to-day. When their ancestors originally broke off from the progressive races no one can tell. If we may assume a local or Mesopotamian deluge, may not certain stagnant or degenerate tribes have wandered far away from the common stock long before that resounding catastrophe which depopulated the rich and settled plains of the Tigris and Euphrates, the "known world" of those days, blotting out all recollection of such uncivilized migrants from the primeval home. Relics of neolithic man first appear in our western lands within a fairly ascertainable period much less remote than that. The enormous antiquity assigned by certain archæologists to the palæolithic

rac¹ is suggested, I think, less by trustworthy geological or other evidence than by the demands of the evolutionary hypothesis. In any case, whether we first encounter man, civilized in Babylonia or barbarous in tertiary Europe, he is already a man, not a beast. Even the palæolithic cave-dweller has left pictures of the now extinct animals he hunted, which betray rudiments of the artistic sense. He has no predecessor. All the prodigious eras of his toilsome development on the evolution hypothesis, are a blank. The innumerable ascending stages, which ought to have been there, have been swallowed up and left no trace.

The second difficulty I spoke of, though different in character, goes even deeper. Natural selection based on variations which preserve only those best fitted to survive in the cosmic struggle for life will not account for man as we find him. It is by no means evident that the whole even of his mental superiority would be of advantage to him in his struggle for existence or for supremacy, whether with the forces of nature

¹ For example, a recent author writes: "A human history of a million years is a vastly more venerable record than one of fifty thousand or a hundred thousand years. Man's age upon the earth must be, from what has been already gleaned, much nearer the million years than either of the two lesser periods suggested" (*The Stone Ages in North Britain and Ireland*, by the Rev. Frederick Smith. London, 1909).

or with bestial adversaries. That might be said of his reasoning powers, certainly, and of his inventive faculties ; it hardly applies to his noblest mental gifts, such as his intuitions into eternal truths of the reason or his æsthetic taste, with his delight in music and the arts. Chiefly, however, it is when one regards him as a moral agent that the shortcoming of utility as the sole principle of evolution becomes most conspicuous. The growth of a utilitarian morality it may account for, but nothing more. Parental instincts, tribal kinship, co-operation in labour, submission to some form of authority, and the check placed on violence by the blood-feud : such things are conceivable because they are all useful for the preservation of society. Nearly every one of these indeed exists already in a less mature form among certain of the lower animals. Nor need we assign too narrow limits to the advance which such a society might ultimately achieve in law and order, or in the aggregation of mankind into larger and ever larger groups. But can we account in this way for the estimate men put on virtue for its own sake as the one good of transcendent value ? Will it explain a man's sense of personal obligation to do right at every cost ? or his sacrifice of comfort and even of life for noble ideals ?

Still less, I think, can any secular advantage be shown to have accrued from man's attitude towards the Invisible : his haunting apprehension of ghostly presences, his worship of the gods, or his yearnings after immortality. Man is nowhere a merely self-regarding animal, making it his highest aim by material civilization to safeguard his own life or make his species dominant. There are ends which he prizes above life. Every endeavour has been put forth by evolutionists to deduce the higher ethics of life from motives of utility ; and of these every reader is competent to form his own judgment. But the moral gulf that divides self-interest, however enlightened, from genuine morality and religion is not one which in my belief can be spanned by evolving the one into the other. They differ not in measure, but fundamentally. No measure of regard for his own welfare or that of his species really exalts man essentially above the animal level. Unless germs of a higher nature, some care for abstract truth and right, a sense of duty, the feeling of responsibility, a capacity for religion, a craving after the supersensuous, dependence on the Unseen—unless such things had been implanted from his origin as parts of his spiritual endowment, I do not see how any survival of those best

adapted for survival could ever have produced them.

I conclude, then, that at the advent of Man we are obliged to assume at least a second—more probably a third—instance of what we found on the introduction of life upon the globe, and perhaps also of sentient or conscious life: that is to say, a forthputting of Divine Power in the creative process, not continuous with what went before, but involving fresh methods according to fresh laws, lifting the creature to a higher plane of being.¹ Once more, as in those earlier instances, the old forces or modes of Divine action are not superseded. They remain: they are still operative: only they are supplemented and put to use for superior ends. Thus, man's material organism works still, like all organisms, as a living machine moved from within by some unknown power inherent in it; still his soul, like that of other animals, carries on its automatic as well as its conscious and volitional life of desire and effort, for the preservation of its life and propagation of its kind, just as before. Only both are made subservient to the purposes of a personal and free life, rational, moral, and spiritual, which has been

¹ See Note H, "The Inbreathed Soul of Gen. ii. 7."

superinduced upon them. The step forward involved an enormous change of which natural science has no satisfactory account to render. To the eye of religious faith, what has happened is that the immanent will-power of God, always at work, has here begun to work in an altogether original way, adding to its previous products a creature of a nobler kind, with functions more akin to the Divine, capable, therefore, of personal relations with God Himself.

CHAPTER VIII

SOUL AND SPIRIT

Origin of man's immaterial part—relation of spirit to soul—Dichotomy *versus* trichotomy—Theology, like modern Psychology, may decline the question—unless Scripture has pronounced—evidence on this point—result: soul and spirit in Bible use are different aspects or functions, not substances—Origin of souls—creationism and traducianism—history of opinion—modern efforts at compromise unsatisfactory—evidence on both sides—Man's primeval condition—argument from modern savages misleading—what to expect from a new creation—how far Genesis iii. agrees with it—exaggerations to be avoided—immaturity, no positive evil—the crisis and the lapse.

I AM not sure that we shall ever be able to define at all narrowly or with scientific precision the Divine action in the origination of man's immaterial part. I am not sure that, for the purposes of religious faith, it is requisite that we should. Puzzling questions, both in reference to the first man and to each of his descendants, can be started, which have been at times keenly discussed, though to little profit. They turn mainly on this central problem: Is man's immaterial part a mediate or an immediate work of God; or partly the one and partly the other?

Adam's soul, or the child's—whence came it? How far in each case has it been inherited? How far is it a direct creation by the Father of spirits? Questions like these have been found singularly insoluble. The Creative Presence, here most of all where it accomplishes its noblest earthly work, hides itself in darkness; nor is there any creature more mysterious to man than the deeps of his own being.

Take, for example, the long-debated controversy on the relation of the spirit in man to his animal soul. Shall we say that what the Divine Power, working through nature or upon it, did when man appeared, was to raise (along with a developed cerebral organ) certain intellectual germs present in the animals to a much higher level of reason and to self-consciousness, adding to this enlarged intellect quite fresh powers of moral discernment, self-judgment, and free choice; so that, with no radical change of essence but only a vast enrichment in functions, the soul in becoming human became also something more than a soul, became spiritual? Or are we to suppose that there are in human nature two distinct, though not separate, immaterial substances or entities—one merely psychic, a "soul," which we share with our humble fellow-creatures and probably inherit

from them through our human ancestry; the other a purely spiritual essence which may be a fresh creation for each individual, as we conjecture to have been the case with the angels?

It is the old debate, much more at home in psychology than in divinity, between dichotomy and trichotomy. Now, since modern psychology became a natural science, confining itself, in alliance with physiology, to empirical phenomena, such a debate has naturally lost interest. The psychologist has not merely grown impatient of the outworn apparatus of mental and moral "faculties" into which the mind used to be parcelled off. He leaves to the metaphysician the very existence of such things as "soul" and "spirit"; of whose nature we can know nothing by the way of scientific observation, even observation of our own conscious states. Yet no psychologist, we are assured, and we may well believe, can possibly question the existence of the personal Self, for it is the fundamental fact in all consciousness; and that at least must surely be an entity of some sort.¹ True; but for empirical psychology the "Self" is simply the unknown meeting-point or common subject for the endless stream of multiform states of consciousness of which the whole of our experience

¹ Cf. James, *Psychology*. London, 1892. Chap. xi.

consists and which is all we really know. Beyond that, I do not even know myself. Here, therefore, it is the tendency of the psychologist to rest; and I am not certain that even the theologian requires to travel any further. Suppose we are content to say: in creating man a personal being like Himself, God made him capable of all the endlessly varied phenomena of consciousness alike; from mere sensations up to religious devotion. Of the single personal subject or conscious Ego which combines and unifies the whole we must affirm the existence, but we can affirm nothing beyond. It is the one entity which we are compelled to postulate—call it “soul” or “spirit” or what you will. But be it single or be it dual, it must remain in either case unknown.

Thus theology might excuse itself from the old barren debate were it not for one circumstance. A theological interest in the distinction between soul and spirit at once awakens when it is claimed that Scripture teaches a definite doctrine on the subject, and that its teaching may carry with it religious consequences. With this idea in mind, a good deal of attention was devoted about the middle of last century to the terms by which Hebrew authors, both in the Old Testament books and in Hellenistic Greek,

designated man's immaterial nature. But this attempt to construct for theological use a Biblical psychology has led, in my opinion, to no very reliable result.

For one thing, the Hebrews were at no time given to analytical thought; nor did even the rudiments of a philosophical vocabulary form themselves till after their contact with Aryan speculation, first in Persia, and still more at Alexandria. Bible language, therefore, on mental, no less than on physical, phenomena, is not scientific but popular.

In the next place, a study of the Hebrew *usus loquendi* has revealed two facts: (1) that each of the terms employed to describe man's higher nature occurs in more than one sense; and (2) that in every one of these senses the terms which we render by "soul" and "spirit" can be used interchangeably.

In its primary meaning, the Hebrew *Nephesh* or "soul," with its Greek equivalent *ψυχή*, refers to the breath as the medium, or at least the index, of animal life—the *anima* simply. Thence it passes to *animus*, or the conscious subject of sensation, emotion, and desire; not merely of the inferior feelings, but of all sorts from purely animal appetites like hunger and thirst, through such passions as fear, anger,

courage, hope or joy, up to devout affections toward God. As thus the seat of conscious personal life in general, it comes, in the absence of any separate word for selfhood, to stand finally for the individual man. Constantly we read of "every soul" where we should say, "every person" or "every one."

Now the important point is that in each of those three senses the nobler word which we translate "spirit" can likewise be at times employed, although with a certain discrimination. Preferably it occurs when the reference is to that inmost and highest aspect of human life where man lies open to influences from the unseen world, whether good or evil. The only writer in either Testament who has here a phraseology of his own is St. Paul; and this is due, partly to his borrowing a few classic Greek terms, but more to his frequent use of *σάρξ* and *πνεῦμα* to connote human nature in its unregenerate and regenerate condition respectively. Where he is not thinking of these ethical states, but of psychological constituents, St. Paul's language, like that of other New Testament authors, conforms to the Old Testament usage.

Guided by these facts, careful students, while discriminating in various ways the separate

connotation of soul and spirit in Bible usage, tend on the whole to see in it a difference of function rather than of essence. Not dichotomists only, like van Oosterzee, Auberlen, Oehler, von Hofmann, and, in this country, a previous Cunningham lecturer who examined the subject, the late Dr. Laidlaw,¹ nor those only who, like Delitzsch or Beck, sought to steer a middle course, but even some professed trichotomists, as Rudloff, have admitted that, setting aside a couple of Pauline texts and one in Hebrews, there is no other evidence to establish a distinction in essence between soul and spirit.²

From all this I think we may gather that, so far as Holy Writ is concerned, man as an immaterial being can be described by either term; but that, in so far as any distinction is observed at all (apart at least from St. Paul), he is called a "soul" on his lower phenomenal side as a congeries of individual experiences mediated, as in the case of other animals, through contact with the world, but a "spirit" in his transcendental aspect as divinely originated

¹ *The Bible Doctrine of Man, or the Anthropology and Psychology of Scripture*, by John Laidlaw, D.D. Revised edition. Edinburgh, 1895.

² For some further details on this subject, see Note I, "Scriptural Use of Soul and Spirit."

and divinely sustained. Even so the distinction is nowhere based on psychological analysis; nor did it ever acquire religious, any more than scientific, value till it came to be utilized by St. Paul in the interest of novel Christian experiences—regeneration, namely, and sanctification. The inner life of each of us is indeed very far from being of one piece. Rather it forms, as we say, a “little world” of its own, where many factors meet to constitute that strange compound, human nature. Of this complexity the literature of Holy Writ offers a mirrored image of singular completeness. But it says nothing to contradict the testimony of our consciousness that at the heart of it all we are one single being. What in its essence that being of ours is, we do not know. All we really know is, that its manifestations, however manifold, are bound in one by the vinculum of personality. Sin, no doubt, as St. Paul teaches, has set up between the lower and higher elements an unnatural intestine strife within the will. Yet not even this goes deep enough to split up the unity of our being as God made it. Evil desire may be in revolt against both reason and conscience. The better will may be impotent to control the passions. Yet, after all, it is “I myself,” the same indivisible

person, who "with the mind serve the law of God, but with the flesh the law of sin."¹

Before, however, we can fairly judge how far the psychic and the spiritual are to be discriminated in man's original constitution, I think we do well to glance at a cognate question, once keenly discussed, which, after being long in abeyance, has of late been revived. I mean the origin of individual souls: whence comes the soul of each new-born child? The case here is obviously different. Of the first man's alleged simian descent we have not found the evidence convincing; but of our own descent from a human ancestry we can have no doubt. Our own creation, therefore, however it may have been with the first of the race, is in part at least mediated through a process of generation. How far does this extend? To our immaterial as well as to our material part?

In Christian theology the question early acquired importance through the Pauline doctrine of inherited or racial sinfulness. Yet the theory which best lends itself to that doctrine, I mean the venerable and widespread belief in the pre-existence of souls, was rejected by orthodox Churchmen. Even under the modified shape

¹ Rom. vii. 25.

which it assumed in the hands of Origen, it died out in the fourth century, and in the sixth was formally condemned.¹ He had not favoured the ancient doctrine of transmigration from one animal or human body into another, as it has long been taught in the further East; but he supposed the souls of all men to have lived and sinned as spirits in an earlier state of probation, and to have been, as a penalty for that ante-natal sin, incarnated in human bodies. The only dogmatic interest which attaches to any pre-existence theory lies in its making birth-sin easier to understand; and it was with this design that Origen's speculation in a finer form was revived in last century by Julius Müller.² It certainly relieves the difficulty of congenital sinfulness, but it does so at the cost of real unity in the race.

It had been an early view held by some in the Church³ that the soul of every man is really a *particula Spiritus Divini*, literally an emanation or inbreathing from the substance of God Himself. But this, which seemed to go to the opposite extreme (although it could quite well be combined with Origen's speculation), was

¹ By a council at Constantinople, A.D. 553.

² *Lehre von der Sünde*, Buch iv. Kap. 3.

³ As Justin Martyr and Clement, for example.

likewise rejected by divines so soon as it was found to be employed by Manichæans to prove that sin can only inhere in the matter of our bodies, but cannot possibly infect the soul, whose nature is divine. On this ground we find Augustine still combating it strongly in his *De Animâ et ejus Origine*.

Failing such outlets, Church opinion, especially among the Greeks, fell back on what Harnack has called a "counsel of despair"—the direct creation of each soul by God at or before the moment of birth. The real strength of this tenet lay in its recognising that every human being is, like Adam,¹ "a son of God," sustaining to Him, although distinct in nature, an immediate personal relationship both of origin and of affinity. Its weakness as a theologoumenon is that it seems to render it impossible that God should send new-made souls into the world sinful. The counter-theory which naturally arose, and is known as traducianism, was started and defended by Tertullian in his treatise *De Animâ*. He assumed the substance of our species to have been created *ex nihilo* once for all in Adam, so that from him the souls, no less than the bodies, of all other men have been propagated by generation, like shoots from a parent vine (*ex*

¹ Luke iii. 38.

traduce). The recommendation of this view was twofold. It bound the human family into a spiritual, no less than a physical, unity; and it made it intelligible how every man enters life in a fallen condition. The Latin Fathers, with the notable exceptions of Jerome and Augustine,—the two greatest of them,—were mostly traducianists.

Between these rival theories, Augustine was never able to decide to his own satisfaction. Scripture texts on the one hand, cited to prove separate creation, he found to be invalidated by other passages.¹ Besides, he clearly saw how difficult it must be to avoid making the Creator the author of sin, if we suppose Him directly to call sinful souls into being. On the other hand, in his controversy with the Pelagians he had a strong temptation to embrace the traducian tenet of his "master" Tertullian, which promised to buttress the doctrine he was contending for. Yet in spite of its usefulness in his system, he could not get over certain difficulties in traducianism. Especially did he stumble at its materialistic tendency. Not only had such a tendency betrayed itself in the author of traducianism himself, but it seemed scarcely possible to avoid it if the soul of the child be

¹ Cf. Gen. v. 3; Ps. li. 5; Eph. ii. 3; Heb. vii. 10.

derived by partition or propagation of some sort from the soul of the parent. On the whole, one readily sympathises with the refusal of the great doctor of the West to dogmatize on so baffling a problem.

In the mediæval schools, opinion had leaned so heavily to creationism that a Pope in the seventeenth century¹ declared it to be *de fide*; and this view has certainly been followed by a majority of subsequent Catholic divines, although there have been exceptions. Fortunately the question was left an open one in Protestant Confessions; thanks chiefly to the caution of Melancthon, who wisely declined it when Luther, like that later Pope, was disposed to make creationism an article of faith. During the system-building age which followed, nearly all Lutheran dogmaticians were traducianists, whereas among the Reformed the balance, after Calvin's example, inclined the other way.

The old puzzle, after an interval of neglect, was in last century revived; chiefly, I suppose, under the influence of natural science which has brought problems of heredity to the front. With modern theologians, like Martensen, for instance, Dorner, Nitzsch, Lipsius, and others, the tendency has been to attempt, or at least

¹ Alexander VII. (1655-1667).

to propose, a combination of both views, believing that they need not absolutely exclude one another, and that each may reflect one side of the truth. It must, I fear, be confessed that this mediating treatment has not yet been worked out to satisfaction. What commends it is simply that on the old lines no result can be reached, since upon each of the alternatives the old objections press as strongly as ever; while, on the other hand, there are facts and considerations not to be left out in any solution of the problem which speak strongly in favour of each of them.

Thus, on the one side, science no less than theology has an interest in owning the human family to be spiritually, not less than physically, one. It is not merely inherited sinful tendencies, but inherited mental and personal characteristics of every description which go to show that we derive from our ancestors in respect of our souls as well as of our bodies. Nor can we gain in any other way a scientific basis for that race-consciousness, that sense of universal brotherhood and racial sympathy, which lies near the root of altruistic ethics. Facts which establish intellectual and moral affinity between men of the most opposite races prove a common generic life. Contrasted facts

which show that, within certain limits, moral and intellectual types of mankind persist, or that deviations from the racial average can be propagated in certain families, or how mixed breeds are formed, bring us no less unmistakably under the law of heredity. Nor can Christian teaching on our unity both in the First and in the Second Adam dispense with some law of traduction, or at least, of what Frohschammer has called "generationism."

On the other side, there is the sense of solitary personality in every human individual to be no less reckoned with; each man's separate responsibility to God alone; his feeling of direct religious dependence upon his Maker; his isolation as a self-conscious Ego from all others; his absolute equality, no less than independence, as a spiritual unit; with the inexplicable emergence from time to time of outstanding personalities who tower above their ancestry. These things forbid the idea that a man can be entirely accounted for by his ancestral inheritance or by what he shares in common with all his fellows. They point to something peculiar, original, and divine in each new member of the species, binding him directly to the Author of his being.

At present it is entirely beyond our power

to determine how much is generic in each man, how much individual. Still less are we able to say in what way the Divine Power immanent in nature works through ancestry, in consonance with the laws of reproduction, to give rise in each individual to an endlessly varied set of congenital powers and tendencies. Further study may yet cast some light upon the subject. At all events, I cannot escape the conviction that—given all that ancestry can give—there must be in addition, at the birth of every child as at the origin of the first man, a creative act by which the generic basis of human nature both physical and psychic, with all its inherited modifications, is divinely lifted to the level of the spiritual, and receives, at least in germ, the gift of personality. When in adult life one's sense of personal dependence upon God develops, I do not think that the inference from it that "I am His creature" is at all confused or enfeebled by the fact of human parentage. Much, indeed, of what makes me what I am I can certainly trace to parents; but the religious consciousness of relationship to One higher than they is too assured for us to dream for a moment that we are the creation of a pair or of the race of men. In that intimate and secret life of the spirit, out of

which religion emanates, each adult man knows himself to be independent of parents, their spiritual equal; with a hidden world of action and of suffering all his own and incommunicable, where he has to live alone with but One Other unseen for the Confidant and the Master of his real life. Is it permissible to suggest that could we trace with assurance the dimly felt line of distinction which defines an animal soul in man from the principle of moral and spiritual personality in him, we might possibly find that the former (like the body with which it stands in peculiarly close relationship) is mainly, if not wholly, an inheritance; while the latter, whether it be a distinct entity or not, is at least the result in each case of a direct Divine act, of a "Breath," as the old Book puts it, from the Father of our spirits.¹

The picture which we fashion for ourselves of the earliest human being must be determined by the view we adopt of the Divine method in his creation. Naturally, therefore, opinion has here diverged as widely as anywhere.

If the species arose, as the hypothesis of "natural selection" requires, by an incredibly slow accumulation of small advantages in the

¹ Gen. ii. 7; quoted 1 Cor. xv. 45; cf. Job xxxii. 8, xxxiii. 4.

struggle for survival, then the earliest animal on earth that could be called a man at all must have differed from his nearest progenitor by the narrowest possible margin of superiority. There, on that hypothesis, anthropological science ought to commence. But as the evolutionist has no acquaintance with such an inchoate or imperfectly formed man, nor much likelihood of any ; as he neither knows at what stage in the supposed process the earliest traits which were properly human first entered, nor even of what sort they were ; he usually falls back for the closest representative of primitive humanity upon the most degraded specimen of present-day savagery. He can do no otherwise ; and yet it is questionable how far this resemblance is to be trusted. The savage of to-day is separated from aboriginal man by the successive generations of untold millenniums, which cannot have passed away without leaving indefinite changes. Whenever a tribe has been discovered in a normal condition of uncivilized life, whether in the arctic or the torrid zone, it had long before reached a well-defined stage of human culture—simple indeed, yet immemorial and adapted to its habitat and its wants. It had little or nothing in common with bestial life. Races, for instance, like the Negro or the Polynesian, the Eskimo or the Red Indian,

were possessed when discovered of social institutions, a language of their own, some form of marriage, an accepted code of duty, and certain religious rites—just like Europeans. Even the most backward, as Patagonians or Australian Blacks, whether their backwardness be a sign of degeneration under unfavouring conditions or not, have proved by individual instances at least that they are capable, under kindly tendance and instruction, of learning the simpler arts and of acquiring the manners that become a Christian. Not even the most degraded of savages, therefore, can be taken as a specimen of man not yet fully escaped from the brute. The truth seems to be that this much-studied department of anthropology, although it sheds some light on the steps of human advance, has nothing to teach us about man's origin. Whether he began as little better than an orang-utan or set out from the gates of a lost paradise, in either case he had his culture to create by gradual steps, the earliest of which lie such a long way behind him as to be now forgotten. Nearly everything which anthropology has to tell of stone and bronze ages, survivals of folklore, slow emergence out of barbarism, or of the occurrence to-day of tribes at diverse stages of culture, some progressive, others unprogressive, stagnant, or retrograde,

will fit equally well into either theory of human origins.

Assuming then, as, in the absence of stronger evidence in support of origin by descent, I think theology is entitled to assume, a sudden leap upward out of a lower into a higher order of creation—a beginning by Divine Power quite as marked, though not more so, than the leap out of mechanical into organized, or out of dead into living, substance, it is not our reading of the history of civilisation which will be different from the evolutionist's, but only our conception of the primitive state of man from which that long story set out. No intermediate links are in that case to be looked for. The newly formed species will be just as true to its idea or type as any species, brought into existence through the method of evolution, ever comes to be. For the meaning of such a sudden rise of level is that the Immanent Power initiates at a stroke what elsewhere it introduces gradually—that is, a new kind of creature in which is realized a new creative idea. What one is prepared therefore to expect is that the first of its kind will be perfectly representative in every essential feature, however far it may yet have to travel before all the possibilities which lie in the species can be unfolded. An infant is as completely human as

the adult will be. Man's Maker had by no means done with the development of His fresh product when Adam opened his eyes upon the world ; yet it was no incomplete, though it might well be an immature, manhood which was given him for his dower.

So I think we should expect from such a method of creation ; and what little Revelation tells us is in agreement with the expectation. No extraneous light falls on the earliest condition of man from any other source ; for, although vague traditions of a "golden age" are met with in abundance among many races, they contribute nothing worth speaking of to our knowledge.¹ The absence from other parts of Scripture of almost any allusion to a paradisaical state throws us back for our sole authority on one of the most obscure chapters in Genesis. The second document in that book² is quite as strongly marked as the first one with an unhistorical character. No less than the former, it rests on older materials common to Israel with other Eastern peoples ; and on these as on a narrative

¹ Consult O. Zöckler, *Die Lehre vom Urstand des Menschen* (Gütersloh, 1879), with the authority on which he chiefly depends : H. Lüken, *Traditionen des Menschengeschlechts* (2 Aufl. 1869). Also Ebrard, *Apologetik*, B. II., and Fischer's *Heidentum und Offenbarung* (Mainz, 1878).

² Gen. ii. 4–iii. 24.

framework the prophetic author hangs the religious and ethical truths he is concerned to teach. At a fairly early date, Israel must have grown familiar with such concrete and imaginative tales of a lost paradise, a garden of God with sacred trees and waters of life, traces of which in various forms crop up all over the East—in Babylonian documents perhaps, in the sacred books of India, above all, in the Persian Zendavesta.¹ When one reads with open mind the childlike and bizarre details: how Adam was fashioned, and still more how Eve; of the quaint procession of beasts among which no companion was found for the man; of the park with its mystic trees of knowledge and of life; or of the serpent that could talk,—one feels oneself in a region of suggestive and poetic shadows, where it is not matter-of-fact history that meets us, nor even tradition with its blurred outlines, but symbolic imagery. The moral lessons intended and the religious ideas conveyed have to be disengaged from the dress in which they bodied themselves to the imagination of a very early age. It is far from easy for the modern occidental mind to read aright such stories, although they have been always at home in the East: especially when they date from the childhood of our race,

¹ See the third volume of Spiegel's version.

while men still thought and spoke in parables, and religious conceptions never stepped forth as naked abstractions but wrapped themselves in pictorial drapery. It is just what we find in apocalyptic representations of a paradise to come. The reason must be similar in both cases. Neither the original nor the final condition of our race appeals to actual experience, and therefore neither can be set forth save in figures borrowed from the present. Such cryptic and mystic imagery is not the stuff out of which hard or clean-cut dogma can be manufactured. Yet, shadowy as it is, the second chapter of Genesis is after all the one morsel in all literature which does convey anything in the least satisfying to the mind concerning the heaven which lay about man in his infancy.

By more than one school of divines in the past has our first forefather been exalted into a prodigy of wisdom and virtue. Such a tendency was indeed at home in the Church from quite early days, for it had already begun in the rabbinical schools of Judaism.¹ In the fourth century certain Christian Fathers indulged in inflated rhetoric on the almost angelic glory of Adam; and among the Schoolmen extravagant notions of his wonderful insight and knowledge

¹ See Eisenmenger, *Entdecktes Judenthum*, i. pp. 365 and 830.

were usual.¹ They passed on into Protestant communions, and may be met with both in books of devotion and in seventeenth-century dogmaticians. The power of the protoplast over the animals, his acquaintance with natural facts, his strength and beauty, his immunity from pain or discomfort, were all extolled as surpassing anything which his descendants have attained.

From exaggeration of this sort the sober language of the sacred text is wholly free. The picture which it offers is one of more than idyllic simplicity. So far as the results of culture are concerned, Adam is as far from a civilized man as he is from a savage. Culture, indeed, he has none ; that is all to come. He starts with neither clothing nor shelter, nor the merest rudiments of the arts of life ; with everything to discover or to invent. He lives in close fellowship with nature and in familiarity with inferior creatures. Of his superiority to them, or of his isolation from them in kind, he only grows aware by experience. So far as morals are concerned, the record pictures him in a state of childlike innocence ; ignorant as yet of good or evil, although capable of either ; and unconscious of shame, not with the shamelessness of a beast, but with the touching uncon-

¹ Cf. Zöckler, *Lehre vom Urstand des Menschen*, Gütersloh, 1879, pp. 11-18.

sciousness of infantile purity. His religious nature lies open to voices from the Unseen, though as yet they take the elementary form of prohibitions, obedience to which is his first lesson. It is still a familiar step in the awakening of the moral sense. Savage law, like Eden's, is a taboo; even that of Israel was a code of "thou shalt not"; and the obedience of children is disciplined by rules which restrict, they know not why, the area of the permissible.

It is a stage, one sees, of immature because untried goodness—the only kind of goodness that can be concreated. Less than this, it seems to me, would not meet the demand of the religious consciousness. Our faith in God requires that in a moral person as God first made him there shall be nothing of positive evil—no such stain or flaw of nature as either makes him a sinner from the outset or determines him of necessity to an abnormal development. On the other hand, his slumbering proclivities toward what is right and good can only attain their normal issue in a virtuous character through a process of self-development. This law of growth nothing on earth escapes. Least of all can a moral personality form that character of stable virtue which must be its goal without free choice betwixt alternatives. For character is a product, never a creation.

Virtue, to be worth anything, has to be chosen. That initial stage, therefore, of paradisaical innocence, though a necessary one, can hardly have lasted long. So soon as obedience to a superior authority, prescribed by reason and conscience, encountered opposition from lower, however blameless, impulses, animal or intellectual, so that a choice was called for betwixt alternatives, temptation arose and a crisis came.

Perhaps we are too apt to assume that this crisis could have but one issue. We forget how unnatural to a faultless, though immature, child of God must be that poison of distrust in Him which, according to the narrator, had to be first instilled into the mind of Eve before her will could be seduced to transgression. By calling in from without the earliest suggestion of disloyalty, by addressing it to the feebler sex, by its appeal not solely to sensuous craving but even more to a nobler appetite for knowledge, and by tracing its success at length to specious falsehoods—how skilfully does the story labour to make credible, if not intelligible, the falling away of our first parents from that spontaneous, instinctive piety towards the beneficent Author of their being, that unquestioning confidence in His word, by which alone man lives his true, his highest life.

When all is done, there must remain in such a

falling away from good to evil something inexplicable, because irrational. It stands connected in some way, indeed, with the twofold constitution peculiar to a spiritual being who is incarnated in matter, retaining at the base of his compound nature the tendencies, no less than the limitations, of the animal ; but it is not fully explained by that, much less excused as inevitable. We are here at that mysterious point in the moral history of each fallen soul where, on a testing conjuncture, the tempted will, abusing its freedom, makes an unaccountable, an arbitrary, and a criminal departure.

CHAPTER IX

A WORKER THAT HIDETH HIMSELF

Man, according to science, the close of animal evolution—a new principle of advance—Man also its intended goal, according to philosophy and theology—His spiritual perfecting is God's aim—a painful struggle—the aim sheds light back on earlier steps—Nature's testimony to the Worker—real but partial—especially on the moral character of God—this seen in ethnic faiths—Hebrew religion taught a hidden as well as revealed God—importance of this principle—why it is unavoidable—illustrations of it in the hiding of Divine power—the Worker in secret—His use of the creature—subjection to the reign of law—an ethical feature—the Incarnation its supreme instance.

SCIENCE is at one with theology in calling Man the crown and close of earlier evolution on the globe. When the evolutionist has traced the prodigious chain of changes that links in one the long past of our earth, making of it a causally connected history, he is aware on the whole, partial instances of degeneration apart, of what he calls "progress." The process mounts like an inclined plane, which he takes to be, and would fain prove to be, continuous: although in fact the incline may be broken at two or three points, as we saw, by a "fault" or sudden upward step,

which the scientist is loth to admit. When he reaches Man, however, he pauses to tell us that here we have attained, not only the latest of the series, but the last. What is meant is not that progress has ceased, but that a new principle of ascent has entered. Hitherto the principle of natural selection gave survival and supremacy in their occupation of the globe to those organisms of which the physical structure best fitted them for the two chief ends of animal existence, to wit, the preservation of the individual life and the propagation of the species. But that line of physical advance, we are told, has ceased. It has gone as far as it can be carried. For now a creature has appeared on the scene, indisputably the lord of the earth, whose lordship is no longer maintained, nor his further progress guaranteed, by physical advantages, but by supremacy of a different sort—supremacy which is intellectual, social and ethical. The reason is obvious. Man is more than an animal. The ends of animal existence, heretofore exclusively pursued—preservation and perpetuation of the individual and of the species—are no longer his sole, nor even his chief, ends. Not bodily development, therefore, but moral, social, and religious development of the personal life, has come to be man's appointed path. Whatever his destined royalty upon earth

may be, it is by spiritual culture it has to be attained. It means that with the advent of personal life, one line of ascent, the material, has closed, and another, the spiritual, has begun.

So much science recognises ; but science would overstep its limit if it added that Man is the goal or aim of evolution, and not merely its crown. It is not entitled to say that he is the intended, as well as the actual, outcome of the whole ; that towards which there has been a conscious or deliberate advance all along : although for once science is sorely tempted to become metaphysical and to say so. Finding that since Man entered on his occupancy of the globe, its rich stores have become more and more his heritage ; its past eras have bequeathed their products for his use ; its secret forces have learnt fresh forms of service at his bidding ; and the whole interest of its long drama has come to centre as in a natural *dénouement* in the culture of its dominant inhabitant :—it is nearly as much a suggestion of science as it is of faith that the earth has been made for Man.

Neither the philosopher, at any rate, nor the divine need hesitate to say so. Philosophy must own that on the arrival of Man, an end-result worthy of what went before has at length come within sight. If the “increasing purpose” of the

Creator had kept in view all along this race of personal spirits, rational and free, capable of being trained to the utmost in moral excellence, then a goal was reached which might repay all past effort. For, while every earlier race was both an end in itself of strictly limited and transient value, and likewise a means towards something better, in producing which it perished, unregretted, reason is compelled to recognise in moral personalities an end of absolute and enduring value, each of them worth a universe of matter, too precious to be sacrificed as a mere stepping-stone in nature's onward stride to some race superior to itself.

Especially clear has always been the witness on this point of the Christian faith. Ever since the days of the early apologists, there have been divines who supposed the Divine motive in the creation of the world to lie in a spontaneous impulse of love, seeking for a family of holy sons of God, in whom His own image might be mirrored as Nature cannot mirror it, and towards whom His heart of fatherhood could find outlet with satisfaction. It may, no doubt, be a dictate of reason as much as of reverence to own that we never could have read this purpose of the Creator with much confidence unless He had unveiled it to us in Christ; or even that we may be quite ignorant of other purposes served by the creation

which He still keeps concealed from us. Yet Christian theology has never questioned that one design at all events, if not the chief one, towards which, so far as our globe is concerned, God's work in creation has tended, consists in the development, by moral and spiritual forces, of mankind as a race of spiritual persons, each of them placed under training for moral completeness after the Divine likeness ; that in the end all who are perfected may be organised into a kingdom of God under the headship of His Christ. It is the ideal of Jesus, and has been learnt at His lips. Not always fully understood even by His Church, it has of late begun to dawn on thinkers, not all of whom confess His Name.

Confessedly, the method of advance has changed, to the spiritual from the animal: not so its strange attendants of struggle and suffering. Towards the human ideal Man's road of moral development might have been, according to the teaching of Scripture, actually as well as conceivably a normal one. Then it had been comparatively easy and painless. That is what it certainly has not been. The pure evolutionist and the Christian theologian agree at least in the fact, although they differ in their explanation of it. Account for it as you choose, our human family does need to be conducted to its proper perfection

by a deliverance of it, most painful and protracted, from the power of evil. In one way or another, evil, and above all the kind of evil which we term "sin," have to be worked out. Each step forward, therefore, like the earlier steps of animal evolution, has not only been an arduous one—it has been the fruit of a struggle, to be fought for against antagonistic forces and won only at frightful cost.

Here, then, are two points on which opinion can hardly be said to differ. Whichever view you adopt of human progress, whether the race has been left to struggle upward from the animal to the spiritual by its own native strength, or Christ be a heaven-sent Deliverer from a lapse which ought never to have occurred, in either case it seems to me, first, that the goal of creation can be described in similar terms as the spiritual perfecting of our species, and next, that towards this result mankind has from the first been slowly tending with infinite pains and through the fiercest struggles. In this twofold fact it is that I think we have all of us to search for a key, if key there can be found, to the long preparation which led up to man, no less than to everything else that has followed in the Divine conduct of our race since its origin. Whether we call it evolution simply or redemption; whether we hold the method of it to be natural or super-

natural; whether by providence alone as the history of civilisation, or by a Divine Revelation as well, centring in the Incarnation and Self-sacrifice of Jesus Christ: it is in the light of God's ultimate purpose with mankind, and of that alone, that we can hope to understand the endless steps, earlier or later, by which the Immanent Worker has been pursuing His way with the world. For it is only now that we are in a position to interpret the methods of the Worker or to conjecture His motives. No process can become intelligible till we discern its aim. In any case the end must have affected the steps that led to it. It is true that it is little enough we yet know of this mighty Worker's design. The end is far off. Even yet it is but dimly descried. We cannot expect to solve every riddle in such a mighty agelong process—at least till its latest issues shall stand out in the clear light of their fulfilment. Dark passages must be expected to remain. Nevertheless, we do already apprehend in a measure what the Worker has had in view all along; and when the earlier steps which science investigates, or those late ones of which history tells, are examined from that standpoint, it may be that some features which puzzled before may be found to yield up a little of their secret.

On the Christian alternative, the illumination

which is thus shed backward over lower levels of creation and their methods ought to be more penetrating and suggestive than on the naturalistic. For in that case the Deliverer Who finally effects the end-result has been first of all the Creator as well. He Who began the work is the same Who is to crown it. Not only is human destiny lodged now in the hands of the Word or Son of the Eternal Father, uplifted from His cross to His throne, but the same all-powerful Worker has been guiding the previous stages from the beginning. "Without Him was not anything made that hath been made."¹ The earth which He prepared for the theatre of His own eventual advent and the animal basis on which His own humanity, like ours, was to be framed, these He was fashioning throughout the ages of the past. At no step in the whole process which was to conduct to His incarnation, could that astounding issue to it be either unforeseen or overlooked. Whether or not the union of the Eternal Son with humanity would have happened had there been no Fall, is an academic inquiry which I think we have no data for answering with confidence, and may therefore leave to the theological schools. But certainly that fatal misuse of human freedom which He was to redress

¹ St. John i. 3 (R.V.).

by sharing in its unhappy consequences, could not possibly take the All-seeing at unawares. Could it then be left out of reckoning by the All-worker when He planned and built this world for man? Considering what our recovery was to cost Him of self-emptying, humiliation, and suffering, is it not to be supposed that from the outset He for Whom as well as by Whom were all things created,¹ kept steadily in view, ever since He laid the foundations of the earth, the amazing sacrifices of His love? Were they to exert no influence at all upon the preliminary work which He had in hand? to cast no prophecy or foreshadow backward? Those foundation facts of our Christian creed—His Incarnation and His Passion—if they are anything better than the wildest of dreams, are, to say the least of it, the most stupendous events that have transpired upon our globe. Of other worlds we are profoundly ignorant. What aims of equal goodness God may be pursuing with equal wisdom in His administration of the inhabitants of other worlds in His immeasurable universe, we cannot even conjecture. To us it seems as if these events must distinguish for ever among the mighty orbs and systems of space this tiny planet on which

¹ Col. i. 16, literally, as in the R.V., "through Him and unto Him."

such things were done. At the very least they must form, if they be such facts as faith takes them to be, the very hinge or pivot of *its* history, to which all things looked forward from the first, as now all things look back.

For a Christian theologian, the strongest interest which attaches to the discovery by science of creative methods on the one part, in view of the revelation in Christ of creation's goal upon the other, lies, as I conceive, in his hope to find some more satisfactory reply to that difficult question in divinity: What can be learnt of the Divine Worker from His known workmanship? When the whole antecedent process of evolution, inorganic and animal alike, comes to be reviewed in the light of its redemptive aim, do we ascertain, or can we conjecture, why it did not disclose the features of its Author with greater fulness or at least with greater fidelity?

To a certain extent we are here on very familiar ground. It has never been doubted by theistic thinkers that in some of His attributes at least Nature does reveal its Maker. It has been both His earliest and His most universal voice to the human soul.¹ If even on the deist's view of the Creator as the Supreme Artificer, it be legitimate,

¹ Ps. xix. 1-6.

as men have always supposed, to reason back from His workmanship to certain workmanlike qualities, much more when He is recognised as the ever-present, ever-active Agent dwelling at the heart of all, Executant no less than Designer, Who with unwearied hand has been carrying forward from inception to finish a work so wonderful. At each step, on such a theory, we are in personal touch (so to say) with the immediate Operator. We cannot fail to meet His thoughts at first hand, and ought to trace in His chosen methods characteristics of Himself. Altogether apart, therefore, from any guess men have made as to the purpose which might have been supposed to control the whole or any portion of it, three things in Nature, its power and skill and beauty, have always testified to the Unseen behind it. Under the most elementary forms of religious faith, marvels of might have perplexed or awed the worshipper. Science became possible only because the system which it studies is so intelligently ordered that its laws can be learnt by any rational investigator. The heavens, as a Hebrew poet sang, were made by wisdom.¹ Art and poetry are man's response to a loveliness and sublimity with which the earth is filled.

So far all men have found in nature more than

¹ Ps. cxxxvi. 5.

suggestions of the Divine : some features even of its Unseen Author. Yet to all this there are strait limits. Nature speaks with a myriad voices ; not all of which carry to the devout ear a message which it can recognise for Divine. Clear or impressive enough at a few points, the disclosure of its hidden Author is partial only. Nay, in other aspects of it, the revelation has been, not merely partial, but baffling, disappointing, one might almost say, misleading. Certainly, there is concealment as well as disclosure. "Verily," wrote the prophet, "Thou art a God That hidest Thyself."¹

Especially, as we might expect, although by no means exclusively, it is on the moral qualities of the Creator that creation at its lower levels has spoken with halting, or one might say with inconsistent, accents. The ethical features in the Divine were held largely in reserve until there was a creature introduced capable of understanding or of reflecting them. At most we find in the animal world adumbrations only of features which were meanwhile kept back—hints as it were of Divine thoughts and ways of working of which the prophetic significance has only now within the human period become intelligible. This hiding of the ethical in nature comes out clearly

¹ Isa. xlv. 15.

in the conflicting and often immoral gods of heathenism. So far from the manifestation of God in His works being a thought peculiar to Hebrew revelation, it is really on pagan soil that it has found thoroughgoing utterance. True to the pantheistic spirit which underlies it, polytheism treats Nature as actually an incarnation of the Divine, informed in every part of it therefore by the very life of Deity. To what results this deification of Nature led, need not be told. No ethnic religion has ever drawn from it a clear witness to the righteousness, the purity, or even the benevolence of the gods. Some of these religions ignored, others grievously misread, the disposition and the motives of the Immortals. Gods of impurity, gods of deceitfulness, gods of injustice or of cruelty, have crowded the pantheons of heathendom: inferred, every one of them, from what men read in Nature.

From this the religion of Revelation alone escaped. Two things ultimately saved the Hebrews from their long entanglement in the Syrian cult of nature-gods. The first that the prophets had impressed on the national mind a profound sense of the gulf of contrast which divides the feebleness, imperfection, and transitoriness of the creature from the transcendent majesty and omnipotence of the Eternal. The other was

their doctrine of Jehovah's righteousness. It was through their passion for Divine "holiness"—a word which blended both of these prophetic lessons into one—that the best of the Hebrews came to see, far more plainly than any other race had done, that nature declares the glory of its awful Maker only after a veiled fashion, concealing as much as revealing Him. To this deep truth to which modern men are becoming painfully sensitive, inspired poets gave fine expression when they called Nature the robe or garment of God.¹ What it hid rather than told, even in dim outline, was Jehovah's moral perfection as the God of rectitude and loving-kindness. To unveil that, at least with far greater clearness, was the office of the Law, the "Torah" or Revelation given to Israel.² To us there has been more unveiled. "The Law was given by Moses, but grace and truth came by Jesus Christ."³ While, therefore, the Apostle of the Gentiles, in addressing untutored heathen at Lystra or cultured ones on Mars Hill, as well as in his Letter to Rome, could treat "that which may be known of God" in His works, namely, "His everlasting power and divinity," as sufficiently plain to render the idolatries of paganism inexcusable, it was in Christ

¹ Ps. cii. 25-27, cited in Heb. i. 10-12; cf. civ. 2.

² Ps. xix. 7-9.

³ St. John i. 17.

alone that he recognised the perfect "Image of the Invisible"—Godhead discovered at last in all its glory.¹

If we would deal quite candidly with the facts of nature as a manifestation of its Author, we must not be afraid to take with all seriousness this Biblical teaching about His self-concealment or self-withholding. The principle is one that has played a very large part, especially during the ascent of living organisms. Observers of nature know well that through most of its departments phenomena are met with, which it baffles our insight to explain on any theory of a complete or adequate exhibition of Divine perfection. Sometimes it is power that is restrained; sometimes to our shallow insight skill seems at fault; sometimes, which is hardest of all, it is goodness which we are puzzled to reconcile with the facts. All this may result partly from the secrecy in which the Immanent Worker operates; partly from the slowness with which He has worked forward towards His far-off ethical aim; partly from the ties by which He straitly limits Himself in His relations to the creatures; and partly also

¹ Acts xiv. 15-17, xvii. 22-31; Rom. i. 19-25; Col. i. 15, 19; 2 Cor. iii. 7-18, iv. 4-6. Cf. Note A, "The Protestant Doctrine of Creation."

from our still inadequate acquaintance with His real designs. But it is not to be entirely explained by any or all of these considerations ; nor probably by any other which we can at present discern.

I am not surprised at the misgiving which is thus awakened in many religious people. Reverent minds have always loved to trace so much of their Maker's glory in His workmanship, that they give no hospitable reception to any suggestion of the hiding of His attributes, or to obscure features difficult to interpret, still less to the ghastlier facts of the animal world. They are right to be jealous for the Divine glory. But let me suggest, on the other side, that a devout heart ought to be no less jealous for the sovereign freedom of the Self-revealer as regards the order, or the manner, or the measure of His self-revelation. It is true that He cannot create a world at all without giving some expression to Himself, to His power, His wisdom, and His goodness. But just as by no conceivable number of worlds could He ever exhaust the opulence of His infinity, so must it remain at His own option what or how much any single world at any given moment in its history shall set forth of qualities that are inexhaustible. Suppose it true, what some have conjectured, that His reason, or one of His reasons, for

creating has been the desire to make Himself known, still an imperfect self-disclosure it must always be. The mode, therefore, and the degree in which He gives such partial expression to His perfections must lie within His own discretion.

Self-limitation, then, it would seem, is inevitable, because the resources of the Revealer are boundless. No less inevitable does it appear to be because the creature is bounded. So much only is any creature capable of expressing of the Infinite Perfection; so much only can it be designed to express.

It must further be remembered that all creation is of necessity a self-limitation of the Almighty. Recall the bond set up between Creator and creature by the mere act of creating. The relations which spring from it are mutual. To have called anything into derived and dependent existence, while it cannot infringe upon the sovereignty or the free self-determination of the Most High,¹ necessarily affects His subsequent procedure by the unique relationship into which it brings Him. By His own act He has constituted a link which He cannot now disregard. To say this is not to destroy the Divine absoluteness. In the true meaning of that term, the only meaning at least in which the theologian can

¹ See *ante*, pp. 57, 58.

apply it to God, what it excludes are relations which are not constituted at His own free choice, but forced upon Him from without. A demiurge such as the ancients imagined, occupied in moulding to his own use a world which he had not made, would not be an absolute being. But the true Creator in giving existence to the world remains absolutely Lord, because He sustains no subsequent relations to it which are not of His own choosing and ordaining. None the less, relations there must be on His side to the creature, as well as on the creature's side to Him. On His side, of responsibility (if one dare use the word) for its mere existence, and also of self-committal to the purposes for which He made it. For it is impossible to dissociate the Divine act of creation from the Divine intention in creating. What He willed to create He must design to use, else He had no reason for making it. And it will probably be sustained in its being just because, and just so long as, it ministers to His design. Can we then avoid saying, with the utmost reverence, that the creating act is on the Divine part a free assumption of obligations? This I take to be the idea underlying that singular phrase in Holy Writ "a faithful Creator."¹ Apart from the purpose which the Almighty had in giving being

¹ 1 Pet. iv. 19.

to any creature, the astounding wonder of creation must have remained a mere portent without significance, offering to thought no rational explanation of itself. But no sooner is creation seen to be an initial step towards some end which the world is to serve, than it becomes apparent that the future action of the Divine Worker upon the world has been doubly self-limited: by its nature first, and next by its purpose. He cannot act now as if it did not exist, or as if it were something different from what He has made it. Neither can He show Himself indifferent to the design contemplated in its origination. Nor can He pursue that end save by means which are in harmony with the properties and faculties He has conferred upon it. For to do any of these things would be to override what He Himself has done, and so to act inconsistently with Himself. That is a reasonable plea, put into the mouth of the creature by the Maker Himself: "Forsake not the works of Thine own hands."¹

It seems clear, then, that in any world conceivable by us, all this must have entailed a certain restraint in the manifestation of Divine attributes. It confined it within limits prescribed by the capacity or by the uses of the things made. How far in such a world as ours this self-

¹ Ps. cxxxviii, 8.

suppression or "hiding" of Himself may go; whether it will ever amount to a positive obscuring for a time of moral features in the Divine nature, and, if so, how long such obscurity may last: are questions to which no man can be expected to give an answer beforehand. Not even after the actual facts have been observed and recorded by science, is it certain that we shall be able fully to explain them. Yet it seems to me that a frank recognition of this law of Divine limitation must be our best guide through the confessed difficulties which beset this field of study.

Reserving for next chapter certain of the more serious of these difficulties, I shall only indicate here one or two illustrations of this law taken from what I may call, in a Bible phrase, "the hiding of His power."¹

That power to which we can set no measure is manifest enough in the works of nature, no one needs to be told. Here, indeed, omnipotence finds its characteristic sphere, and is, so to say, at home. It is the attribute which arrests the most heedless; and closer study only makes it more conspicuous at certain points: as, for instance, in the initial act of calling the material of the universe into existence; in the incon-

¹ Hab. iii. 4.

ceivable store of energy with which it was originally endowed; in the vast masses and movements of the heavenly bodies; or in the prodigious velocities with which light travels or the planets describe their orbits. Wonders wrought on a scale so large oppress by the sense of incalculable might which they imprint on the instructed observer. But where science can track Nature home to her intimate or hidden workshops, as in terrestrial phenomena it can sometimes do, I confess that I am more struck by a concealment or reserve of power than by its display. Changes in molecular physics, for example, or in the cells which build up organisms, take place on a scale so incredibly minute as to escape all observation that is not microscopic, and in the last resort to elude the most powerful instruments which it is in our power to construct. The further we go into the constitution of atoms or in biology into the part played by inconceivably minute organisms, the more impressive becomes the hiding out of sight or reach of man of all ultimate processes whatever. Moreover, they transpire in silence and in darkness; by such gradual steps, too, that they steal upon the observer ere he can detect their rise. Everywhere the power at work is, so to say, veiled or withdrawn from sight. Nor is any

tour de force exerted so long as old methods can be made to serve. For the Worker is patient, economical also, and will compass His end by the slowest of routes rather than break through by a short cut. Prodigious in some ways, and opulent, as nature is, the same contrivance is made under altered conditions to do duty for diverse uses. Economy there is of design no less than of power. A few ground-types persist in both plant and animal structures, adapted with unwearying ingenuity but never wantonly departed from.

The same feature of strength withheld or sparingly employed by the Worker to Whom all things are not only possible but equally easy, may further be seen, as I think, in His condescending to avail Himself of the ministry of the creatures. With the entrance on the scene of any organism capable of spontaneous, though not yet of free, activity, there entered a possibility of Divine co-operation with it. Not as yet of co-operation on the side of the creature which was either intelligent or intentional. That was to come later when man entered. It has become our privilege whom He summoned, no longer as mere servants but as free sons, to the understanding of His purposes and to sympathetic participation in them.¹ But the Lord of life

¹ St. John xv. 15.

rehearsed His method with man on lower levels. Up to this point the Divine Worker had had to execute all His work in the upbuilding of a habitable earth by His sole will, because other will there was none. With the first advent of animal life, creaturely volition began. From that hour all the lower animals were utilized as unconscious fellow-workers. While each of them sought its private ends for the satisfaction of its individual desires, it really wrought far better than it knew. Unintentionally it became a contributor to its Maker's scheme: by its efforts to live and multiply its kind; by adding its small share to the development of superior forms; by surrendering its life at length to the nutriment of other organisms; or in some cases by bequeathing its carcasses in myriads to pave the sea-floor or store the bowels of the land with rocks for the future service of man. In a thousand ways it has been the method of the Almighty to press the existent into His service and utilize the old to bring forth the new. Of this utilization of living wills for creative ends, the Darwinian hypothesis is but the most signal example. Theology has never solved the problem how to find room alongside the absolute determinism of Deity for man's free will, whether to withstand or to obey his Maker, to further or

to hinder his Maker's moral aims. But since the dawn of sentient life there has never been awaiting a dualism of co-operant wills which prefigures for us that higher mystery.

The widest illustration, however, of self-restraint in the Unseen Worker, with economy of method and acceptance of arduous conditions, is seen in the uniformity of nature. What is meant by the "reign of law" is simply this, that when limits were once laid down within which it was the Almighty's pleasure to effect natural processes, He permitted Himself no deviation, but everywhere scrupulously observed them. Behind every change, in every result of energy, faith discerns His power at work. Only it operates with uniformity and the exactness of a rule. Given identical conditions, mechanical, chemical or electrical, His power brings about the same kind and amount of change, so that events follow an ascertainable order of occurrence, on which for practical purposes we can rely, and which science names a "law" of nature. To us this appears to be nothing else but a self-limitation of the Almighty Worker in the exercise of His power. His own elected methods for operating change He steadfastly adheres to, submitting Himself to their restrictions. He sets laws for Himself and He obeys them.

Now, in this universal observance of rule, which is, I suppose, the largest generalization of modern science, something of an ethical character may already be detected. It is more than a mere regulation of physical energy: it becomes a disclosure of Divine self-consistency; part of the faithfulness of God, the foundation attribute on which all creaturely trust in Him reposes. It is an equivalent in the realm of matter for what in the moral sphere, as it obtains between persons, we know as righteousness. And thus it is a lesson, writ broad across the page of nature for man to read, of the sanctity which attaches to the obligations of moral law and of the inexorable sanctions which guard it.

In this strange suppression and bridling of power of which I have given instances, above all in its acceptance of arduous conditions and submission to rule, it is reasonable for the Christian to recognise features in the Divine character which found their supreme exhibition, not in nature, but in the incarnation. Nor are we surprised to meet in both regions with the same principles in action, we who have been taught to refer both to the same Agent. The Eternal Word, Agent of the Father's might and wisdom, Who was in the end to become flesh, that, within the narrow bounds of our humanity and with

lowly self-denying acceptance of every human obligation, He might accomplish the crowning act of earth's history, is the Same Who throughout creation's long labour carried through a like method. There, too, He subordinated His workmanship to exigent conditions. In both He hid His power. In both He placed Himself under law.¹ In both "He humbled Himself, becoming obedient."² In the one as in the other, it was within a world of material things and behind a veil which screened while it betrayed His glory, that He set Himself, as Creator no less than as Redeemer, to execute the purpose and manifest the honour of the Father.³

¹ Gal. iv. 4.

² Phil. ii. 8.

³ St. John i. 14, xvii. 4.

CHAPTER X

THE PANGS OF NATURE

Difficulties in Nature—alleged physical imperfections—indifference to morality—non-moral, not immoral—Suffering inevitable—reign of death—Darwinian law of survival—Amount of animal suffering unknown—avoid exaggerations on both sides—It results from two fundamental principles—Evolution brings graduation of values—sacrifice of inferior—sentience exposes to pain—effort involves competition—Christ's lesson on Divine fellow-suffering—Paul's teaching—Nature subject to vanity—creation's groans—hope of new earth—redemption of the body.

THE limits to the exhibition of Divine power in nature, to which I alluded in last chapter, present no perplexing difficulty for Christian thought. On the contrary, they fall unexpectedly into line, as we saw, with that lowly and obedient Life in which Christianity has taught us to behold the human Image of the Father. But there is a great deal besides this which tells "of a God that hideth Himself." Some of it raises graver issues for the theologian because it flings a veil over the perfection of the Divine Worker, even over His moral perfection. Especially when we ask after proofs of Divine beneficence among sentient

creatures, we encounter, along with a great deal that speaks of the goodness of God, evidence also of a baffling and discordant character. The difficulties raised by the widespread suffering of the animal world are serious. For then it is more than a question of goodness concealed that meets us, or of apparent indifference to the ethical. There are not a few who, contemplating animal life as a scene of carnage and pain, see against the background of nature only an image distressingly unlike that which looks out upon all men from the Face of Jesus Christ.

With certain physical shortcomings alleged to exist, we are, I think, less concerned; as, for example, when students of animal or vegetable structures point us, whether justly or not, to organs in some respects defective, or to their atrophy through disuse, or to degeneracy of type under untoward environment, with similar marks of what is termed "imperfection" in nature. Criticism of this sort may be due in some instances (as possibly when the eye is called "imperfect" as an optical instrument) to the critic's adoption of a theoretical standard of his own, overlooking the actual needs of the organism; or it may prove on closer inquiry to be

a mere mistake. Other alleged defects are obviously incidental to the complicated movement from which the rise of new animal forms has resulted : a movement which, though an upward one on the whole, has not been invariably from less to more perfect. Of course, each case of the sort needs to be examined in detail, and their just appreciation would require such a complete acquaintance with the whole of organic life in its conditions and development as no man of science can at present pretend to. Perfection, it is obvious, can be no more than a relative term at any stage in an upward or progressive movement : a term, therefore, not strictly applicable anywhere in such a world as this. That each creature or each structure be adapted for its immediate purpose or serve the needs of its time and place in the vast whole, entitles us to call it "good" ; and while evidence of such adaptation extorts in unnumbered instances the admiration of every student, he must be a rash man who will venture to affirm its absence in the exceptional instances where it is less obvious to human observation.

But when it is brought as a charge against the animal world that it is indifferent to morality, with the implied suggestion that its Maker must be so too, the allegation deserves to be more narrowly looked into. So far as the animals

themselves are concerned, they are, of course, frankly non-moral. Instinctive affections do occur of the same complexion as enter into the ethical life of man, but in the brute these never rise to the ethical level. Thus the altruistic instinct of a parent-bird proves as little its possession of ethical love as ferocity in the tiger shows it to be inspired by ethical hatred. We may speak of either, if we will, as a foreshadow of our own moral conduct, or as material laid in our animal constitution, either for temptations that assail us or for problems of duty which we have to solve. But when we would speak accurately we must own that morality never emerges till we reach the human. Ferocity in the tiger, shamelessness in the dog, lubricity in the ape, deceptive mimicry or craft in an insect, are not blameworthy. They cannot be where the moral sense is absent. Yet by a fallacy of association, a hasty onlooker is apt to impute blame where there can be none; the non-moral strikes the popular imagination as immoral.

Does, then, the formation of a non-moral world show the Maker of it to be Himself indifferent to morality? Is this anything more than a fresh instance of postponed self-revelation? Reserve we certainly encounter in the ethical sphere just as we did in the physical: a temporary

hiding or withholding of some deeper features in the Divine Image. For Man alone of earthly animals was it reserved to be the mirror, as well as the beholder, of his Maker's moral likeness. But this we cannot with justice call "indifference to morality" unless we are prepared to say that the Creator of all is bound to express the whole of His perfections at every stage in the course of His workmanship, so that no subsequent revelation is ever to supplement earlier revelations of Himself. To say so would be no less unreasonable than irreverent. False inferences we shall certainly draw if we pay regard to a portion only of the Self-manifestation of God. For in that as in so many other departments, His method has been one of advance. The best He has kept until now. The Son of Man, sent forth "when the fulness of the time was come," is the only complete "Image of the Invisible."¹

It is not the mere peopling of the globe with races in whatever numbers destitute of a moral sense, which offers to faith a real problem; nor the fact that only through an almost interminable succession of such non-moral races did the creative process mount to one solitary race by which the moral in God could be at length

¹ Gal. iv. 4; Col. i. 15.

reflected. It is the presence of suffering all through the ascending series. That blameless creatures have always suffered, not by a rare exception, but as a constant law, is what perplexes every serious thinker and casts over sentient life a dark shadow. This goes beyond any merely negative concealment of the feature which is highest in God—His goodness or beneficence. It looks like a contradiction of it. The very attribute in which Christianity has taught civilized men to see the highest glory of the Godhead—compassionate care for the creature—seems here to be obscured.

The central fact of the situation to be kept in view is the universal sway of death ; for it is with death that all pain, disease, and decay stand connected : violent death for the most part, brought about in every kingdom of animated nature through slaughter of the weak by beasts and birds of prey, with the infliction as a consequence of widespread, and sometimes of wanton, suffering. There has come in our own time the scientific formulation of all this into a theory which accounts for the origin of higher species in the past just by this systematic killing off of feebler or less advantageously equipped individuals, that others, better furnished for the struggle to exist, may survive and bequeath their

advantages to successors of a superior type. The very method of nature's advance is thus made to rest on ruthless competition, where it does not take the form of actual warfare. But I need hardly point out that the Darwinian law of survival did not start the difficulty, and does little if anything to aggravate it. The problem is inherent in the facts themselves, and these have always been patent enough. At most, science has merely fastened upon them the attention of our contemporaries, by suggesting for the first time a useful purpose which they are believed to have served in the economy of nature.

Nor does the difficulty turn essentially upon any computation which we may attempt to form as to either the extent or the intensity of the suffering involved. For any such computation the data are too scanty, or too precarious. It is not in our power to measure the sensibility of the animals. Were we to judge by our own experience, we should probably overestimate their pains; for it is likely that the further down we go in the scale, the less sensitive does the organism become. In the higher orders, accident, malformation, disease, old age, and scarcity of food are, no doubt, occasional evils, just as in the human family. These the pathologist is probably justified in regarding as unavoid-

able incidents in any sentient life which we can conceive of as inhabiting the globe. But from these the bulk of most species escape through a swift and comparatively painless extinction of life by other species that prey upon them. That so many furnish food to the carnivora or to insects is admittedly better on the whole than that they should die a lingering death or leave their carcasses to taint the air by slow decay. It is easy to exaggerate or overstate the proportion of pain to enjoyment in the animal world, as if the earth were little better than a torture chamber; forgetting that after all it is a place of pleasurable existence to the vast majority of its unnumbered occupants, where, by the lavish hospitality of their Provider, a table has been spread for their varied wants, down till the moment arrives for their dissolution. At all events we must recollect that the lower animals are spared the apprehension of future ills, the living over again in imagination of past ones, the moral regrets, the "grief that saps the mind," disillusionment and baffled hopes, with many another shape of mental distress; all of which go to make up man's solitary and melancholy pre-eminence in pain.

There is, however, an optimistic exaggeration to be avoided, as well as a pessimistic. Of this

also we have had instances, curious or flagrant, in the past. If some pre-scientific expositors, for example, pressed the verdict pronounced in Genesis: "God saw every thing that He had made, and, behold, it was very good,"¹ so far as to mean that the earth before Adam's fall knew neither death nor pain nor noxious beasts, so that all suffering, even in the lower creation, has been a consequence of human sin, we know how false to scientific fact was their idyllic dream. But it is still probable that some pious people cherish a facile optimism which shuts its eyes to real difficulties.

The point of consequence to be faced, it seems to me, is not the amount of animal suffering in the world, which must remain an unknown quantity, but the fact that it has been rendered unavoidable by the very system on which animated nature has been constructed. It results in the main from two fundamental ideas which underlie the whole. The one is evolution:—that the history of life upon the globe has been one of slow and difficult progress upward from simpler to more complex structures. The other is incarnation:—that conscious mind, animal or human, has always been incorporated in a sentient organism of matter. Why either of

¹ i. 31.

these methods should have been selected by the Author of nature as a ground-idea on which to proceed, is a question which, I believe, we possess no data whatever for answering. That is His secret. Unembodied spirits, without genealogy or inheritance, is the popular conception of those superior orders which we call angels: whether a correct one or not. Why it pleased Almighty Wisdom to pursue a different plan in the production, ultimately of man, and as a preparation for him of earth's other inhabitants, is a useless inquiry which it is no business of ours to put. But if any sober and candid attempt were to be made to account for the prevalence of physical evils, so as to justify them, it would have to proceed, I conceive, on the lines of these two characteristics of the animal world. For, once you accept a progressive evolution of mental life with its incarnation in sensitive material organisms, you have precisely the conditions from which imperfection, effort, pain and death may be expected to proceed.

Imperfection obviously, to begin with: that sort of imperfection which is implied in inferiority. Any advance from lower to higher forms of existence, moving steadily to some goal, creates, of course, an ascending scale of importance, conferring upon each rank of being a

distinct value of its own. We speak freely of superior and inferior grades. We do not even confine this graduated scale of values to living, any more than to inanimate, nature. We say the lower always exists for the higher, and the higher for the highest : matter for organisms ; plants for animals ; simpler for more developed structures ; and all for man. So we roughly block out the chief stories in the pyramid of creaturehood. Each is surpassed by those above it, for which it has furnished a platform, until we reach that which alone possesses a worth to its Maker that can neither be measured nor compared : namely, moral and spiritual personalities.

What may be the comparative worth of other creatures in their Maker's eyes, it must pass man's wit to estimate. He alone Who made every organism and fixed the ends it serves can appraise the claim of each, either to survive or to overcome or to enjoy. But to each, if we believe in God, we must suppose His wisdom to assign just that kind and degree of power or capacity, of permanence, of happiness in living, which consists with its position in the series or with the service it is to render in the complicated whole. Utility as a standard of valuation or of endowment among the creatures looks to us probable enough on a broad survey. It is at least the test by

which human society roughly adjusts the relative importance for its own ends of its several members, as well as of the humbler creatures which it domesticates or employs. But the question why in each case a larger room, or ampler faculties, or a richer heritage, or keener enjoyment, or longer life, has not been conferred upon the lower animals, is one which obviously none of us can be expected to answer. Enough to know that the very idea of progress implies inequality; that is, inferiority of some sort, an imperfection in some sense, in the humbler members of the series. It must likewise bring with it the disappearance of the lower when their purpose has been served, to make room for higher forms. Such familiar biological facts as the sacrifice of inferior species and their supersession by others, are seen on this scheme of life to be inevitable. Every creature must have its limit of time assigned to it, as well as of place. Death is as necessary as birth; for the species as for the individual.

Next: for every sentient organism, be its environment ever so favourable, or its rank in the scale high or low, we must admit some mixture of physical pain with its pleasures. We are all made so. Sensory nerves, lying open to stimuli of many sorts and in all degrees, cannot convey

agreeable sensations without also conveying at times such as are disagreeable. Yet it is the nature of the sensitive organism to exercise its voluntary functions only in response to stimulation of some sort ; and it is in the exercise of these functions that its very life consists.

Especially, if the activities of the creature are to be made co-operant factors in the upward movement of life,—which is the central thought in organic evolution,—then we are at once introduced to effort of some sort on their own part. We are not likely to be misled by the exaggeration which lies at the root of Schopenhauer's pessimism, that all want, or desire urging to effort, must be an evil because it involves some degree of pain—the pain at least of unattainment ; or by his desperate conclusion that mere existence, as we know it, is for that reason worse than no existence at all. It is true enough that in sensitive life, desire, with the effort after its satisfaction, is the spring of action, and that in all desire an element of pain in the shape of dissatisfaction, is unavoidable. No animal is fed without searching for its food, although it “takes no thought for the morrow.” Nothing lives that can achieve the ends it lives for without effort. And if the desires or aims of different creatures inhabiting the same area conflict, as when they

multiply they are sure to do, it is obvious that effort will become, at one time a competition for food, at another a contest for survival or for mastery. Thus by the very law of life, earth becomes a scene of struggle ; and struggle to the weak must mean pain or death.

There is no doubt that it is here, in this law which calls for competition, rewards the strong and crowds out the feeble, that Nature tramples most openly on the sympathies of a heart educated in Christian teaching. Yet even here there is something to be remembered on the other side. Life is not harder for the brutes than it has been for man himself. And yet to most men it has always been made patent enough from their own experience that all effort is by no means pain or loss, nor even all contest. The world is well agreed that much of the joy and much of the profit, no less than of the dignity, of living, both for man and beast, lies in the bracing of the will to attain, in difficulties surmounted, and opposition overcome. For anything our imperfect knowledge as yet enables us to affirm with confidence to the contrary, the economy of nature may quite well be as merciful on the whole as could obtain in a world constituted on those general principles which, for whatever reason, have always governed the development of life upon the globe.

After all is said which fairly can be said to reduce the sum, or to understand the cause, of suffering in the animal world, have we reconciled ourselves to the spectacle? While, on the one hand, the cultured classes in Christendom have been growing much more sensitive to pain of every kind,—that of the lower creation not excepted,—science, on the other, has been delineating before our eyes a darker picture of nature than our fathers saw. The full facts of the indictment are better known. We have learnt through what untold ages it has lasted. Popular writers have come in consequence to describe nature as ruthless or even cruel ; and the impression is left on many who have closed their minds to the lessons of Christianity that life as we know it can only be the gift of a Being who, if he do not delight in suffering, is at least heedless of it.

At this point all we can do is to invoke the lessons of Christ for the purpose of lightening the weight of a problem which not even He has solved. Granting that there are difficulties here which Christianity leaves unanswered, no Christian can believe that the Divine Heart opened up to us by Jesus Christ is pitiless or indifferent to the fate of His humblest creature. Even Old Testament revelation had recognised that the claim on their Creator's care made unconsciously by the

dumb animals is acknowledged on His part, and that in the multitude of His pensioners He forgets nothing that He has made. In the references of our Lord to small birds, not one of which falls to the ground without our Father, one catches a tenderer note. Into the Creator's care for His handiwork, He Who interprets to us the Father has put a heart of fatherhood. Still better, He has been Himself the messenger of a love in the Godhead that can stoop to carry a sufferer's load. Nature does not tell us anything of a God Who enters into pain to suffer with it, but the Cross of Jesus does. It is true that it is man's pains which Jesus shared, not those of brutes ; nevertheless, it was not our nobler sorrows only He made His own, but even our physical and purely animal sufferings. Once this clue is in our hands, we can follow it up, and read the sympathy of the Immanent Creator with both the gladness and the pains of creation in the light of His intimate knowledge of all sentient beings. For it is clearly one thing for the Omniscient to possess a perfect acquaintance with the states of matter and its changes such as a complete human science, were it attainable, would give to the observer ; and a very different thing to be actually conscious of a creature's consciousness—privy from within (so to say) to every sensation, every feeling of pleasure

or pain, desire or volition, which forms part of its secret experience. Man's is not the only hermit mind in the world, inhabiting a secret cell into which no other finite mind can penetrate. All conscious life probably must share this solitariness. But the Infinite All-conscious Mind, immanent everywhere, must be immanent in the lowliest of conscious beings, cognizant of its experience. It is a kind of knowledge which, because shut off from us, appears to us mysterious if not inconceivable. Yet in our own case, is it not faith's very key to Divine sympathy—the means by which we believe our Father enters into helpful fellowship with our spirits? In the case of other animals, it may be the key to His compassions. In the pangs of harmless little lives, sacrificed unknowingly to His great world-plan, shall we be afraid to say He Himself is a fellow-sufferer? If in their full-throated songs of gladness He rejoices, shall there be no fellow-feeling for their pain?

Finally, the most singular contribution which Christian revelation has made to this mystery lies, I think, in its frank admission that the existing creation is only a temporary and imperfect stage in the Divine plan, with its hopeful outlook toward a higher development to follow.

The clearest intimation of its teaching on both these points, though by no means the only one, is found in a well-known passage of St. Paul's Roman letter, where he tells us we are looking on an unfinished world which waits and longs for a better one to come.¹ He put his finger on two features in the present stage of creation which imply that this is not to be its latest. One of these was by no means new in Hebrew literature. "Subject to vanity" had long been a familiar complaint with pessimistic thinkers.² It means, to begin with, the subjection of nature to a law of incessant flux and alternation: birth and death, day and night, summer and winter, blossom and decay, integration and disintegration; the systole and diastole of the world, its ceaseless rhythmic pulse ever in ebb and flow. It is a pulse of which the beats measure the lifetime of a perishable world. But for this reason it means likewise what may be called "unfulfilment" or "unattainment." It is a world where nothing realizes its ideal. Nothing even remains at its own best. When things are nearest to perfection, they begin at once to succumb to "corruption." Hence nothing abides; nothing stands still. All life upon the globe is but a fruitless effort after some

¹ Rom. viii. 18-25.

² See Ecclesiastes, *passim*; especially i. 2-11.

fruition unrealized. Disappointment everywhere ; decay dogging the heels of life. "All things are full of labour ; man cannot utter it : the eye is not satisfied with seeing, nor the ear filled with hearing."¹

No one needs to be told how deeply this defect is graven upon creation, or how heavily it has burdened the thoughtful in every generation. Of itself it offers no assurance that any higher or more permanent state is kept in reserve. The present era is unsatisfying, no doubt : does it follow that it must prove to be transitional ? Shall consummation ever replace disappointment ? or the enduring the transitory ? Is there to be a state of attainment ? At this point the Apostle's new hope, born of the Christian facts, breaks in upon us like a prophecy. There is a second evil from which earth suffers, worse than unattainment. It "groans in pain together until now." Do we not know that it does ? Yet out of its very groans comes a prospect of deliverance. Suffering cannot be the last word of Almighty Love. Not since Almighty Love has come down in the Eternal Son into the heart of creation to share its pains, and, out of its passion made His own, to win redemption. To the instructed ear of Christ's Apostle, creation's groans sound like

¹ Eccles. i. 8.

travail-pangs which foretell a new and better birth. Nature stands, therefore, now on tiptoe with expectation; and its last word is—hope.

In this great passage, no doubt, as in all deep sayings that concern things unseen and future, there is obscurity. Much must be left untold; and the message is for the ear of faith. Of such things science can have nothing to tell. Yet there is no inherent improbability, to judge from the past, that some higher development awaits man's world. Already, as science assures us, there have been two main epochs in its annals. During the first, matter was everything. It was a world of mechanism, moved by necessary law, where no sign was given that life or mind or spirit was ever to be joined to dead matter. Then came the long period, near the close of which it may be we are standing, when conscious mind has been embodied in the material; embodied for ages in the slow evolution of the animal, but now finding its culmination in the embodied spirit of Man. But we see not yet the lordship of moral and spiritual personalities over matter assured. What we see is spirit conditioned too much by matter, only with difficulty conditioning it, and too frequently in positive conflict with it; limited, hampered, fettered; warring against the flesh, often overcome by it, never quite

victorious.¹ Why should not a third and final era of development slowly dawn, or it may be with suddenness burst, upon man and upon man's earth, when spirit shall be not disembodied, but regnant, matter itself becoming so transformed at last as to be the obedient organ or handmaid of the spirit? Is it a dream of this Apostle that all the baffled endeavour and painful longing of the world not merely foretell, but are actually "working out for us more and more exceedingly an eternal weight of glory?"² May not the glorified and overcoming Son of Man be at once the pledge and the firstfruits of "New Heavens and a New Earth" that shall be?³

Here is, then, a hope which rose upon our race with Christianity, that all this pathetic night-side of nature, with its unfulfilled promise and gleams dashed with shadow, is but another stage after all in the illimitable process by which Infinite Wisdom has been conducting man and man's world to the ends of Infinite Love: a stage doomed in its turn to pass away and give place to a world no longer subject to change or liable to decay. It is no reasonable complaint to make against this Christian hope, based on Christ's deliverance of mankind, that it affords merely the

¹ Cf. Gal. v. 17; Rom. vii. 21-25.

² 2 Cor. iv. 17 (R.V.).

³ 2 Pet. iii. 13.

vaguest or most shadowy hints of that "world to come, whereof we speak,"¹ leaving us with a swarm of curious questions all unanswered. Hope that could be seen would be no hope at all.² In creation all beginnings hide themselves in obscurity. Every great moment in the past, when a change, long looked forward to, broke upon the world, has been a moment of surprise. It came in a shape which no one had guessed beforehand. So it was when Christ came the first time. So it is to be at His second coming.

At first sight the "redemption of our own body" might seem to promise safer material for an eschatology than the new heavens and the new earth. We are to be still incarnate beings, retaining, as our Lord does, our dual constitution, material as well as spiritual, for our re-fashioned bodies are to wear the likeness of His own.³ Yet after all it is little enough we know of His risen humanity now that a mystic change has passed over it, from earthly mortality to the strength, honour, and incorruption of a spiritual body.⁴ Of the changes that are to pass upon man's dwelling-place we are left in ignorance no less profound.

¹ Heb. ii. 5, *τὴν οἰκουμένην τὴν μέλλουσάν.*

² Rom. viii. 24.

³ Luke xxiv. 39-43 ; Phil. iii. 21.

⁴ 1 Cor. xv. 42-54.

So far as I see, two features only stand out in Holy Scripture. Both are set forth by negatives. The first sets aside the old complaint which all men make about the present age, that it is "subject to vanity." The world to come is pictured as a city, no longer of unattainment and change, but of permanence, enduring because undecaying. It is imaged in Apocalyptic symbols by earth's most indestructible treasures, its splendid opulence of gold and gems.¹ When those things are removed that can be shaken, as things that have been made, then the things which cannot be shaken shall remain.² The other feature made clear to us is that it shall be a Home fitted for the abode of human beings in whom the spiritual has won its final victory over the sinful and animal flesh, with its passions and lusts :—a world "wherein dwelleth righteousness," In order to a perfected human society, at once satisfying and everlasting, it is indispensable that provision be found for endless advance in the healthful development of our manhood. Nor is such an endless advance in knowledge or in character conceivable for the individual save through corporate manhood—a commonwealth of unlike personalities who by mutual co-operation

¹ Rev. xxi., especially vers. 10–21.

² Heb. xii. 26–28.

complement each other. So might men dwell together at last in a happy and loving exchange of services, each contributing to all and all caring for each, in a Society from which self-assertion is banished and rivalry and envy. This is enough for hope. "If we hope for that we see not, then do we with patience wait for it."¹

¹ Rom. viii. 25.

CHAPTER XI

AIM OF THE DIVINE RULE

A Doctrine of Providence vital to Religion—therefore all but universal—its value depends on doctrine of God—Old Testament teaching—centred in national fortunes—New Testament enlarged it to all history—centring in Christ's Redemption—agrees with modern hope for mankind—two world-aims combine—God's glory and Man's well-being—Doctrine of the Decree in older theology—a Plan eternally thought out—difficulty raised by free will—Plan willed as a whole—misleading term "decree" to be avoided—Attempts to interpret actual events unsuccessful—in great or small—Yet the aim is made known in Christ—Hebrews took retributive justice as guiding aim—problem thus created—efforts to solve it—has ceased to perplex Christian faith—limits within which retribution enters—other ministers to discipline of character

THE same fundamental sense of religious dependence on a Higher Power which we saw to lie at the basis of every doctrine of Creation, calls no less for a doctrine of Providence. The two are much too closely interwoven to exist apart. From the moment when an individual life enters the world with its inherited stock of congenital capacities and predispositions, it finds itself acted on by a given environment which it did not make for itself. Throughout the whole course of its experience countless influences come to it from

without, against which, no doubt, it can react, but which nevertheless go far to make it whatever it is to become, determining its good or evil fortune. For all this it is no less dependent than for its existence. The instinct for religion bids us trace both to the same unseen Hand.

It is therefore not surprising that well-nigh every religion has had a germ of belief in Divine oversight of human affairs. It was no discovery of revelation. Cicero could argue from the mere existence of the gods that the world must be administered *eorum consilio*.¹ Of course, men's ideas about the part which Superior Powers play in their affairs have varied greatly, advancing slowly with the general advance of religious thought. The most elementary stage of religion begins atomistically, by imagining some invisible being to lurk behind whatever occurs to further or to cross man's private ends, and to that the savage ascribes conscious intention. Among the gods of the polytheist, departments of nature are similarly parcelled out, each under the sway of its presiding patron. The first great step forward was taken when the world-order was seen to be one. A still greater when it came to be suffused by the light of a single Divine purpose. To this substantially, Greek thinkers,

¹ *De Naturâ Deorum*, i. 2.

though not Greek religion, had come before Christ; and so soon as this belief is reached that the same Power which made the world orders whatever happens in it with a view to secure that His design in its formation shall not miscarry, we may justly speak of a full-formed "doctrine of Providence." No ancient school of philosophy was without such a doctrine; save the Epicureans, whose theory that the care of the world would interfere with the self-sufficing happiness of the gods was, in fact, equivalent to atheism,¹ and perhaps the Stoics, whose teaching on fate was inconsistent with any genuine belief in Providence.

Although human reason, inspired by the innate sense of dependence on the Unseen, was sufficient to originate among the devout heathen a belief in some sort of Divine overruling, it had no clear or steady light to shed either on the character or on the intentions of the Over-ruler. Yet until these are known the mere sense of dependence cannot rise into pious trust. The whole value for religion of any doctrine on this subject must turn on its inspiring confidence in the Unseen Power that presides over each man's life. Only when the Over-ruler is believed to be both upright and friendly, One Whose purposes

¹ Cf. Cicero, *op. cit.*: "Epicurum verbis reliquisse Deos, re sustulisse."

with men are kind as well as just, can the soul find support under earthly vicissitudes in the fact of His over-rule or rely upon it with hopefulness. Such reposeful confidence in the Divine control was one of the precious gifts for which mankind has to thank Hebrew revelation. Hence the Old Testament is not simply alive from end to end with the thought of Divine over-rule—"the Book of Providence," to borrow a phrase of Lange's—it is the earliest literature in which that thought becomes a constant stay and solace to the pious. Devout Hebrews clung to the truth of a providence in the affairs of men, because they had learnt to see in Jehovah, One "Whose eyes are upon the righteous and His ears open unto their cry."

It was a rooted conviction of Hebrew piety that no event, however casual, escapes the directing Hand of God. Nothing is accidental.¹ Behind human actors, in their freest or most sinful acts, the will and power of the Almighty were to be discerned, turning them to His own wise and good ends.² Teleology could even gather itself up into a popular proverb: "Jehovah hath made everything for His own purpose: yea, even the wicked for the day of evil."³ No doubt,

¹ Prov. xvi. 33.

² *e.g.* Gen. i. 20.

³ Prov. xvi. 4 (margin of R.V.); cf. Amos iii. 6; Lam. iii. 38; Isa. xlv. 7.

when events were looked at on a large scale, Israel was the centre of this providential outlook. The Hebrew annals are history with a clue to it divinely supplied; and it is in view of Israel's fortunes that everything is interpreted. Normal incidents in nature or in human life, equally with occasional wonders, are woven into Jehovah's guidance of His people. From the same national point of view do the prophets divine His intentions in the rise or fall of adjacent tribes, even in the wars and politics of world-empires. It could not be otherwise so long as the saving purposes of God with the race remained bound up closely with the fortunes of one called and chosen people. The point of view was necessarily too narrow: but as time went on it began to dawn upon Israel's farthest-sighted seers that it was for mankind, and not for Israel only, that a kingdom of God was in preparation.

When we reach the New Testament the horizon has widened. We still find the ancient Hebrew doctrine of a Divine Hand that controls all events. But now it is seen that this is done in the interest of human deliverance from evil. The Divine purpose for the race has culminated in Jesus Christ; so that, to the Apostle of the wider Gentile world, Christ becomes the centre, not of Jewish history alone, but of all history. In his most speculative

epistle St. Paul reached his widest outlook.¹ God's real aim from the first, he said, had contemplated not one small people only, but all nations. This had been a secret deliberately held back till the new era dawned, because until now it could not be made intelligible. In Christ it had been disclosed. The era of fulfilment was come. And the secret which interprets everything is the Divine Purpose to gather up at last into a head in Christ the whole of restored and regenerate humanity—one Family of the recovered sons of God. The clue to providence, therefore, has been redemption. The centre of God's "purpose" (*πρόθεσις*) has from the first been His incarnate Son as Lord of the new creation and King of the Realm of God on earth. The Apostle's idea seems to be that all events, no matter how we sort them into distinct classes, are concurrents to this common issue and melt into one system. Nor does he think of God as a simple arranger or disposer of events, much less as an idle spectator, but as Himself an active co-operant. He "energises all things in harmony with the counsel or scheme which He Himself has willed."²

In its larger outlines at least this theory of

¹ Cf. Eph. i. 3-14, iii. 1-13.

² Eph. i. 11 : *προορισθέντες κατὰ πρόθεσιν τοῦ τὰ πάντα ἐνεργοῦντος κατὰ τὴν βουλήν τοῦ θελήματος αὐτοῦ.*

providence, which was the mature fruit of Christian revelation, has gone far to capture the best thinking of the modern mind. It falls into line with what science itself (as we saw in an earlier chapter) has come to suggest, that the long sore travail of earth's past has been tending towards the perfecting of humanity as its latest birth. That covers a great deal. It includes every element which enters into the complex whole which we understand by civilisation: the growth of knowledge, progress in the arts, spread of education, social and economic well-being. Nor can it overlook the culture of the body or the relief of both mental and bodily disorder. But read in its highest terms, it must mean before everything else the perfecting of the race in moral and social virtue. Few serious and thoughtful persons nowadays doubt that the ethical culture of mankind, through the development on the widest scale of unselfish and disciplined character, till the whole world become a brotherhood of peaceful communities linked by common interests and mutual sympathy, is the very highest result to be hoped for in any far-off future from the progress of our species. It is for this that the best of men are labouring to-day. But this ethical culture of mankind is but another name for a world-wide kingdom of God; and probably

not very many will question in their heart that our best hope for such an issue rests with Christianity. To have attained this conviction is a long step in advance.

Once this moral development of the race is accepted as the Divine aim in human history, it commends itself to the theologian from another point of view. It combines into one two possible motives between which religious thinkers have hesitated, in their effort to account for that whole work of God on earth which we distinguish into two as creation and providence. What ultimate motive moved the Eternal to call into being our human race at all, with the world which He fashioned for its dwelling-place? From opposite points of view different answers have been given : from the point of view of the Divine Being Himself and from that of His human creatures. The early Fathers believed the world to be made for man ; whereas the stronger emphasis which was laid at the Reformation, especially by Reformed theologians, on the Divine glory, led them to say that God made all things *Sibi, non nobis : ad majorem Dei gloriam*. When we ask, however, what is meant by the glory of God, we can only define it from the Christian standpoint as the manifestation and satisfaction of His holy love, through calling into existence a world of holy and

loving spirits after His own likeness. Not in power to create, nor in wisdom to guide the creature, resides the highest element of the Divine. "God is Love"; other attributes are but ministers to holy love. That alone, therefore, can be the supreme or final self-manifestation of God which the Eternal Son has made by His incarnation and sacrifice.¹ And the Divine glory is nowhere reflected so completely on earth as it shall be in the realm of the redeemed, when the freely chosen law of love shall have become an inner necessity for each, and all are bound into free and spiritual harmony by no other bond than this ethical resemblance to God Himself.

We reach the same result when we adopt the other alternative, and say, the Divine motive was to secure the highest benefits which love could desire for His human creatures. Not indeed on a hedonistic theory of life. If mere happiness were the supreme end, it would not be possible—man being what he is—to bring that into unison with the Divine glory. But it is not happiness at any cost, or for its own sake, which such a Being as God will seek for such a creature as man, but goodness, or ethical perfection like His own. Happiness, to be sure, in its best form of inward blessedness akin to God's, must inevitably

¹ Cf. 1 John iv. 9, 10.

accompany ethical perfection like His own. Nevertheless it is not even such happiness as this which is consciously sought after in the noblest life. Not that, but the victory of perfect love over evil is the end which rewards all sacrifices, conflicts, and toils, whether on God's part or on ours.

The two aims, then, of the Divine glory and of man's supreme good are not conflicting, but coalesce in Christ's redemption. Jesus glorified the Father on the earth : He did it by accomplishing the work of human deliverance.¹ In seeking either result, He sought the other. You may call the one, with Reformed divines, an "objective" and the other a "subjective" end; or the one, with the Lutherans, a "final" and the other an "intermediate" end. Essentially, they are the same.

The magnificent generalisation of St. Paul, that all human events converge to a head at last in Christ, welcome as it is to Christian faith, has to be taken over by Christian theology and made the guiding light for its doctrine of universal providence. From two opposite points of view may such a doctrine be attempted : from the side of an eternal plan in the Divine Mind ;

¹ St. John xvii. 4.

or from its temporal evolution in human experience.

So long as theology is content to move in the region of the abstract, and deal only with what the Apostle terms "the Purpose of the ages which He formed in Christ Jesus our Lord,"¹ a few steps conduct the reasoner to this conviction, that the whole plan of the world's history, no less than the end on which it all converges, must be eternally and unchangeably present to the Divine Mind as a thought, and to the Divine Will as an intention.

The ultimate design of God cannot fail of accomplishment. If it is not to fail, the steps to it need to be foreseen and resolved upon as steps : each, that is, in its several place, as so many concurrents or links in one vast process. This belongs to every rational plan ; for if the bearing of any event upon the issue be not foreseen or thought out, then it may possibly thwart, or even defeat, instead of furthering, the result aimed at. No human intellect when planning a great scheme, a campaign, for instance, or a work of engineering, can possibly anticipate, calculate, and provide against every contingency in the execution of it. But it does its best. If it fail to take account of any unforeseen occurrence, that is only because

¹ κατὰ πρόθεσιν τῶν αἰώνων, ἣν ἐποίησεν ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ τῷ Κυρίῳ ἡμῶν, Eph. iii. 11.

human powers are limited. Consequently when we speak of the Infinite Mind, we cannot admit what is unforeseen or contingent. Everything that shall be or shall happen, both in its causes and in its results, must lie "naked and laid open before the eyes of Him with Whom we have to do"¹ Not, indeed, as a result of calculation : our methods of forecasting the future by estimating probabilities and inferring consequences, are requisite only from the imperfection of our faculties. To the Eye that always sees everything as it is or shall be, and in all its connections, nothing can be uncertain, nothing merely probable. And, of course, this reasoning will equally apply to what we call trivial or accidental as to what appears to us important ; to individuals as well as to classes ; to the particular applications of a rule as to the rule itself.

Such an act of cognition may be said to be in a sense timeless. It is a knowledge of things in their constant relations. When any event is known in its necessary causes and no less necessary effects, its place in the series remains the same, whether it be viewed *a parte ante*, as not yet having occurred, or *a parte post*, as already over. To such a perfect all-embracing science as this, to happen becomes a mere incident in time.

¹Heb. iv. 13 (R.V.).

No doubt whatever is to happen is known to such a Mind as certain to take place in a given order of succession : that is, in its own time. Nevertheless, the knowledge or thought which He has of it admits neither of change nor of succession, but is independent of time altogether. For He unceasingly contemplates everything in its place as a rational link involved in the universal chain of what is to be.

All this would offer little difficulty to the reason were man himself nothing more than such a link in the chain of nature's mechanism, with all his acts physically predetermined, like the other organisms on the globe. On a thoroughgoing hypothesis of necessary evolution, divine foresight presents no insoluble problem. It is free will which creates the difficulty. Even as respects the vast majority of human actions, little difficulty need arise. For our will does not act *in vacuo*, as it were, but under the complex influence upon it of environment, of inherited tendencies, of acquired habits, and of motives, conscious or unconscious. Our liberty is thus straitly fenced and limited. So much so, that the better we know our fellow-man, the nearer we can come to predicting how under given conditions he will act. When a master of fiction or of the drama has developed the character he has created, he knows that he must

exhibit him as behaving in a certain situation so and not otherwise, on pain of violating verisimilitude and incurring a charge of being untrue to nature. These facts suggest that with an absolutely perfect knowledge of each man, of his past, as well as of all the forces, seen or unseen, that are playing upon him, the Searcher of hearts may be able to read his freest actions in their genesis. Along this line some solution of the difficulty may be possible. Yet we cannot be said to solve it. For at the core of the will there does remain a small class of human volitions, acts of deliberate choice, in which, after reasons for action *pro* and *con* have been weighed, the agent is conscious that he decides with personal freedom. How actions of that class can be foreseen, it is beyond our power to understand. But, at all events, however little we can explain it, it is certain that the Omniscient does foresee even the freest of human actions, for He has sometimes foretold, and He constantly makes use of them.¹

¹ Of this the most conspicuous instance by far occurs in the passion of our Lord. That had not only been purposed as essential to the Divine counsel of redemption, but foretold both in prophecy and by Jesus Himself; yet it was all brought about in an undesigned way by free acts of human actors: by the criminal plotting of the Jewish rulers, the treachery of Judas, and the weak complaisance of the Roman magistrate. Thrice over in the early chapters of the Acts is it repeated that Messiah's death had been divinely ordained, but executed in ignorance by wicked men. See ii. 23, iii. 17, 18, iv. 27, 28.

Now, if we assume the entire history of man, from origin to consummation, thus to lie open to God's eternal insight as a plan that leads most surely to His design, purposed in Christ, then it cannot but be willed by Him as well as thought. This also is involved. No doubt before Infinite Intelligence, an infinity of possible worlds may be presumed to lie ever intellectually present. But to constitute a "plan" in the proper sense, there must be a resolution of the will to give actuality to what the mind conceives as possible. This is just what by old divines was called the decree of God (*decretum*). The term has been an unfortunate one. To English ears its use conveys the suggestion of a command issued to subordinates by the Supreme Power: a sort of *ukase* with such associated ideas as irresistible force, arbitrariness, and severity. Of course, to any instructed theologian its employment as a technical term of his science means something quite different. It covers, in truth, a harmless enough idea:—this, namely, that whatever changes or events, including men's sins and errors, were seen to be comprised in the history of the world as it was to be, these the Most High incorporated in His plan, and decided to employ with perfect wisdom as means towards His holy and loving design. It is well that a word so liable to misconstruction

should be as far as possible avoided. When it is used, it ought to be in the singular, not the plural number ; in order to bring out that the world-plan is the object of Divine Volition in its integrity or totality, as a single consistent and concatenated whole. Though developed in time by successive steps, which come to our knowledge piece-meal, as it were, or as separate events, yet to the mind and will of the Eternal, no event stands apart in isolation or is willed entirely for its own sake as an end in itself ; but each one must stand in such relationship with the rest, that it is beheld as contributory to the final result. Only so can we hope to understand in what sense God can be said to will the sinful acts of men. What He wills is a whole of things into which the crimes and vices of mortals enter as foreseen, tolerated, and utilised factors. To that extent, and no more, He must choose to let them be done by the responsible and free agents who do them. Further than that our theodicy, it seems to me, cannot go.¹

So far, with aid from philosophy, the labours of the older theological schools, mediæval and Protestant alike, built up, not unsuccessfully, an abstract theory of Providence *sub specie eternitatis*.

¹ See Note L, "Protestant Symbols on Providence."

Though, like much else which we inherit from the same source, it has largely passed out of view, yet it may still assist one's reason to grasp the multiplicity of events under the unity of a plan with a single purpose. But of itself it remains a mere framework, which tells us nothing of the contents of the plan or how they actually contribute to promote the end-result. When theology attempts to pass from its abstract theory to interpret concrete facts of life in the light of what we believe to be the Divine motive or guiding thought, it essays a task where its success, either on the collective or on the individual scale, has been more questionable. On the historical scale, the task is too immense; a Christian interpretation of the whole past of our race is yet to seek. On the minuter scale of individual experience, the problem of Divine guidance in each man's life is one which each of us has to attempt for himself. It hides itself in the secret history of one's personal experience. Both in great and small alike, therefore, the Divine plan is a matter, not for scientific knowledge, but for religious faith. Our ignorance is too profound. Even of the events and influences which are shaping our own lives, each of us knows only a little; of their meaning or intention in the plan of God we know still less. Every single life is but a very

minute factor in the contemporary movement of one's generation. Of the long story of the past, oblivion has swallowed up everything save a few scattered facts, imperfectly reported, the value and coherence of which we can only guess at. While of the future we can say nothing. We have no idea how much is still to come; nor are we sure enough of what the end result is to be, to compute or even to guess how this or that puzzling incident in providence may bear upon it. But, if we are not able to unravel the tangled skein of earthly providence, its guiding motive at least has been revealed to faith. The key to universal providence which theology receives at the hands of Christian faith is the love of our Father for all mankind, His supreme concern for the training of moral character, His purpose to evolve a world-wide deliverance from evil, and His gift of the Son to be the Divine-human Head of the race, in Whom and by means of Whom its destiny is to be wrought out.

It was not, however, until the Advent that these guiding thoughts could enter fully into faith. Before Christ came, there was an earlier level of revelation, when devout men employed for the interpretation of providence a different aspect of the Divine character. And this deserves

some attention ; for Christianity could only surmount it by absorbing it.

Hebrew religion set out from the recognition of Jehovah as righteous Lord and Judge. Consequently its guide to the interpretation of providence was the justice of the Overlord. In the good or ill fortune which befalls men it saw only retribution. Such a judicial theory was not peculiar to the Hebrews. It is attested by natural conscience, and readily occurs wherever religion grows ethical. Here and there it was found in pagan faiths, especially in Greek religion during its better days. An eternal law of retributive justice is administered, it was thought, by Zeus, of which the Furies were the executants. That secured that sooner or later "the punishment of sin [of flagrant crimes at least], is certain and inevitable."¹ But the surpassing emphasis which Hebrew religion, especially during its prophetic period, laid on the righteous character of Jehovah, lent to this interpretation of His rule a central pre-eminence. "Jehovah's throne is in heaven: His eyes behold, His eyelids try, the children of men."² On this regal attribute of administrative justice as on a rock was the trust of godly men taught to repose. So that it became their settled

¹ Haigh, *Tragic Drama of the Greeks*, p. 91.

² Ps. xi. 4 ; cf. ix. 7, 8, lxxxix. 14, xcvi. 2.

expectation that God would repay every wicked person with earthly disaster, but crown the upright with success. For such an expectation there was much to be said, especially so long as regard was had to the fortunes of the people as a whole. When Israel, therefore, on the eve of its fall had to be warned that its privileged vocation would not avert the Divine penalties which impended, we know how it became the standing message of the prophets, delivered with unapproached passion and eloquence, that no State which is a prey to evil-doing can escape national calamity. There is enough in the fate of other nations in the past to corroborate such teaching. It is a lesson of history which moralists and philosophical historians have echoed. The faults which infest successful States, like pride, luxury, cowardice, and laxity of family morals, are precisely such as by a natural law work their decay and overthrow. Moreover, it was essential that before Jesus could with safety disclose the paternal grace of God as a gospel for the worst of sinners, this foundation truth of His moral earnestness and severity against wrong-doing should be, not disclosed merely, but wrought into the very fabric of revealed religion.

Nevertheless, when retribution was made the interpreter of providence, above all when it came

to be applied to individual experience, its inadequacy became apparent. It clashed with patent facts. Prosperity and adversity are not always allotted in proportion to desert. And when this theory broke down, there was created for every devout Hebrew the sorest of all trials to his faith. No other is so frequently dealt with in the Old Testament; and no other went so near to wreck the trust which good men reposed in a Divine government of human affairs.¹ At all times, no doubt, the unequal distribution of earthly good has been a standing problem. But to the Hebrew it was made exceptionally perplexing by two circumstances: the one, that Israel was placed under a régime of secular reward and penalty—both the promises and the threatenings attached to its covenant with Jehovah being of a material character;² the other, that a future judgment in the hereafter to rectify the inequalities of the present was a very late discovery to Jewish faith, unknown till near the close of the canon.³

¹ See the treatment of this subject by A. B. Davidson in his *Biblical and Literary Essays*, London, 1902, Essays II. and XI.; also in Professor Peake's *Problem of Suffering in the Old Testament*.

² See the blessings and curses recited in Deut. xxviii.

³ Cf. Eccles. xi. 9, xii. 13, 14. By its emphatic teaching on the point, this late book "opened," says Ginsburg, "a new bar of judgment in the world to come": a step of paramount consequence for the relief of the ancient perplexity.

To meet the difficulty which arises when wicked men prosper, the aged author of the Thirty-seventh Psalm, which Tertullian called a "mirror of providence," could only say: Wait until you see the end. Ere all be over, disaster is sure to overtake such as hasten to be rich by unworthy means. But neither does that always hold. If he himself escape, then may not retribution fall on the offender's descendants,¹ like an ancestral curse cleaving in Greek drama to a criminal's house? When this doctrine of posthumous retribution was abused by the godless in Judah, who argued that if men are doomed to suffer unjustly for the fault of their ancestors, it matters nothing how they themselves behave, the traditional theory had to be supplemented in a prophet of the Exile by a counter-doctrine of individual responsibility.²

The other side of the problem was even more puzzling to faith: Why do good men suffer disproportionately, and often die unrelieved? With this problem much of the Old Testament literature is exercised. The sorest element by far in the trial of Job's faith was created by it. Protesting his integrity, the sufferer in that poem has no explanation to offer. It is Elihu who is brought

¹ Ps. xxxvii. 28, xxi. 10, cix. 9-13; cf. Jer. xxxii. 18, 19.

² Ezek. xviii. ; see also Job xxi. 19-21 (R.V.).

in to suggest in a hesitating way that affliction may sometimes be, not retributive, but reformatory; and who of us is above the need of correction?¹ Yet it does not appear as if the author or final editor of that wonderful drama felt satisfied with the suggestion as a solution. At least the address of Jehovah Himself furnishes no clue; and the patriarch's restoration at last to twice the wealth he possessed before pays a parting homage to traditional orthodoxy.

Occasionally a higher note was struck. There are certain Psalms² where the saint, wrestling with temptation, rises to a conviction that the fellowship which he enjoys with God is after all a deeper, and may prove to be a more lasting, good than any temporal advantage to be gained by iniquity. Thus faith won a victory over facts which baffled the understanding. And we all recollect how in the presence of Israel's calamity yet another way of looking at the problem of undeserved suffering, and a most fruitful one, occurred to the great prophet of the Exile.³ It may be vicarious: it may work out blessing for others. So near could the best-taught souls in Israel approximate to the New Testament view. Yet nothing before Christ really dislodged from the Hebrew mind its old theory of an earthly

¹ Job xxxvi. 9, 10.

² Pss. xlix. and lxxiii.

³ Isa. liii.

retribution.¹ Not even late tenets, like resurrection, future judgment, or a share in Messianic glory ; for it was still, Mr. Charles tells us, "the object of apocalyptic literature in general to solve the difficulties connected with the righteousness of God and the suffering condition of His righteous servants on earth."² Our Lord's disciples could still ask, "Who did sin, this man or his parents, that he should be born blind?"³

Under the light which Jesus threw upon human destiny and the purposes of His Father, it is now easy for us to see why this ancient problem ceased to perplex. Providence became inspired in His hands with a new spirit. He was come, He said, not to judge but to save the world.⁴ His lessons on the Fatherhood of God and the example of His own Cross-bearing for mankind combined to give a quite altered meaning to suffering. Rather they gave to it many meanings, all of them salutary. It was taken up into an economy of grace. It became an instrument of deliverance from sin, a means of refining character and of strengthening faith. Sometimes it betokened the faithful severity of a Father Who chastiseth every

¹ It still finds expression, for example, in Ecclesiastes ; cf. viii. 11-14. Malachi speaks of persons who openly blasphemed God by charging His ways with injustice ; see Mal. ii. 17, iii. 14, 15.

² *Book of Enoch*, Oxford, 1893, p. 22.

³ St. John ix. 2.

⁴ St. John xii. 47.

son whom He receiveth. At other times, borne cheerfully for Christ's sake, it deepened the disciple's fellowship with his Master. He drank of the same cup. The cross became the Christian badge of honour. Besides, in the prospect of the Lord's impending return the present life dwindled to a vanishing point. Thus, through a variety of causes, it came about that there is very little shadow cast upon the enthusiastic pages of the New Testament either by retributive suffering or by any other mystery of earthly providence. Nor did such difficulties attract much attention from the early Church till near the close of the fourth century, when the disasters which gathered round the Empire dealt heavy blows at men's traditional reliance on the stability of the world-order.

Although we never can fall back again into the old mistake of expecting the prosperous and adverse events of life to be apportioned strictly to men's desert, we cannot overlook the fact that to some extent retribution does enter into the order of the world. It is at least one factor in the Divine rule. There is, as Bishop Butler said, "a tendency in virtue and vice to produce good and bad effects";¹ so that, although not judgment but discipline in character is the Ruler's

¹ *Analogy*, iii. 5.

guiding purpose, yet under that supreme aim and in subservience to it, retributive forces do assert themselves. They fill a subordinate rôle though it may be a large one. They are absorbed into the service of a higher and more kindly aim. Up to a certain point they actually are found to minister to moral improvement, both in private and public life. Many a prodigal has been brought to himself by the bitter fruits of his past misconduct. Israel is not the only people that has emerged from political overthrow the wiser or the better for it. May we lay down the formula that under the present dispensation retribution enters just so far as it contributes to moral discipline, and no further? Take, for instance, social and homely virtues, like industry, honesty, temperance and thrift. Certainly these are fostered on the whole by the material prosperity which it is their tendency to produce. The opposite vices are discouraged by the poverty and discredit which they entail. Here we find a deep-seated and self-acting law of social retribution which is manifestly conducive to the formation of one type of character. It strengthens the motives which make for virtue precisely at the point where virtue is of most utility for the good order of society. It makes it easier for average men to practise a kind of good behaviour,

which, if not the noblest type of goodness, provides at least a needed platform on which superior grades of virtue may rise. So far a retributive administration is obviously serviceable. But it would by no means tend to the highest development of the moral and religious life of humanity, were the principle fully carried out : that is, were the best of men always the most prosperous or the ungodly uniformly unfortunate. For the life of the spirit in its topmost reaches attains its development best under trial. The highest virtues are actually vitiated when pursued from mercenary motives. Hence, if the noblest or purest types of character are to be cultivated, earthly providence must not repay them with material benefits. Hardship, rather, and self-denial and endurance are then the road to spiritual riches. The best of men, even in humble spheres, not to speak of saints or heroes, must learn to dispense with secular rewards which on a lower level were found helpful, in order that they may find their true life in the imitation of Christlike self-sacrifice or in secret fellowship with the Divine love.

When providence, then, is regarded as the handmaid of that ethical and religious elevation of mankind which is God's chief end in view, suffering, whether deserved or undeserved, takes

a place of its own, with countenance austere, among a throng of helpful and uplifting agencies, through which Divine love is for ever operating. Whatever has tended to humanize men, or train them in truth and self-control, or draw hearts and lives nearer to the Father, must all minister to the advance of Christ's kingdom, or at least to "prepare the way of the Lord and make His paths straight."¹ The "rains and fruitful seasons," for example, which scatter blessings in Heaven's indiscriminate charity;² parental discipline and home ties, with the presence of the little child always "in the midst";³ the memory of worthy ancestors and the inheritance that comes with their blood; education and example; the silent parables of nature; the lessons of sages and prophets; the pressure of custom and law; the gradual elevation of moral ideals; religious truths embedded in the most backward faiths; culture and civilisation; arts and letters; everything, in brief, that is yoked to the slow-moving car of human progress or has any tendency to raise men in virtue and religion: all have to be reckoned among the providential ministers of Christ in His enterprise of freeing

¹ Matt. iii. 3; with Isa. xl. 3-5.

² Matt. v. 45; Acts xiv. 17.

³ Mark ix. 36.

men from sin and bringing nearer His Father's reign. Every such quiet slow force has been placed under the hand of man's Deliverer; and they have been at work since the beginning of history.

CHAPTER XII

THE PROBLEM OF PROVIDENCE

Divine Work in Providence—its features similar to Work in Creation—it is minute because personal—disciplinary for each—guides development of the race—hence too vast for our knowledge—danger of misinterpreting it—Conditions accepted by the Worker—two unlike worlds—that Nature and Spirit interact—their alliance unpromising—yet its limitations respected—the problem that results—“Particular” providence rejected by Deists—reply of Apologists—position changed for both parties by Science—Man’s power to modify Nature—does it illustrate God’s?—no complete parallel—How the two worlds stand apart—events belong to both—their action and reaction shape moral character.

THAT an immanent activity of God has been at work in our human world from the first, evolving His moral purposes with the race, is what we understand by the Christian doctrine of Providence. It offers to the student certain features in common with His previous activity in creation, to which it is a sequel. It is equally impressive, for instance, by its minuteness as well as by its vastness of scale. Moreover, it is just as strictly limited by given conditions, prescribed by the nature of the creature; conditions which in this

case are more difficult than before. And as a consequence, its rate of progress surprises us quite as much as evolution did in nature by its extreme slowness and fitfulness.

A few words may be added on each of these features.

Minute must the action of providence be, as well as vast; because it begins with the individual life. To each human being it furnishes, in harmony with the general purpose of the Father, the conditions of moral and religious discipline. These are designed in His love and care to favour the formation, in each case, of personal character. No one is overlooked. Christ, says His apostle, is the head of every man, and the Saviour of all men;¹ from Whose own beautiful lessons on His Father's universal care it is clear that to Jesus providence signified not simply a world-plan of wisdom overruling all for some far-off end, but likewise a tender heart that feels for the welfare of each. Teaching like this answers perfectly to the requirements of the religious life. To nurture a devout faith, it is essential, not only that the will of God be recognised in whatever affects one's personal experience, but also that His will as it

¹ 1 Cor. xi. 3; 1 Tim. iv. 10.

affects ourselves be recognised as working for our best interests. It is true that the world is ruled, not for our private advantage but for the ultimate good of the whole. Still, it would be fatal to piety if we had reason to fear lest the one might be sacrificed to the many. Nor is it enough to relieve this apprehension, to say that nothing is too tiny, nor any one too insignificant, to enter into the reckoning of the Infinite Mind. What we need to be assured of is that we are too valuable in His eyes or too dear to His heart to be treated as merely a pawn in the world-game. Is it so that each personal spirit, however degraded now, has a worth in the Divine estimation for which nothing can compensate, so that it never can be sacrificed to any ulterior aim? ¹

Of course, what gives the Christian heart this assurance is, before everything else, the price at which souls have been redeemed.² But it is confirmed by the view which science and reason unite to attest, that the perfecting of humanity is the aim of God's ways with our world. No soul can be overlooked if it is for souls that all the rest has been constructed. Earth itself is but a platform on which to rear the lives of men, and

¹ Cf. Rothe, *Dogmatik*, i. 177.

² Matt. xx. 28, cf. Mark x. 45; 1 Cor. vi. 20, vii. 23; Eph. i. 7, cf. Col. i. 14; 1 Pet. i. 18-20.

the final issue of the whole, when it comes, can be nothing but an aggregate of souls now under training. To each single moral personality this imparts an incalculable value for the possibilities that lie in it, making each one in a pre-eminent degree an end for God and an object of His care.

It follows that the leading aim of providence in each man's case must be moral and spiritual training, that is, discipline, the *παιδεία* of the Father. To afford to each person the opportunity more or less for learning to do better; to teach him wisdom by experience, and correct his faults; to beget a penitent temper, and, when the seed of a new and higher life has been quickened, to exercise it into strength through the patient subjugation of lower impulses: such are the ends in view of which it is reasonable, no less than religious, to believe that all our lives are ordered, however we may misuse or fail to improve the Father's discipline. What the secret issue is to be in the case of each of us, or how in the end the righteous Judge shall pronounce upon our share in the result, it is not for us to say. Within the secrecy of the soul where a man reacts upon outward influences, well or ill, and uses or fails to use the spiritual aid always open to him through the presence within him of the Divine Spirit—there

is enacted, under no eyes but the Heart-searcher's, the true drama of a soul. At this point the doctrine of providence passes over into the Christian doctrine of grace. For just as nature on its lower platform is a minister to providence, so does providence in its turn become a minister to redemption.

Minute and hidden is this work of God in each single life. But the mind is burdened by its vastness when we recollect, on the one hand, how it has been going on, diverse in its details, in every human being ; and how, on the other, since the dawn of history it has guided on the widest scale the development of the race. If theologians are to do justice to the ways of God, they need to be very catholic and wide of vision. They have not always been so. Not seldom have they contracted their attention to the special line of Hebrew and Christian annals, forgetful how St. John has taught us that Christ is the Light that lighteth every man.¹ The regenerative influence of the Gospel of forgiveness and renewal has received due recognition within Christendom. But it has not always been duly recognised that the whole upward movement of humanity before and since the Advent has found in Christ its inspiration and its guide. Was not

¹ St. John i. 9.

the immanent Spirit in His *φιλανθρωπία*¹ already at His patient work, brooding over the upward struggles of primeval man ; guiding the first steps to culture of the rudest tribes ; ordering, as Paul said,² the migrations of early races and fixing the bounds of their habitation ; raising men's thoughts of the Divine ; selecting choice peoples to add each its special contribution, making one the teacher of the world in intellectual culture and another in morals and religion ?³ The uplifting and moralizing of mankind in face of all its darkness and violence is for the most part a forgotten work of God, done in silence and obscurity, much of its record lost. I am far from saying that the fascinating study which bears the somewhat ambitious title of a Philosophy of History may not conjecture, even in some places on which no ray from revelation falls, a meaning in the trend of events that is possibly the correct one, or one, at any rate, which yields suggestive lessons. The movement of the Greek mind in speculation and in art lives in one brilliant chapter, preserved in imperishable literature. Hebrew history previous to the Christian era, and Christian history since, have flung an illumi-

¹ Tit. iii. 4.² Acts xvii. 26.³ See A. B. Bruce, *The Providential Order of the World*, 1873 ; especially both parts of Lecture VIII.

nated pathway across the ages, from which a little light spreads even to parts that lie on either hand of it. Active research by archæologists into relics of the stone and bronze eras, into folklore, into the growth of religious ideas, and the buried civilisations, Babylonian, Egyptian, and Ægean, will doubtless issue in a fuller acquaintance with the steps along which God guided men of the remote past. After all, however, it is but fragments we can hope to recover. Our ignorance is too dense to be more than shot through with streaks of light which make us long for more. We cannot hope to compass in our science the connected story of a providential plan which has covered in its range the dim forgotten ages and all the millenniums of recorded time, with their vanished and unregarded multitudes gone into oblivion.

It follows from this profound ignorance that we are in no position to criticise Divine providence, although we often rebel against it. The full intention of each portion could only be rightly understood, if we knew and understood the whole. It is therefore not at all surprising that as often as people attempt to interpret providence they either narrow its scope to their private interests, trying, that is, to read it purely from their own

point of view ; or they presently become entangled in perplexities arising on a larger survey, which they are unable to clear up. But although we cannot expect to search out the ways of God, it may be useful to observe certain conditions under which the Divine Worker is carrying on the moral discipline of mankind.

Speaking in a previous chapter of His operations in the creative process, it was remarked that His action has always conformed to the nature conferred upon each creature. It is precisely the same in that new kind of action upon man and for man's moral training which we call providence. The difference peculiar to this case is that in our human world there are two sets of conditions very opposite to one another, through the interaction of which the ethico-religious progress of the race has to be evolved. Two unlike worlds, of nature and of spirit, are here linked into a single system by ties the most intimate and complex that can be conceived. The forces of each, with their separate modes of action, have to be respected, never violated. Yet it is by the interaction of the two—physical necessity and personal freedom playing incessantly the one upon the other—that human character is formed and the moral issues of man's life have to be worked out.

It is startling when one thinks of it that the

task should have been undertaken at all of evolving a kingdom of perfected spirits on the basis of a material and animal world like ours. One is tempted at first sight to say : these mechanically acting forces of matter, these gross and fleshly instincts which we share with the brutes, form such an unfriendly environment for the cultivation of spirit-life that they must surely have been imposed on the Lord of providence from without. But it is not so. The Father of spirits and no other made nature what it is, and incarnated our souls in flesh. On Him, therefore, the material with its limitations cannot rest as a fetter from which He would fain be free. Nor can we be sure that had we been made pure spirits, His purposes with us would have moved more swiftly or more securely to their goal. Have we not heard of spirits unclean for whom there is no word of any moral deliverance? Our Deliverer, at any rate, has stooped to take up the burden which we feel to be so heavy, and has put honour upon the body by Himself becoming flesh.

If we cannot see why God should achieve spiritual results under material conditions, at least we may be well content that having undertaken the task He should accept its limitations. If He did not, we could never be, as for moral discipline we need to be, intelligent co-efficients in the

building up of our own character. Were events to fall out after any arbitrary or incalculable fashion, men's attempts to work with God or fit themselves into His ways would be but stumbling in the dark. We shall not conceive of providence aright, therefore, if we leave room in its ordinary working for random or occasional interferences with the order of nature. In saying this I am not prejudging the exceptional case of miracles, centring in the history of redemption, some of them inseparable from it. These must stand or fall on their proper evidence. I am thinking of the old theory of special or exceptional providences, which hardly survives to-day. It lay close to hand when physical phenomena first began to be studied on Baconian principles. Then a new difficulty arose, scarcely felt before, how to reconcile Divine control over events with the prevalence of natural law. That led the English Deists, Chubb first¹ and notably Lord Bolingbroke,² to reject what was termed a "particular" providence, while continuing to admit one that is "general" or "universal." As Bolingbroke put it, the physical and moral laws of the universe constitute a system of moral administration under

¹ His Posthumous Works appeared in 1748.

² See Leslie's *View of the Principal Deistical Writers*, London, 1836, pp. 128 and 268 ff.

which man may, if he choose, regulate his life so as to secure his own welfare and escape misery. So far the Almighty may be justly said to care for "His human creatures collectively." But to provide for particular cases would probably involve a sacrifice of those wider interests which general laws are designed to secure.¹

The answer which Christian apologists returned at the time was in substance, first, that no such distinction can be drawn between groups and the individuals who compose them ; and next, that it cannot be supposed beyond the reach of Infinite Intelligence to apply general rules so as to meet each particular case. This was fair enough ; since on such a mystery we can do no better than fall back upon our own inability to trace the working of the Unsearchable, Whose "ways are past finding out." But eighteenth century divines, like those of the foregoing century, still permitted themselves to employ language respecting special providences which lay open to misconception, to say the least. They continued to speak as if

¹ The only great patristic writer who doubted the minute care of God is Jerome, who, while he admits that God concerns Himself with individuals of the human race, thinks it beneath Him to trouble Himself about unimportant details in the lives of the lower animals : how many fish, for instance, are spawned in the sea, or how many flies swarm in the air. (See his Commentary on Habakkuk, cited by Hagenbach in his *History of Doctrines*, ii. 39 of Eng. trans.)

some things were not determined by rigorous sequences ; as if there were regions of nature less bound by rule than, say, the orbits of the planets, regions, therefore, where the Most High could bend or adapt events in some way to suit His moral designs. In this fashion had Dean Sherlock, for example, expressed himself at the close of the preceding century : " Providence guides, exerts, or suspends the influences of Nature with as great freedom as men act " ; " God can temper, suspend, direct its influences, without reversing the laws of Nature." ¹ Of such interposition the favourite instances were taken from obscure facts in meteorology, such as the effect of weather or of the seasons on agricultural prosperity. In this way the orthodox could still retain the old nomenclature which classified providences into " general " and " particular," " special " or " most special." ²

Since the Deistical controversy the advance of natural science, while it has by no means lessened

¹ Sherlock, *Discourse concerning the Divine Providence*, 1694.

² It is, of course, possible to retain such language in a legitimate sense. Providence may be called " general " to mean that it affects masses or groups, and " particular " to denote that it *likewise* takes care of " the hairs of your head." It may even be said to be " special " in the subjective sense that some incidents carry to our minds a specially strong impression that God's hand is in them. But that is neither a wholesome nor an intelligent piety which is ever on the outlook for " special providences," even in this modified sense.

the difficulty, has modified the point of view for both parties in the discussion. On the one side, the objector can no longer, like Lord Bolingbroke, draw a distinction between large interests for which the Creator cares and such trivial contingencies as may be overlooked on the principle : *de minimis non curat lex*. Science has demonstrated such an intimate connection among all natural events that nothing can be changed without propagating change throughout the entire system. It follows that if the interests of the whole are to be consulted at all, nothing is too insignificant to escape attention. If anything is providential in the sense of contributing to a foreseen result, then everything must be so, as the theologians have always said. On the other hand, it is no longer open to the theologian to speak vaguely about "tempering" or "suspending" the action of nature in any department. Every one admits now that the reign of law extends to events which appear to us casual or uncertain. They carry that appearance merely because investigation has not yet reduced them to ascertained rules. The difficulty has thus come to press more acutely than ever : Can anything be ordered for a moral purpose in a world like this? Piety, while it accepts the natural order of all events, continues, though with an effort, to cling to its old faith in

the effective guidance of that order to moral issues ; but it cannot be said that theology has succeeded in formulating a harmony in thought betwixt the two.

That the problem must be capable of solution is, I think, rendered probable by the analogy of man himself. As a finite intelligence inside nature, he can utilize its processes by guiding them, no doubt within narrow limits, nevertheless for ends of his own. That is to say, we see Mind accomplishing results which Nature left to itself would never effect ; and doing it, not by overriding its laws, for that we cannot do, but simply by arranging for a fresh application of the physical forces in obedience to their proper methods of operation. It is fair enough to argue : what is thus shown to be quite practicable to a limited degree for a finite intellect, cannot be pronounced impossible on a larger scale to the Infinite Mind.

Still, I do not think the analogy is sufficiently close to place in our hands a formula that will clear the difficulty. The two cases are not quite parallel. Man stands inside of nature as himself a part of it. His will, therefore, acting in forceful contact with matter at a single point,—that is, on the muscles of his own body,—is simply another new kind of force added to the previous sum of

forces, and for that reason, of course, modifying the result. This might offer a certain resemblance to what we call "miracle," if by that be meant the occasional intervention of Divine power to modify what happens on a given occasion and at a given moment. But its analogy to God's usual providence is less close. For God is not, as man is, a part of nature, adding the action of a new force to a complex sum. Rather His power is to be conceived as constant, underneath or within all its forces alike; immanent in the whole; equally operative, if it operate at all, in every part. His will must express itself not here and there, but in or through every material agency, and it has elected to express itself in the methods and under the laws which science reveals.

This is, it will be owned, a much grander conception of the relation of Mind to Nature than the old one of intervention at given points. Only it is less easy to reduce to clear thought, just because, as we see, it bears less resemblance to our own action upon nature. We have to formulate the notion of a world in which everything is natural, and yet everything is at the same time supernatural, because Divine; in every portion of which there is mechanism, yet also purpose. How the purpose realizes itself through the mechanism is what we cannot tell. The infinitely complex

machine grinds on around us with no interference nor any visible control. Whether its results bless us or ban us, they look equally aimless or fateful. Yet what both piety and reason bid us believe is that not a combination occurs nor a change results which is not made the right means towards some good or wise end in the experience of human souls.

How this can be : how the physical and the moral stand in such a relation to one another, that events, happening when they do, should bear with supreme and unfailing appropriateness upon the exact moral needs of each soul at every conjuncture of its moral development : this is indeed a mystery that hides itself in the secret wisdom of man's Educator. There is no difficulty, however, in seeing that it lies within the power of every one of us to make either a good or a bad use of any circumstances in which we happen to be placed ; thus making of them for ourselves a moral discipline of some sort. Nor is there any difficulty whatever in seeing that such a personal bearing of any event upon the interior life of a man as shall turn it to purposes of discipline has nothing to do with the physical causes which brought the event about. The same incident is at one and the same time a factor in two worlds —of Nature and of Spirit : but in each case in a

way of its own. In the world of nature it took place as an inevitable result of given conditions, forming a necessary link in an endless chain of physical movements. In the world of spiritual freedom it becomes a disciplinary test of character, and works in the soul good or evil consequences. A thunder-clap, for instance, kills my friend at my side but leaves me unhurt. The occurrence, in respect of its natural causes, carries no moral significance at all. The electrical state of the atmosphere being what it was, and my companion standing where he did in the path of its discharge, nothing else could happen. All the same, the event has passed beyond the sphere of physics, to enter into the personal history of two men and work spiritual changes there. It has closed the period of my friend's earthly probation, which means much for him. It has struck into my own moral consciousness to warn me or to chasten, setting in motion new movements in my religious experience which may last for ever. So far the scientific and the moral aspects of the one fact are quite independent of each other. But were they intended by the Lord of both worlds to have any connection? Did He fit the one to the other with any design? Was the physical meant to serve the spiritual? This is what piety believes and, for sufficient reasons of

its own, must believe ; but it is what theology can neither hope to prove nor science to disprove.

Yet we all know that it is precisely here, in this intricate interaction of the outward and the inward, that we find the means of moral probation and discipline. The mere outward setting of a man's life has no importance for him as a moral being save for the personal reaction which it calls forth in his own spirit. The very same incident may prove to one man indifferent, to another a blessing, to a third simply ruinous. It all depends, as we say, on how one takes it. Viewed widely, it is by the endless play of these two sets of forces that history is made, and history is providence. Our own little life is involved in and shaped by the same vast play of shuttles. Under the pressure upon us of circumstances such as no other ever lived through before, we have each of us to act our part and beat out as we can our permanent character for good or evil. We are acted on and we react. We are tempted and we yield or withstand. We struggle upward, making moral profit out of events, or we lose their benefits by neglect, or we misuse them and grow worse. The result is our moral selves. We are what the two worlds between them have made us. So to every human being, under the invisible hand of One

Who allots to us our place and fills for us our cup, this world is made a veritable arena of discipline and school of education. Herein lies the entanglement and mystery of life. Here is the pathos and the tragedy of it.

CHAPTER XIII

AT WORK ON THE SPIRITS OF MEN

Divine action upon personal spirits—conditioned by their nature—indirect action—through other persons—direct action confined to God—Who acts as Sustainer—as All-knower—as at work on the heart—behind consciousness—and in many ways—Human progress slow—like evolution in nature—moral evolution most tardy.

WHEN from the Divine ordering of outward events we pass to the interior action of God upon the soul itself, we enter a large field which stretches beyond our doctrine both of Creation and of Providence into truths which are peculiar to revelation and experiences that are among the most characteristic in Christian life. I can do no more than glance at the fringe of it ere I close.

Here no less than in the physical world must the Universal Worker be at work in harmony with nature; but now it is with the nature of spirits, and therefore on quite other lines. It belongs to personal life that its movements are determined by ethical motives instead of by physical forces; that it lies open to powerful

influences from other personalities ; yet that such influences, whether upon thought or on emotion and desire, never override its own liberty of choice so as to destroy personal responsibility. All these conditions are observed in the guidance, inspiration, or control, whatever it be, which the immanent presence of the Divine Spirit exerts over the inner life of a human spirit.

An indirect action of God on the personal life can be traced ; a direct action must be presumed. Since a characteristic of persons is that they are most influenced by persons, we have been set from birth in social groups ; so that our fellow-men compose in nearly every case the chief part of our environment, and for our ethical education the most effective part of it. No student of human progress questions that on the whole such groups, beginning from the family as the most important of them, have been among the most valuable, no less than the most powerful, instruments for developing moral ideas and forming moral habits among mankind : in spite of the ghastly converse where here or there kindred and comrades have acted fatally upon one another as the worst of tempters and corrupters. Through the influence of men upon each other, on the whole, God has been operating steadily along the generations for the building up of character and the elevation of

manners. Obviously this is indirect influence. It operates, as nature does, from without, through language or some other sensible medium.

In all this is no indwelling of mind within mind, no immediate contact of one personality upon another. When we inquire after that, human parallels seem to fail us. To me at least it seems probable that the Divine Spirit keeps in His own hand such a direct action upon our spirits. It may not be so, to be sure. The opinion was very long entertained in the Church as unquestioned Bible teaching, that wicked spirits are permitted to exert a sinister influence, by suggesting evil thoughts or wishes through no intermediate agency at all. In our own day, not a few would possibly agree with Dr. Inge that psychical research has already done something to break down our "view of the imperviousness of the ego."¹ In spite, however, of some evidence looking in that direction, I do not know that it has yet been made out by well-ascertained facts to the satisfaction of scientific psychologists that one created soul can influence another with no material means of communication between them. So long as that is so, we must be still supposed to dwell each of us apart, alone and self-contained, in a solitude impermeable to our fellows. But

¹ Inge, *Mysticism*, p. 265.

can we shut out God? Must it not be true that, as John Smith the Cambridge Platonist said long ago, "He That made our souls in His own image and likeness can easily find a way into them?"

The immanence of the Divine in our personal life presents more than one aspect to thought. First, we encounter God's working in ourselves just as in the rest of the world, under the mere category of power that upholds. Simply as a creature, the spirit of man cannot but be dependent for all its ability to think or to do upon the sustaining will-power of Him in Whom we live. Students of extinct controversies will recall this as for centuries a battle-ground of rival schools under the name, now grown obsolescent, of "concurus."¹

A more intimate form of Divine indwelling arises out of Divine Omniscience. That the All-knowing is not dependent for His acquaintance with what goes on in a man's mind upon the man's ordinary ways of expressing himself, but is privy to our most secret thoughts and searches out our deepest motives, has hardly ever been questioned by serious thinkers. If we venture to deny it, we shall be contradicted, not only by the best of men, but by the worst. For it is a recognised feature in the guilt-con-

¹ See Note K, "Concurus."

sciousness that the criminal trembles under the apprehension of an unseen Observer from Whom nothing is hid. If He Who made us knows to the bottom the ongoings of this mysterious nature of ours, He must hold a key that gives Him free entrance to the *penetralia* of our personal life, and dwell there as Mind within our mind, conscious of our consciousness.

Is He, then, an idle spectator merely? Has He power to know, but no power to influence? It is out of the deeps of a man's nature, the little understood region of his inherited predispositions, taints of blood, half-conscious motives and acquired habits, with all their subtle play of mingling and conflicting tendencies, peculiar to each human individual—out of this, I say, that he acts, or reacts, under every given set of circumstances. That is the "heart" of which our Lord spoke, from which come forth "evil thoughts," and out of whose abundance "the mouth speaketh."¹ Here, therefore, may the gracious Indweller operate, if He will, behind our consciousness, and yet most effectively of all.

Some of us may find it difficult to accept this idea, however much we may wish it were true, simply because it is never attested by our consciousness. The objection is not one to which

¹ St. Matt. xii. 34, xv. 19.

much weight can be attached. Divine action on the creature is always concealed. It is "known only by its fruits." The Breath That quickens and energises—Spirit of life and health in plant or beast—puts forth everywhere Its gentle might in such agreement with the nature of each creature that It eludes all observation. Christianity with its revelation of the Holy Spirit speaks, of course, confidently enough. But it does not speak alone. All the higher religious experience of the race agrees in bearing witness that behind the screen of the visible a Hidden Power acts on the springs of our nature to illumine what is dark and heal what is disordered. There is no real difficulty in believing that even within the area of clear consciousness the Father of our spirits may share in their life, mingling His action with their own in ways that baffle detection. Were that impossible, there remains the concealed deep out of which conscious states emerge. Recent psychology has been telling us how much goes on in the life of every soul outside or beneath the states of which we are sharply conscious. Students of mind have long been aware that to account for the sudden emergence of novel feelings and resolutions, we must assume processes to have been long maturing behind observation in the dim background of moral life. Professor James

suggested in his Gifford Lectures "that in religion we have a department of human nature with unusually close relations to the trans-marginal or subliminal region."¹ If so, it arises from the fact that in this region a man can best be supposed to lie open to spiritual influences which escape his own attention. There at least we are at liberty as theologians to speak of direct operations of God upon the soul. Without our being at all aware of it, an Indweller to Whose eye the obscurest recesses of a man's wondrous being lie naked and open, to Whose finger each stop of his soul will answer, may, if He so please, set agoing movements of change, the ultimate issues of which alone, that is, when they shall have been hospitably welcomed and freely affirmed by the personal will, shall be registered in conscious experience.

No one needs to be reminded what kinds of human achievement it has been most usual to refer to some such secret influence. One recalls how the ancients traced to the inspiration of a god whatever lifted human nature above its customary level: even the berserker fury of battle or the promptitude of heroes at critical conjunctures; still more, signal instances of prevision, presentiment, or divination, rising into successful prophecy. And one knows how common it has

¹ *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 483.

been in later times to speak of an "afflatus" or inspiration of genius at those rare moments when, as if by half-involuntary improvisation, some great work of art is swiftly produced, or a new truth swims, as by its native motion, into the delighted ken of the seer. We who are disciples of an ethical faith will be full as ready to claim a Divine origin for signal efforts and victories of the moral will: for the sacrifices men lay on the altar of truth or of duty; for the strength that withstands a great temptation; for gallant resistance to oppression; for lives of high moral endeavour or of conspicuous sanctity. Christian divines have their own doctrine of supernatural revelation through prophets and apostles to defend. And every private Christian who leads a life of prayer in the Holy Spirit, the Regenerator and Sanctifier, is aware of secret answers of help received at hours of perplexity, feebleness, or conflict. But if we are to admit the access of immanent Deity at all to the springs of human character and conduct, there is certainly no reason why we should limit too severely either the area or the quality of His possible operations. If, for the furtherance of His designs with mankind, we suppose God to have been at work even in dead matter, leading nature along ordered paths to ever higher developments, much rather is it

consonant with reason and piety to believe that He has never deserted the human spirit, at any stage of its tedious and toilsome advance, or even in moments of its deepest degeneracy ; but has been always present with His earthly child to educate, to illumine, and to guide the race for the fulfilment of its appointed destiny.

But in that case why is the progress of humanity so slow ? This has ever been, and is still, one of the standing perplexities of religious minds. Eager hearts, intent on the advancement of the Kingdom of God, would like to witness more unmistakable, more rapid progress, within the few years they have to live. Hence every generation frets at the slowness of the action ; praises former days, beheld through an imaginative haze ; or grows despondent ere it quits the scene.

To such a question a full reply cannot reasonably be expected. But tardy evolution has met us before in nature. Why was its advance there so extremely slow, creeping with hardly measurable pace through untold eras of the past ? One obvious answer there is in both cases ; perhaps the only one to be given in either case. The immanent Power respects the constitution which He has given to nature and to the spirit of man

respectively, and in His action upon both is content, as we have seen, to employ their native forces, or at least to limit Himself by their laws of being. In the case of the physical world that is obvious enough and acknowledged. In the case of man it is less easy to say how much this may mean. But some points are clear. God's ends here are moral; and to moral ends there is no forcing of the pace. Least of all is that possible in the face of inherited moral evil. We know something of what it costs to build up an individual character: how evil can be got rid of only by being worked out of the system; how laborious is the development of right principles and the formation of good habits; what stages have to be gone through, of immaturity, excess, one-sidedness; how the truth which purifies and makes free has to be gradually assimilated into life as men grow ready for it—assimilated by individual effort:—a process tedious for the individual, how inexpressibly tedious for the race.

Above all, there is the subjection of God's immanent action in providence to the self-determination of His responsible creature. We have not the slightest reason to imagine that He will ever act upon any man in such a way as to infringe upon his personal liberty. That would be to destroy his manhood. To say this does not

imply that the Divine Inworker has no influence at all over human choice. For what we call our free will is by no means absolute or unbounded liberty. It is a power to choose within limits. What these are we do not well understand, but they exist. There is room for an endless play of motives, inducements, impulses, arguments, passions, habits : a thousand things that tend to move the will in this direction or in that. Yet in spite of all, man remains in the last resort free enough to be responsible ; and within that bounded area of freedom, not even God will intrude. When even He would change the will of man, as in His grace He does, it must still be by ways, not to be traced by us, which are in harmony with the nature of a moral personality.

All this goes a long way to account for the slow upward progress of humanity. It explains why it has sometimes gone backward for a while in order to go forward on fresh lines ; why in so many lives we can read nothing but failure. The lesson is to be patient. We learn it from what I may term, I hope without offence, in this region, as in that of natural evolution, the self-restraint of the Lord of Providence. Not as blind force does He act upon His human child, but with the gentle measured influence of One Who adapts His action, not simply to the nature of personality in

general, but even to the person He is dealing with. Within the obscure recesses of each soul we believe that the Lover of men toils with patience and with skill to make us better ; submits with infinite self-denial and long-suffering to the awful rights of our personality ; deals with our perversity and wickedness, accepting neglect, accepting resistance, accepting even failure ; yet in the unspeakable tenderness of His fatherhood, works on, so long as we are able to follow Him, unceasing. What is Providence but the age-long, world-wide labour for man's deliverance of the same Divine Lover of men Whose redeeming passion was consummated upon the Cross ?

APPENDIX



NOTE A

THE PROTESTANT DOCTRINE OF CREATION

It is a curious contrast to pass from the Schoolmen to Melancthon or Calvin. Subtle inquiries about the nature, manner, and time of creation have disappeared ; together with those conjectures, discussed with keenness and pushed to foolish lengths, on the number of the angels, the date of their creation, whether they have bodies and of what sort, and so on, which had exercised the ingenuity of later schoolmen. The religious and practical temper which animated the first age of the Reformation showed itself intolerant of purely speculative questions. Melancthon is content to define the act of creation in one beautiful phrase : “Deo dicente, cum res non essent, esse cœperunt” (*Loci*, Art. II.). Calvin has not even so much on the mere act itself. The side of the doctrine which interested both these Reformers was the revelation which God has made of Himself in His creatures. Melancthon’s chapter “de Creatione” in his *Loci*, while mainly occupied with the maintenance and government of the world, closes with a collection of proofs from the constitution of nature as well as the course of providence for the attributes of God. The very design of God in creating at all, he finds to be His desire to make Himself known : “Voluit Deus innotescere et Se conspici. Inde et condidit omnes creaturas.” And the keynote in his treatment of the doctrine is the Divine glory as mirrored in His works.

Calvin devotes to the same thought a long and beautiful

chapter of his *Institutes*—the sixth of the First Book ; showing what knowledge of God may be learned, both from the ordinary and from the extraordinary course of nature, not only by scientific observers, but even by the vulgar, if only they will use their eyes : a knowledge which has become inadequate indeed, requiring to be supplemented by supernatural revelation, but only because sin has obscured and perverted the minds of men. In the Reformation symbols this subject of a nature-revelation hardly occurs. The only sixteenth century ones in which I find it are the nearly contemporary Gallic of 1559 and Belgic of 1561—a relic with many others of Calvin's influence in their composition. “Ce Dieu” (says the Gallic, Art. II.) “se manifeste tel aux hommes, premièrement par ses œuvres, tout par la création que par la conservation et conduite d’icelles.” “Comme un beau livre,” adds the Belgic, Art. II.

The attention of Reformed Theology was necessarily directed very much more to Divine Providence (of which God's elective decree was but a branch) than to the origin or conservation of the world ; and when the symbols enlarge at all, it is on the creation of men or of angels. See, for example, the Later Helvetic, cap. vii. But all of them, with the solitary exception of the Thirty-nine Articles, insert a summary statement, usually covering in few words both creation and preservation as well as control. Examples may be given :

“Qui ut condiderit per Verbum, id est, Filium Suum, omnia ex nihilo, sic providentiâ Suâ juste, vereque et sapientissime gubernet, servet, foveat, omnia” (First Helvetic, 1536).

“Deus hic bonus et omnipotens creavit omnia, cum visibilia, tum invisibilia, per Verbum Suum coæternum, eademque quoque conservat per Spiritum Suum coæternum” (Later Helvetic, 1566).

“. . . Be Whom we confesse and beleve all thingis in hevin and eirth, aswel Visible as Invisible, to have been created, to be reteined in their being, and to be ruled and guyded be His inscrutable Providence, to sik end as His eternall Wisdome, Gudnes, and Justice has appoynted them, to the manifestatioun of His awin glorie” (Scottish of 1560).

In the following century the latest of the series, the Westminster, sums up as usual the Reformed teaching of that period : "It pleased God the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, for the manifestation of the glory of His eternal power, wisdom, and goodness, in the beginning, to create or make of nothing the world and all things therein, whether visible or invisible, in the space of six days, and all very good." (Chap. IV. Art. I.)

Naturally, this Article has become both inadequate and inept for modern use in view of more recent discoveries and discussions. Still, its framers have adhered so literally to scriptural phrases, merely piling one upon another with no attempt either to explain them or to indicate their relation to each other, that the sentence may be used at this day, if one is allowed to put his own interpretation on the words of Holy Writ.

How much we have escaped through the Confession-makers keeping to a bald, but safe phraseology, any one can see who disturbs the tomes of Protestant divinity of similar date. The mediæval taste of the schools had surely revived when we find later Protestant dogmaticians again debating the old style of puerile questions : Whether God consumed a whole day of twenty-four hours in producing the objects named under each ; where was the sun in the zodiac when it was first made ; whether the "Heaven" which God created includes the "Heaven of Heavens" where He has His dwelling ; whether it includes the angels also, as Augustine supposed, and if their creation preceded the first day ; what sort of light it was that was made before the sun ; and whether the waters above the firmament were clouds, or some kind of super-celestial water, of which we know nothing ! Such were the idle disputes, now grown ridiculous, of a pre-scientific age.

NOTE B

GNOSTICISM

THE lists, variously given by different Gnostic teachers, of imaginary beings, whether viewed as personal or as hypostatised

powers, proceeding in a descending series of fruitful pairs, male and female, out of the Divine pleroma, wear to the modern mind an air of the bizarre or fantastic which only repels. In spite of that, Gnosticism was in its day a serious attempt to grapple with the immemorial mystery of evil; not only where revelation explains it as a moral fall, in the human soul, but also in the world of nature, where recent science has much, but Christianity has had little, to say of it. The æons are just a contrivance to account, through their step by step descent from the Divine, for a world-framer, who, as the lowest in the series, is undivine enough to be the author of this imperfect world. Yet even this Demiurge, least godlike of them all, could scarcely have fabricated an evil and sorrowful world like ours, had he not found to his hand the dark and evil material of which it is composed. The Gnostic still traced everything back to the Supreme God, from Whom the maker of the world is derived, no matter after how many descents. Consequently it was usual to say, either that it is by a necessity of His being that God gives origin to the æons, or, at all events, that He is unable to attain to His ultimate design, except by submitting in this way to a temporary evil which opposes Him, but which He is in the end to overcome. The bearing of this on some modern views of the evolution of nature and man is obvious enough.

Gnosticism constituted a serious danger for the Church of the second century. It combined a cosmogony with a soteriology, and came into conflict with the Church's teaching on both. It was the product of an amalgam of the new faith with old ideas drawn partly from Oriental sources, and partly from the Greek mysteries (cf. Wobbermin, *Studien zur Frage der Beeinflussung des Urchristentums durch das antike Mysterienwesen*, Berlin, 1896). It was, as Harnack says, the "acute form" of that Hellenizing of Christianity which in a milder degree affected the orthodox Church as well. Church writers consequently treated it as a heresy. It evidently attracted many Christians to its organized sects, whose cultus was largely modelled on the pattern of the Church. The Gnostics even appealed to Scrip-

ture in support of their tenets ; and Irenæus tells us that they brought discredit on the Church, because the heathen imagined that all Christians were such as they (*Adv. Hær.* 1. xxv. 3). This quite accounts for the vigorous polemic to which they were subjected by the ablest Fathers of the period.

The most churchly of these was Irenæus, in whom we get the elements of a new or Christian "gnosis," a scheme of the Divine plan embracing both creation and redemption as the Gnostics aimed at doing. To this he was led by his study of the opposing system, the most attractive feature in which was that it sought to sum up the Divine aim or design in the whole course of cosmic history, and to show how it ran out at last in a deliverance of souls from evil. In the hands of Irenæus that meant that the aim of God in the creation of man after the image of the Logos (which is human perfection) had been imperilled by the Fall, but resumed in the Incarnate Logos, and by Him brought to a higher perfection in the second creation.

By the Alexandrians, Clement and his greater pupil Origen, this Christian gnosis was more consciously worked out. At one point where Gnosticism impinged on religious faith they laid special stress. Gnosticism treated good and evil as physical rather than ethical qualities, impaired the liberty of the soul as a prisoner held in material chains, and made the process of its salvation in some sense a nature-process. To cut through the roots of this error, the Alexandrians were led to dwell on the goodness of Nature as a physical work of God, and to insist on the ethical character of sin as an abuse of creaturely free will. Evil lies wholly in man's choice, and the free soul is master of the body and of its earthly environment, competent and called upon to use the material as an instrument for the higher development of the spiritual life.

It was not to the Alexandrians alone, but to the Apologists as well, to all Christian writers more or less who had shared in the Greek culture which formed the higher education of the time, that Christianity presented itself as the true "science" or

gnosis. No doubt it was a knowledge to be reached through faith. As it is put in the anonymous Letter to Diognetus, one of the earliest and finest productions of the school, "neither can life exist without knowledge, nor is knowledge secure without true life" (c. xii.). Still, the supreme claim of the new faith was held to be that it had brought to men at last clear and certain knowledge of those things about the Deity and the World and the Life to come, concerning which the wise had been inquiring to little purpose for many generations. Your Christian believer, therefore, when fully instructed in the faith, became your real and only Gnostic.

NOTE C

EARLY LOGOS THEOLOGY

ON the lips of such a school of Christian thinkers as is referred to in the last Note, one sees how naturally their favourite title for our Lord should be the one which St. John had introduced into the canon—the "Logos." The first steps were taken in the long road which was to conduct Christian theology to its ultimate doctrine of the Second Person. But the snare which at first beset the whole Logos school was the effort to construe the Son by help of Divine attributes. The term Logos covered both the Reason and the Speech or Word of God. It was the embodiment of the active creative Mind in a spiritual Hypostasis by whom Divine Ideas became realized in the world of actuality. Equally, of course, had He been the organ of Divine self-revelation to mankind. Imperfectly had the thoughts of God been revealed through His Word to the wise of every age or race, as Justin was the first to propound through his fruitful suggestion of the "seminal word" scattered over the heathen world. More fully had they been taught by the Hebrew prophets. But the oldest utterance of all had been the creation of the world itself; for in it were embodied ideas of truth and beauty which lay from eternity in the Divine Mind. It was part of the common Christian faith that God made all things by His Son or

Word. But the first shape which this faith took in the hands of divines was that the Divine Word came forth into distinct or personal existence for the purpose of creation. That the Logos must have had an eternal being in the Divine Nature was obvious, since God never could be without His Reason. But at first He was not conceived as eternally personal. He became a Person distinct from the Father before all creation, and expressly for the purpose of creating all things. So some early apologists conceived.

Thus Tatian of Assyria, in the fifth chapter of his oration *To the Greeks*, describes the Logos as proceeding by the will of God as the ἀρχή or first principle and origin of the universe. Athenagoras of Athens, too, in his *Plea for the Christians*, addressed to the emperor in 177, says the Logos "came forth to be an Idea and an Energy in the material universe." Dorner is of opinion, indeed, that Athenagoras rejected the mistaken notion that it was with a view to such creative activity that the Logos acquired personality (*Person of Christ*, i. 284, Eng. trans.). If he is right, then the contribution of this philosophic apologist becomes important; but I do not feel sure that Dorner has not read too much into the few and brief passages in question. At any rate, it was to assist the mind to seize the distinction between the pre-temporal subsistence of the Logos in the Godhead, and the Logos as He became the personal ground and former of things created, that Theophilus of Antioch availed himself of the philosophical distinction, found in Philo and elsewhere, betwixt the Logos ἐνδιάθετος and προφορικός. Whether Theophilus held this objective and distinct forthgoing for purposes of creation and revelation to take place of necessity, or by the choice and will of the Father, is disputed (*ad Autolycum*, ii. 10 and 22).

It was probably the effort which Clement made to conceive of the distinction of the Second from the First Person as an eternal one in the nature of Godhead which led him to object to the phrase of Theophilus, as he does in the *Stromateis*, v. 1. But the sense of the passage is not too clear. Clement does not always express himself consistently or in the terms of later

orthodoxy; yet he strives to secure for the Logos true and eternal Deity, and yet to maintain, what it was so difficult to formulate, a real pre-temporal distinction within the Godhead. "God," he writes, "Who is unbeginning, absolute beginning of the whole of things, is maker of the Beginning" (ὁ Θεὸς δὲ ἀναρχος, ἀρχὴ τῶν ὅλων παντελὴς, ἀρχὴς ποιητικός, *Strom.* iv. 25). Yet this production of the Logos as the personal ἀρχή or Beginning of all production, is not viewed as a time-act; for elsewhere He is Himself called the "timeless and beginningless Beginning and Firstfruits of all that is" (τὸν ἀχρονον καὶ ἀναρχον τε καὶ ἀπαρχὴν τῶν ὄντων, *Strom.* vii. 1). There is no question of Clement's belief in the proper Deity of the Son, nor does he seem to me to question His distinct personality, although he does occasionally slip into language which sounds Sabellian. The student may consult Redepenning's *Origenes*, i. 108 ff.

Irenæus approached the doctrine of the Logos-Son Who became Man, with a keener interest in the redemptive design of the Incarnation than in the production of the world. For that reason he escaped better than the Greek Logos-school did, from what Baur calls their fundamental error—namely, conceiving the Logos (after a Gnostic manner) as an emanation or forthgoing from Deity of a subordinate hypostasis. The Gnostics had named the "Logos," just as they had named the "Christ" or the "Only-begotten," as one in the series of supposed emanations put forth from the Abyss of Deity by a quantitative subdivision of the Divine Nature. On the contrary, Irenæus refused to see in the Logos either the Divine Reason or the Creative Word which at first had rested in God and then come forth for a definite purpose; and, consequently, he too rejected, like Clement, the distinction of immanent and uttered Logos. He will not hypostatise a mere attribute, as if the contents of Deity could be broken up or divided, as was done by his Gnostic adversaries.

Tertullian, unfortunately, in his polemic against the modal monarchianism of Praxeas (the object of which was to secure the unity of God against this prevalent disposition to break it

down by intermediate beings like the Æons of Gnostic sects), fell into the very way of handling the Christian Logos which to many seemed so suspiciously like a Gnostic "emanation." Indeed at one place he feels it needful to defend himself against the charge of making the Logos a *προβολή* like the Valentinian Æons (*Adv. Prax.* 8); yet he does not scruple to borrow this Gnostic term. Nor does he escape the error of a temporal origin of the Divine Word. With him as with earlier writers of the school—Irenæus excepted—the cosmological interest in the hypostatising of the Second Person is still uppermost. Of course, Tertullian recognises, as they all did, that God never was without both His "Ratio" and His "Sermo" (the Latin words he employs to cover the two senses of the Greek *λόγος*). But this, which is no other than the Divine Intelligence communing with itself in Thought and in Word, was not yet a Personal Being distinct from the Thinker. That first happened at the origin of creation: produced at first, as he explains, for the thinking [of the universe] under the title of "Wisdom," He was afterwards begotten for the carrying of it into effect (*ibid.* c. 7). Tertullian is therefore quite consistent when he remarks in another treatise that the Son, like sin, did not always exist: "Nam nec Pater potuit esse ante Filium, nec Judex ante delictum. Fuit autem tempus cum et delictum et Filius non fuit, quod Judicem, et Qui Patrem, Dominum faceret" (*Adv. Hermogenem*, c. 3).

From this error of a temporal hypostatising of the Logos, Origen delivered the young and struggling theology of the Church by his teaching of an eternal generation of the Son; setting it thereby on a path which was to lead to Nicene orthodoxy. Yet Origen stands otherwise in the full succession of the Logos school. The starting-point for his trinitarianism remains the old cosmological one taken over from Greek philosophers, rather than the interest, as with Irenæus, of Christian redemption. He accepts that view of the Divine simplicity and unchangeableness which made the absolute primal Essence incapable of communicating Itself to the creature without a mediating agency. Hence God, to be the God of creation,

behoved to be the source of His own Logos-Son. This Second Person is still conceived as combining the Divine Reason (or as Origen prefers to say, with the Hebrew Scriptures, the Divine Wisdom), that is, the sum of Divine ideas, and also the Divine Word of Power by which these ideas are realized in the universe. It was certainly a step forward to reject the Gnostic term *προβολή* (or *prolatio*) as a description of what cannot be described, and adhere in preference to the Biblical metaphor of generation. 'He did this, he tells us, in order to shut out such heretical ideas as that the Divine Nature is divided betwixt Father and Son, or that the Second Person was produced out of something which lay outside of the hypostasis of the First: in short, to cut off all corporeal and material associations from the mysterious act which gives origin to the Logos-Son (*De Princ.* i. 2. 4 and iv. 28). And it was, as I have said, a still greater gain to represent this generating act, as a timeless one, that is, as both unbeginning and unceasing. But it is interesting to observe how he was led to this by his theory of an eternal activity in creating. If there never was a time when God began to create, and yet in creating He always acted through His Son, then it followed that there never could be a time when the Son was not (*ibid.* i. 2. 9, cf. 2. 2; he even uses the converse of the exact formula which Arius was afterwards to render famous; or at least Rufinus puts it so in his version: "Nunquam fuit quando non fuit," *ibid.* iv. 28). Dorner has tried to show that it was by the Christian conception of the Deity as ethical Love that Origen was led to his doctrine of necessary and eternal generation, as not a momentary, but a continuous and changeless act, immanent in the Godhead. Whether that be so or not, it harmonizes admirably with the ethical idea of the Divine as modern divinity holds it. But in the second century, one rather suspects a cosmological origin for the new doctrine. An eternal act of creation called for an eternal begetting of the Son through Whom all things were made.

NOTE D

INTERPRETATION OF GENESIS I

PREVIOUS to the discovery in 1873 of the cuneiform translation (made about the middle of the seventh century B.C. and preserved in the ruins of Assurbanipal's library at Kouyunjik) of a far older creation Epos of Accadian origin, interpreters of Genesis i. had been compelled, first by astronomy and then by geology, to attempt various plans for adjusting it to new facts. The earliest proposal was to retain its historical character by reading the six days as periods of indefinite duration, and fitting the ascertained eras of geology into this scheme. Reusch has called this the "concordistic" theory (*Bibel und Natur*, 4 Aufl., Bonn, 1876; Eng. trans., Edin. 1886). But such attempts, as by Hugh Miller in Scotland (*Testimony of the Rocks*, Edin. 1861), or Dana in America (*Manual of Geology*), Zöckler in Germany (*Die Urgeschichte*, Gütersloh, 1868), and Bishop Meignan in France (*La Monde et l'Homme primitif*, Paris, 1869), did not commend themselves to scientific authorities and are now abandoned. See the parallel drawn out in diagram form by Prof. Cope and Prof. Le Conte in Romanes' *Darwin and after Darwin*, i. 163-5.

Then came the "vision" theory, put forward by Kurz and others (*Bibel und Astronomie*, 5 Aufl., Berl. 1865), which supposed the story of Creation to have unrolled itself to the inner eye of the seer in six successive scenes or pictures. A third was favoured by Reusch, who has called it the "ideal" theory. It takes the six scenes to be not chronological at all, but to express so many creative ideas or Divine thoughts ("durch die Schöpfung verwirklichte göttliche Gedanken oder Ideen").

All of these have been driven from the field by the Chaldean cosmogony, or rather, in its original form, theogony, which the sacred writer is now supposed to have utilized, while treating it with the utmost freedom, as a vehicle for teaching a monotheistic doctrine of creation.

NOTE E

"CONTINUED CREATION"

By some divines the sustaining act of God has been called a "continued creation." In the use of such a phrase there lies a little confusion of thought. All that can be meant by it is that it is the same Divine power which originally conferred existence on the creature, that prevents a return to non-existence. But it cannot be said that the Almighty will operate in both cases to the same effect. To "create" properly denotes, not simply causing to be, but causing to begin to be. So understood a "continued creation" would be a contradiction in terms. If the Divine power were doing every moment what it did at first, it would require the creature to fall back at every moment into nonentity in order to be afresh called out of nonentity again; and even that, of course, would be not continued, but intermittent creation. What the phrase was designed to imply is more exactly expressed by Jonathan Edwards as follows: "God's preserving of created things in being is *perfectly equivalent* to a continued creation, or to His creating those things out of nothing at each moment of their existence. If the continued existence of created things be wholly dependent on God's preservation, then those things would drop into nothing upon the ceasing of the present moment, without a new exertion of the Divine power to cause them to exist in the following moment." Even as so explained, the language is not very happily chosen.

NOTE F

MEDIÆVAL MYSTICISM

THE speculative combination of theology with philosophy which marked that remarkable thinker of the ninth century, John the Scot, called Erigena, involved a doctrine of immanence which is strongly pantheistic. The Absolute Being, according

to him, first embodies in the Logos the archetypal ideas of goodness, wisdom and power, which thence come to manifestation in the world through the Holy Spirit as the principle both of objective existence and of manifold life. But as this is supposed to happen, not by the free choice of a personal agent, but by a necessary process of theophany, it follows that the Godhead is present in the All of existence after a pantheistic fashion. Erigena was too completely under the control of the orthodox Church of his age to be free to carry out his ideas to their consequences. Yet he has sometimes expressed himself (in his *De Divisione Naturæ*) as if the creature had no real existence, but were merely a transient manifestation of Absolute Being, which is to revert to it again at last.

This heterodox development of Divine immanence, probably drawn from the treatises of the Pseudo-Dionysius, just then introduced to the West, left at the time no appreciable result. Erigena was too far in advance of his contemporaries. But it has of late attracted the attention of scholars, partly because it assists us to trace the parentage of modern philosophical pantheism; partly because it prepared the way for the much later mystical devotion of the mediæval Church. After his time it was into the hands of the Mystics, who were both more churchly and more orthodox than he, that this doctrine of Divine immanence fell.

Mystical piety in the Middle Age was a reaction, not only against the intellectual aridity of the Schools, but likewise against the formalism and externality of popular religion. For, as Christianity became more and more an affair of subservience to Church authority, exhibiting itself in orthodox belief and outward rites, the inner life of many devout souls naturally shrank out of sight to nourish itself in secret on mystical contemplation. Especially after the great revival which marked the opening of the twelfth century, we trace it by a stream of notable representatives: in the twelfth century itself, St. Bernard and the three famous monks of the Convent of St. Victor in Paris (Hugo, Richard, and Walter); Bonaventura in the thirteenth, and Chancellor Gerson of the fourteenth. All

these, who constitute what is known as the French School of Mystics, were anxious to harmonize their contemplative devotion with loyalty to the orthodox creed and to combine it even with scholasticism. The effort which they all made after a direct communion with God, believed to be possible to the soul that loves Him and has purged its vision through discipline, rested on strong views respecting His indwelling and abiding both within the soul and in the outside world as the ground of all creaturely existence. This doctrine of His immanence had therefore to be made the most of. At the same time, these devout thinkers all strove to save themselves from falling over into a pantheistic extreme by holding fast to the distinction of nature between the creature and the Creator, however close their union might be.

Early in the fourteenth century, however, a German school of a similar tendency suddenly appeared among the Dominicans of Cologne, represented chiefly by Meister Eckhart, a Provincial of that Order. In this remarkable thinker, about whose position much has been written in recent times, we again encounter, as in Erigena, a speculative philosophy in strict alliance with religion, yet distinctly diverging from the faith as interpreted by the Church, and with a strongly pantheistic tendency. In him speculation entirely broke with the Biblical teaching on the relation between God and the world. For he held, with Erigena, that the Absolute Spirit, in Whom thought and being are identical, is the only real existence. From the background of unconscious Godhead, or the Divine in itself, there is eternally produced the Word, which is just God in His self-manifestation through a phenomenal universe. It is in the human spirit that God first becomes conscious of Himself, and this happens so soon as man attains to a clear consciousness of his own essential unity with the Divine. There is thus but one real existence; and that is one Spirit—God: the spirit of man being of one and the same essence with God. All else is mere appearance. Perfection and blessedness are to be reached by ridding oneself of all that hinders one's conscious union with the Divine—especially of the

sense of one's own personality as a separate entity. (Consult especially Martensen, *Meister Eckhart*, 1842; Lasson, *Meister Eckhard*, 1868; and Schmidt, *Essai sur les Mystiques du quatorzième Siècle*.)

It was in the main from the religious mystics, such as the secret society of the "Friends of God" founded by Nicolas of Basle, or the well-known preacher of Strassburg, John Tauler, or the Netherlander, John Ruysbroeck, that Eckhart met with sympathy. But these all, who were in search of a piety more intimate than the common, strove to steer clear of pantheism. Their aim was a union of the spiritual life with the indwelling God, a vision of Him, and a fellowship with Him in love and in will—which should nevertheless leave the personal distinction of man from God quite valid. Yet the border-line sometimes became so fine, as Schmidt has said, that they frequently overstepped it, at least in expression. (See his article on Ruysbroeck in Herzog¹.) Although it is only since Spinoza that pantheism has taken a distinct place of its own as a clearly formulated theory of the universe in open opposition to Christian thought, yet the fourteenth-century mysticism of the Rhineland is enough to show that the doctrine of Divine immanence in the creature, especially in the human spirit, while it is an undoubted article of Christian teaching, is apt to carry within it a seed of pantheistic opinion, unless it be carefully balanced on the other side by the doctrine of the Divine transcendence over the creature.

NOTE G

"IMAGO DEI"

ALTHOUGH this subject fills a long chapter in the history of doctrine, Scripture furnishes extremely scanty material. The author of Gen. i. 26, 27 has, indeed, marked his sense of its importance by the solemn counsel which the Creator is represented as holding with Himself, or, as some think, with the angels, by the threefold repetition of the statement that He

made man in His own image, and by the use of two synonyms to make the statement emphatic. But he affords no explanation of what the "image" consists in. The early Fathers agreed in thinking that the word "image" embraced the inherent gifts of reason and free will which distinguish man as a moral personality from the brutes, but by his "likeness" to God they understood a developed character of virtue to which he was intended to aspire in union with the indwelling Divine Spirit. (Cf. Irenæus, *adv. Hær.* v. 6. 1; Clement, *Strom.* vi. 11, 12.) This way of looking at man as formed in the negative perfection of a full-grown child, whose inclination indeed was to good, but who had still to work out the positive perfection of his character by his own acts of choice, remained to the last the usual one in Eastern theology; although in the fourth and fifth centuries we discern two opposed tendencies. Chrysostom and the Gregories extol the surpassing gifts of Adam, whereas the Antioch School, on the contrary, took a low view of the Divine Image; a view which was only pushed to an extreme when the Pelagians reduced it to no more than freedom of moral choice with a capacity for immortal life.

Recent scholars have not retained the distinction betwixt the two synonyms, image and similitude. Finding the one used alone at ver. 27 and the other alone where the statement is repeated at Gen. v. 1, they conclude that the occurrence of both together is merely for emphasis. In the whole of the Old Testament the "image" is never again alluded to after Gen. v. 1-3 except at ix. 6, a passage which implies that it has survived the Fall, since it constitutes the ground for the exceptional sanctity attached to human over bestial life. Compare Jas. iii. 9, where it is similarly urged to enforce the guilt of cursing men.

Besides this reference in James, there are only three N.T. allusions to the Genesis ground-text. In 1 Cor. xi. 7 the Divine image as the peculiar "glory" of man is claimed for the male as the immediate representative on earth of the Divine authority or majesty. But it was on the parallel passages of St. Paul in Eph. iv. 24 and Col. iii. 10 that

Protestant dogmaticians built their teaching on man's original righteousness. With them this was, of course, an inheritance from Augustine. No more than his predecessors did that great Father miss the important distinction between goodness which can be concreated and that character of virtue which is the result of ethical development or discipline. But by his controversy with Pelagius he was impelled to go further than had been usual, and to claim for unfallen man a positive goodness of nature, a proclivity or inborn propensity of the will to virtue. This congenital propensity to virtue may be called a "rectitudo voluntatis," if only you understand by "voluntas," not only, as Greek theology had done, the act of choice, but also those tendencies to action which slumber in the disposition and precede and lead up to acts of choice. By adding to the older definition of the aboriginal "image" of God in man this element of what he termed in one place "prima justitia" (*De Pecc. Meritis*, ii. 23 in Migne), Augustine introduced into the "image" something which could be, and had been, lost by the Fall.

It is doubtful, however, how far the post-Reformation dogmatic was entitled to found this Augustinian doctrine on the passages in Ephesians and Colossians. Both passages treat, in the first instance, of the re-creation of a new manhood in Christ. They allude to the first creation merely, as Lightfoot says, by "analogy." This leaves it uncertain whether the ethical features in the "new man" (righteousness and holiness of truth) can be pressed as part of man's original likeness to God in the day that he was created. It certainly was the tendency of the older Protestant dogmatic to exaggerate Adam's "original righteousness" in the interest of its doctrine of the Fall and of the need of a recovery from its consequences. In this instance it read into these two texts fuller and more definite information respecting lost moral elements in the Adamic "image" than most recent expositors would allow. When the Symbolic Books, Lutheran and Reformed alike, describe unfallen Adam as in a condition of "righteousness and holiness" (for example, in the *Formula Concordiæ*, the

Second Helvetic, or the Heidelberg Catechism), the choice of these terms was plainly suggested by the Pauline passages. This was usually defended on the ground that the moral image in renewed man must have been found also in man unfallen, because the design of salvation was to bring human nature back to its pristine goodness. The inference is at best a hazardous one. Whether such a thought lay in St. Paul's mind or not, it is at least certain that Adam's original likeness to the Divine, whatever it was, could not be in every respect the same as that of Christian saints, for it was not with him the fruit as in their case of a long process of sanctification. It can hardly have gone beyond the single feature signalized in a unique Old Testament text: "God made man upright"—right, that is, or true to His idea (Eccles. vii. 29). If it were read in this sense, the term "righteousness" might be allowed to stand. But the employment in this connection of the other term, *sanctitas* or "holiness," was undoubtedly apt to suggest a developed character, such as belongs rather to the end than to the opening of moral development. It is possible, at the same time, that the exact sense in which this word also was intended may have been a different one. It may have meant such "holiness" as simply results from or is equivalent to moral faultlessness and right disposition (cf. the etymological sense of our English word "holy" = wholeness or integrity of moral nature). I think it is possible at least to interpret in some such limited sense the "*totus sanctus fuit*" with which the Council of Dort concludes its careful account of the *imago Dei*; for it explains it by the words: "*justitiâ in voluntate et corde, puritate in omnibus affectibus exornatus.*"

On this difficult subject the Roman Catholic Church has pursued a line of its own. In the mediæval schools the patristic distinction between the "imago" or the rational nature which cannot be forfeited, and the "similitudo," which denoted man's lost harmony with God in the love and choice of moral goodness, was retained and emphasized. Where the Schoolmen diverged from Augustine was in pronouncing the former alone to be concreated. The latter, moral goodness or

righteousness, they took to be no part of Adam's original nature as a man, but a gift conferred subsequently to his creation by the Divine favour: an *accidens*, therefore; *justitia superaddita*; or *donum supernaturale*. In this view both the school of Lombard and Scotus on the one side and that of Aquinas on the other concurred; with this minor difference only, that while Scotists assumed some interval to elapse between creation and the bestowal of the added grace, Thomists took the two to have been synchronous. What was important was that they all considered this addition to man's moral state as created to be indispensable, if his animal impulses were to be held in check by reason, and his will to be retained in obedience to the Divine. (Cf. *e.g.* *Summa* of Aquinas, P. I. Q. 95. 1).

Against this scholastic teaching the Reformers all felt it incumbent on them to make an energetic protest. At the root of it they detected the Pelagian error, that man had been created in a state of ethical indifference betwixt evil and good. That human nature as first formed involved a conflict between lower and higher factors, so that it could only be secured against evil desire by a supernatural gift of grace, appeared to them to carry with it grave and perilous results. For one thing, it seemed to reflect on the perfection of the Divine workmanship. It implied also that what man lost by his fall was nothing essential to him, only an accidental addition to his nature. If so, then the renewing grace which saves the sinner became minimized in a like degree. Of course, all this led to their insisting on the Augustinian tenet of "original righteousness," with an urgency which easily betrayed their polemic into exaggeration, and sometimes to the use of language which almost implied (what was never seriously meant) as if in this "original righteousness" lay the whole image of God in man. See, *e.g.*, Melancthon's *Apologia Confessionis Augustanæ*, C. I. Art. II. 19. For Melancthon's full definition of the "image" as comprising these three items: (1) a true knowledge of God; (2) the will turned to God and agreeable to His will; (3) a freedom of choice which has the power to conquer lower desire

and obey God, the student may consult the *Enarratio Symboli Nicæni*, and fuller extracts from him given by Heppe in his *Dogmatik des deutschen Protestantismus*, i. 339-345. All the same, it is certainly well known that at a later date the Reformed made it a complaint against Lutheran divines, that they too much identified the "image" with "original righteousness."

Calvin had correctly taken "image" and "similitude" to be one in meaning, and to cover in the case of the protoplast both what he lost by the Fall and what has been retained by his posterity as inalienable. But his chief contribution to the doctrine, in which the Reformed generally followed him, lay in the careful and logical distinction which he drew between man's *natura*, of which he cannot be deprived without ceasing to be man, and the *status*, or moral condition in which that *natura* was originally created but from which he has fallen. When this distinction is applied, the essence of the Image is seen to lie in man's spiritual constitution as a personal creature fashioned on the model of God Himself; but this Image can only be found in a perfect state when his nature itself is perfect: whether it be with the perfection of untried innocence (as in new-made Adam), or with the perfection of consummated virtue as in the Second Adam.

The official attitude of the Church of Rome to this dispute between scholastic and Protestant theology is worth noting. The Council of Trent avoided any clear decision. Session V. on "Original Sin" leaves it unsettled whether Adam acquired "holiness and righteousness" by nature or by gift of grace. Moehler leans to a suggestion, for which we have no evidence, that the one word "justitia" might denote what came by nature, and the other "sanctitas," what was added by subsequent gift of grace (*Symbolik*, bk. i. cap. i. § 1). The language finally selected at Trent was at least designedly vague enough to cover both Lombard and Aquinas. Pallavicini tells us in his *Historia Concilii Tridentini*, vii. 9, that it was first proposed to read "conditus," which would have favoured the Thomist view, but that the word "constitutus" finally adopted left room for either school.

The exact teaching of Rome on the "Image" must therefore be sought, not in the canons of Trent, but in the Tridentine Catechism, with the explanations of accredited divines. What the Catechism enumerates as its elements are four: (1) free will; (2) a "tempering" of all impulses and appetites so that the control of the reason was never disregarded; and then as a subsequent addition, (3) the gift of original righteousness; last of all, (4) pre-eminence over the animals (pars i. cap. 2, q. 19). So influential a theologian as Cardinal Bellarmine assigns it as the reason why the third element as an addition to man's original constitution was called for, that "by it as by a golden bridle the lower nature may be kept in subjection to the higher, and the higher to God" (*De gratiâ Primi Hominis*, cap. 5). This takes for granted, of course, as the Schoolmen had done, that even in his first state as created, a certain conflict must have existed between man's animal and his spiritual nature which it required supernatural grace to restrain. Hence resulted (in the cardinal's own language) a "languor" of the will to what is good. Exactly in this reasoned form the teaching remains that of private doctors only. But the general position that Adam's original righteousness was not his natural state but a supernatural endowment, was officially sanctioned by at least two Popes, Pius v. and Gregory XIII. (See footnote to Moehler's 5th edition of his *Symbolik*, Mainz, 1838, p. 30.)

NOTE H

THE INBREATHED SOUL OF GEN. II. 7

THE Jehovist document (Gen. ii. 4-iii. 24), although it stands second in the Book, is now confidently assigned to an earlier author than the Elohist account of creation; and although its introductory verses anticipate the other by telling how man was formed, it has a wholly different aim. The preceding section alone (i.-ii. 3) is a cosmogony or geogony, and as such closes naturally with the introduction of the race in which the creative process attained its destined crown. The second one served

to introduce the subsequent history of man and of his fortunes as a religious being from the date of his fall onward. Therefore it details the constitution of the first family as the basis for all social development, and, setting them in their immediate surroundings at the outset of their career, expresses by ancient symbols both the conditions and the issue of their moral and religious probation. The former document made Man its goal as the close of the creative process. The latter takes him for its starting-point. Man is the end of creation; but he is the starting-point for history; in Ewald's words, "the centre-point in Nature, around which its whole evolution groups itself" (see his *Jahrbücher für 1848-9*). The guiding idea with the one writer, therefore, was origination; with the other, moral history.

At one important point, namely, Man's distinctive superiority to other earthly animals, the two overlap. Yet even here their interests diverge. In the first account the sacred writer is concerned to emphasize in contrast to the brutes the likeness of man to his Maker, with his resultant dominion over them. The Jehovist, on the other hand, describes man's two-fold origin, and makes his distinction from the animal to rest, not on the terms which describe his higher nature, but on the immediacy of its origin from the Creator. "The Lord God," we read in ii. 7, which is the key-word to Biblical anthropology, "formed [the] man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life (N'shamah); and [the] man became a living soul (Nephesh)." Neither of the two terms here employed serves by itself to distinguish the nature of man from lower animals. They, too, have in their nostrils "the breath [or the spirit] of life": see vii. 22, and cf. vi. 17 and vii. 15. Here the Breath appears to denote no more than the *anima* or life-principle common to men with beasts as breathing animals—the withdrawal of which leaves both of them alike "to return to the dust whence they were taken"; see Ps. civ. 29. Neither does the other phrase "a living soul" characterize man alone. It, too, is ascribed to the beasts by the author of Gen. i. 30. Where, then, is the evidence that the Jehovist took

man to be superior to them? Only in the mode of his origination: that of him alone is it said, the Breath of life entered into him by an immediate inspiration or sufflation from the Almighty. It comes to him not as a mere member of a species, animated by a common life derived from his progenitors, but is the conveyance to him as an individual person of a life which he holds directly from God. This is something more than, or different from, the transmitted vitality of a race. To some of us the distinction may appear to be a fine one; but it was not unfamiliar to Hebrew thought. We find it again in the Elihu section of the Book of Job: "There is a spirit in man: and the Breath of the Almighty giveth them understanding" (xxxii. 8; cf. xxxiii. 4). It was evidently on this difference in origin that Hebrews, even till a late date, were accustomed to base their belief in a destiny for man different from the beasts; for the sceptical Preacher asks: "Who knoweth the spirit of the sons of men, whether it goeth upward, and the spirit of the beast, whether it goeth downward to the earth?" (Eccles. iii. 21, R.V.). "Going upward" was equivalent to the "return" of the human spirit "to God who gave it," as xii. 7 in that Book shows. If God, we read in Job, were to gather to Himself His spirit and His breath, it would mean the perishing of all flesh together, and men would turn again to dust (xxxiv. 14, 15).

It is only needful to recall how the Genesis account of man's origin is imitated in the famous vision of Ezekiel (xxxvii. 4-10). Piece by piece the prophet saw the carcasses in the valley put together again till the material framework was complete. Then a special Divine act was called for: an inbreathing of the Divine Breath, which alone is the principle of human life.

NOTE I

SCRIPTURAL USE OF SOUL AND SPIRIT

THE evidence for the two facts named in the text: (1) that each of the terms rendered "soul" and "spirit" occurs in

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both Testaments in more senses than one, and (2) that in every sense the two words can be employed interchangeably, it would be tedious to detail at length, but it is not at all difficult to illustrate.

Taking *nephesh* = ψυχή = "soul," and *ruach* = πνεῦμα = "spirit," we find as follows :

1. The primary sense of *nephesh* is the breath as the bearer or the index of animal life, so that death can be spoken of as its departure ; as when it is said of Rachel, "it came to pass as her *soul* was in departing—for she died" (Gen. xxxv. 18), or in Jer. xv. 9, "she hath given up the *soul*." In this its primary meaning it is nearly equivalent to the life itself. Thus Mosaic law called for the surrender of *nephesh* for *nephesh* ; i.e. of life for life (Ex. xxi. 23 ; cf. Job xxxi. 39). In this sense also its physical seat was taken to be the blood, as in Gen. ix. 4 and Lev. xvii. 11.

By the Hellenistic writers of the New Testament, ψυχή is employed in exactly the same way : that is to say, as the principle of life which leaves us at death, for example, Luke xii. 20 ; as a synonym of life itself, see Matt. x. 39 ; and as having its seat in the blood, cf. Matt. xvi. 17.

But the words which we render by "spirit," *ruach* and πνεῦμα, though not occurring with the same frequency, can also be used now and then in the same sense. See in the Old Testament several places in the story of the Flood, Gen. vi. 17, vii. 15, and vii. 22 ; and in the New Testament, "Jesus yielded up His spirit," in Matt. xxvii. 50, cf. Luke xxiii. 46, and Stephen in Acts vii. 59. The same idea underlies the verb ἐκπνέειν (in Mark xv. 37) as the parallel verb ἐκψύχειν (in Acts v. 5, 10).

2. The secondary meaning of "soul" as equivalent to *animus*, not *anima*, is much more frequent ; that is, as the subject of the whole psychic life, including all three forms of consciousness, sensation, emotion, and desire (perhaps with a leaning to the middle form of "emotion"). Nor is it only the lower class of feelings of which it is the subject, but all sorts, from animal appetite up through the passions even

to the most spiritual, such as religious emotion. In this last sense very often in the Psalms : xlii. 2, lxxxvi. 4, and ciii. 1, 2, for example. Nay, it can even be ascribed to the Deity Himself, as in Isa. i. 14, "My soul hateth." Viewed as the conscious subject of all personal life (not of emotion merely), it has its physical seat not, with modern physiologists, in the brain, but in the heart. The ancient Greek physiologists long hesitated between the two : even so late a writer as Galen, for instance. Plato had divided the intellectual and emotional elements, assigning the former to the brain and the latter only to the heart (*Timæus*, 69). But every one is aware how all through the Bible the heart is spoken of as the seat of all inner experience, the home of the soul, as it were, where it is at work, appropriating impressions from without, deliberating, weighing motives, and forming self-determinations. Hence it is the core of personal character, from which actions issue, by the ethical condition of which a man's worth must be estimated by the heart-searcher, and where all moral renewal must commence. Innumerable instances of this use of "heart" might be cited from both Testaments ; but perhaps our Lord Himself employed it with exceptional frequency and emphasis. Cf. such sayings as Matt. xii. 34, 35 and xv. 18, 19.

Yet here again "spirit" occurs in both Testaments either as an alternative or as a substitute for "soul," as the subject of that conscious life which is hidden in the heart, or, in Kleinert's words, as "the active force of life from which proceeds the fulness of all vital activities."¹ Phrases like this occur : "Why is thy spirit so sad ?" (1 Kings xxi. 5), or, "the anguish of my spirit," in Job vii. 11 (cf. Ex. vi. 9). We read of a "contrite" or of a "haughty" spirit, and so on. And the two terms can be bracketed as parallels, as, *e.g.*, in Isa. xxvi. 9 :

"With my soul have I desired Thee in the night ;
Yea, with my spirit within me will I seek Thee early" ;

¹ "Zur alttest. Lehre v. Geiste Gottes," in Band xii. of the *Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie*, p. 21.

or in the *Magnificat* :

“ My soul doth magnify the Lord,
And my spirit hath rejoiced in God my Saviour,”

Luke i. 46, 47 ; cf. also John xii. 27 with xiii. 21.

There is, of course, a certain difference of emphasis to be detected in their employment, as in the case of all (so called) synonyms. In the main, von Hofmann's remark holds good, that when “spirit” and not “soul” is named as the subject of an emotion, it indicates that the state described is eminently an inward one. Hence personality is the uppermost thought in the word “soul,” and fellowship with God in the word “spirit.” It follows that “spirit” is used by preference of that inmost and highest side of man where he lies open to influence from the unseen, whether good or evil ; so that, as Auberlen says, to it are specially ascribed the experiences of the religious life (art. in Herzog,¹ “Geist vom Menschen”). Not far off from this is probably Dr. Laidlaw's meaning when he says : Soul denotes the subject or bearer of life : that is, the individual who is alive ; but spirit the principle or force of life in him as communicated from God the Creator. This accounts for those Old Testament passages where at a critical moment the spirit comes like a higher afflatus to reanimate the flagging soul, or even to restore life when it is, or appears to be, extinct. See Gen. xlv. 27 ; 1 Sam. xxx. 12 ; Judg. xv. 19, and others. One more attempt I may cite to define the relation of the two. Delitzsch puts it thus :¹ Soul he regards as the potency of life going out to the periphery of the body from that life-centre, which remains in immediate touch with God. The difference in any case is one of aspect or at most of function, not of essence.

3. Finally, it follows from this interchangeable, though distinguishable, use of the terms, that either of them, but especially the soul, can stand for the self or personal ego, a metaphysical abstraction for which the Hebrew language had

¹ *Biblische Psychologie*, 1855, 2te Aufl. 1861 ; Eng. trans. issued by T. & T. Clark.

no word of its own. We often meet with "every soul" or "all the souls," meaning every one, and "my soul" just means I myself; compare Isa. xlv. 2. "Spirit" may likewise stand in this way for the whole man, but it does not so often do so. Souls, however, that are disembodied are πνεύματα; see 1 Pet. iii. 19 and Heb. xii. 23. Says von Hofmann:¹ "Men are reckoned up as so many souls; but God is the Father only of spirits."

When St. Paul is not alluding to the ethical condition of human nature, his language, like that of other New Testament authors, conforms to Old Testament usage; except that he occasionally borrows from classic Greek a few terms peculiar to himself: σῶμα, for instance, which had no Hebrew equivalent; and νοῦς, which he seems to have felt the need of, to express the reflecting and judging intellect, which has νοήματα for its products. (Consult Lüdemann in his *Anthropologie des Apostel Paulus*.) It is more difficult to be sure what St. Paul precisely understood by the "spirit" of man. Apart from those numerous places where it occurs in ethical antithesis to the "flesh," we find him sometimes oppose it to the body, as denoting the immaterial nature (cf. 1 Cor. v. 3, vii. 34); while at other times it is opposed to νοῦς, as when he says: "If I pray in a tongue, my spirit prayeth, but my understanding is unfruitful" (1 Cor. xiv. 14). Yet there is at least one place where a noetic or self-conscious function is assigned to the πνεῦμα. It is in 1 Cor. ii. 11 (R.V.): "Who among men knoweth the things of a man, save the spirit of the man which is in him?" Here it must mean the personal self-conscious subject. With ψυχή I do not find that St. Paul ever sets the πνεῦμα in express antithesis, save once. That is in the very difficult but very important passage, 1 Cor. xv. 45 (R.V.), where he contrasts Adam and Christ by saying: "The first man Adam became a living soul. The last Adam became a life-giving spirit." But there is, finally, the well-known text on the strength of which trichotomists are accustomed to rely (in combination with Heb. iv. 12), where "spirit, soul, and body" are set alongside one another as distinct factors in the

¹ *Weissagung und Erfüllung*, p. 17 ff.

human constitution (1 Thess. v. 23). It is on this passage that Bishop Ellicott, for instance, builds, in his *Destiny of the Creature*, Sermon V., and in his Commentary on Thessalonians.

The most characteristic feature in Pauline anthropology does not come into consideration here, for it does not deal with the constituents of human nature as created. It is the result of the Apostle's effort, under Divine inspiration, to mark by a new use of language the ethical contrasts between man's fallen condition of sinfulness and the regenerate state of the Christian. For this purpose he broadens the connotation of the "flesh" from its literal sense of matter in a living body, till it embraces the whole of fallen humanity as now conditioned by the inherited principle of sin:—very much as St. John has ethicised the Greek term *κόσμος* to cover the organized sinfulness of the race as it develops in the social or common life of men a type of its own. In opposition to this ethical and comprehensive use of *σάρξ* by St. Paul, he never sets the *ψυχή*, although that is the obvious antithesis to our corporeal part. Indeed, *ψυχή* rarely occurs in St. Paul at all, and still more rarely with any ethical connotation. But the moral opposite to the life of sin in the flesh, is with him a holy life "in the spirit, if so be that the Spirit of God dwelleth in" the man (Rom. viii. 4-11). So employed, *πνεῦμα* likewise becomes to some degree a *vox technica* for Christian use.

Some dichotomists, like van Oosterzee and Laidlaw, have supposed that St. Paul was thus led to take a trichotomic view of human nature, which might have come to him the more readily because of his Greek training. Even Rudloff concedes that the distinction between "soul" and "spirit" first comes to be clearly appreciated in the light of the new pneumatic experience of the regenerate Christian (*Die Lehre vom Menschen*, Leipz. 1878). And Dr. Charles in his *Eschatology* has made the novel suggestion that two systems of anthropology lie alongside one another in the Old Testament: one being the primitive Semitic dichotomy; the other added by the author of Genesis ii. and iii., which is trichotomic, but had, he thinks, no influence on later Hebrew literature till we reach St.

Paul. But because St. Paul found it convenient to adopt an old term, "spirit," which had always leant to the higher or religious aspect of manhood, in order to mark the regenerate nature indwelt by the Divine Spirit, it does not at all follow that "soul" and "spirit" had originally marked, or were taken even by him to mark, two essentially different substances in human nature.

NOTE J

SECOND CAUSES

WHETHER there are in the strict sense of the phrase any secondary causes at work in nature, outside of the will of man or of other animals, is not properly a theological question at all, any more than it belongs to pure science. It is one which men will answer in harmony with their general philosophy of existence.

1. There is no doubt the prevailing opinion has been that changes in the material world are actually effected by some force or *vis* now inhering in matter itself, however it may have come to be there. This is held by persons of very various ways of thinking :

(a) The materialist must, of course, suppose dead matter to be possessed of power to produce its own changes, to be, in fact, their sole effective cause ; since he recognises no power above it.

(b) Deism, if it will be thoroughgoing, comes to pretty nearly the same practical result : the world once made having been left to run its own course under the operation of such natural forces without Divine superintendence or co-operation.

(c) Theists, while owning that it is the Divine Will which continually upholds the material universe in the exercise of its forces with which He originally endowed it, have usually ascribed to them a real causative efficiency, and have spoken of such derived or created forces as "second causes."

(d) Under the influence of one or other of such philosophical theories, similar language is extremely common among men

of science, many of whom may almost be said to personify, where they do not deify, Nature.

2. Nevertheless, the difficulty has not seldom been felt of crediting material substances with any real power of causation at all. The only way of escape must be to fall back in one form or another upon a living will, whether it be conceived as personal or impersonal, as Divine or sub-divine.

(a) Possibly it was this difficulty, vaguely felt, which gave rise to the notion which haunted ancient thought of the world, as a living whole—permeated everywhere by something analogous to a soul, an *anima mundi*. But this has never shaped itself into a very clear conception.

(b) The Schopenhauer-Hartmann outlet lay in assuming an impersonal and unconscious will to be everywhere striving to realize itself, even in the processes of inorganic nature. Here the motive reveals itself: to avoid, if possible, the personal Deity of the Theist. For plainly such an omnipresent all-working will takes the place and does the work which some theologians ascribe to the immanent and operative will of God.

(c) Quite an opposite motive underlay the very different outlet which the later Hebrews suggested, rather than formulated—that of intermediate superhuman instruments as executants of the Divine will. So long as the naïve anthropomorphism of early religion lasted, Old Testament writers felt no reluctance to bring the Almighty into direct contact with the creature. Jehovah was described as doing everything Himself. He modelled Adam of clay. He walked with him and talked to him in the garden. He shut Noah in the ark. He came down to see the tower of Babel. But as the transcendence and separateness of Jehovah gained ascendancy in Israel's theology, intermediaries were more and more called in. It was deemed more reverent to speak of Him as acting through messengers or "angels," or even through His "Memrah" or voice, and so on. For the most part, indeed, it was on special occasions, for purposes of government, or for the deliverance of His people, that angelic

ministers were thus called in. Yet in doing this, such ministers often acted on nature. For instance, an angel slew the firstborn in Egypt (Ex. xii. 23), visited Jerusalem with plague (2 Sam. xxiv. 16), and destroyed Sennacherib's army (Isa. xxxvii. 36). In the historical books of the New Testament their function is still the same; for while an angel rolled back the stone-door of Jesus' tomb (Matt. xxviii. 2), and another released Peter from prison (Acts v. 19, xii. 7), it was an angel that smote King Herod with his fatal disorder (xii. 23). Thus creaturely wills were called in to effect physical results which the modern ascribes to the forces of matter.

(d) A special form of the objection widely felt to second causes gave rise to the theory of "occasionalism." The difficulty felt by Cartesians was not merely to the causative force with which matter is credited. It was the direct power of the mind itself to initiate changes in a man's body, as well as of material impressions to originate his mental states, which they found it difficult to accept. How mental ideas are connected with molecular changes in the brain, and how muscular contractions are produced by acts of volition, are both mysteries still hidden from us as much as ever. They constitute merely two special modes of secondary causation. Malebranche's outlet lay in his theory of an incessant interposition of Divine activity from moment to moment. It was no more credible as it stood than Leibnitz's attempt to improve upon it by "pre-established harmony." But if the Supreme Will is not only able to act on matter, producing change, as Malebranche assumed, but is in truth the one effective cause of change in the inorganic world, where no other will is present, then it should be less hard to believe that He has endued another living will like His own with a similar ability, at least within the narrow range of its own organism. The result would only be that we should cease to speak of any "second causes" *save created wills*—the one kind of creaturely causation of which we have direct experience.

NOTE K

"CONCURSUS"

ALTHOUGH the Schoolmen made no contribution of value to a religious doctrine of Providence, they spent much toil over speculative difficulties involved in it. Attempts were made to fix more exactly the mode of the Divine action upon the creature by means of which events are made to fall out according to the Divine purpose. This co-operation of the Supreme Cause with secondary causes in the production of a given result was called "Concursus." Disputes over this obscure question were active between the Dominicans (who were Thomists) and the Jesuits. They passed likewise into Protestant theology, and were agitated between the Orthodox and the Socinians.

On both sides it was agreed that there must be a conjunction of some sort of the Divine Energy with the creature. But the Jesuits and the Socinians limited the action of God to the upholding of the creature in its possession of a derived power to operate according to its nature. On that view the secondary cause, be it a personal or impersonal cause, is left to itself to act in its own way without any influence from God determining or directing it in its action. This was called a "general" or "indifferent" concursus. The motive for thus restricting Divine action to a simple upholding of the creature, was to safeguard a freedom of indifference in the human will.

On the other hand, orthodox Protestant schools taught as the Thomists had done before, that God concurs, even in our case, not merely by sustaining the creature's ability to act, but also by exciting it to each separate action, and by so directing it in the act as to secure that it shall serve His own design. This was termed a "special," "particular" or "immediate" concursus. Nothing less, it was argued, could furnish a basis for any real providential control, or explain real answers to prayer and real grace in the good actions of the saints. If such a doctrine seem to impinge upon our freedom, the objec-

tion was met by saying that our free will by no means implies a freedom of indifference. Man acts freely when he acts as he chooses, although his choice may be guided by motives or considerations brought to bear upon him by another, or from the outside.

It is obvious that the point of greatest delicacy in handling such a position lay in avoiding the inference that it makes God the efficient cause of men's sinful acts. To obviate this, Hugo of St. Victor had very early (in the twelfth century) drawn this distinction: When men do good, God causes or co-operates in that good action, both as to the fact of its occurrence at all, and as to the mode (the when and how) of its occurrence; whereas, when men do evil, although the mode of their sinful deed is still determined by the Almighty, He does not determine the existence of the deed itself. Not all the Reformers saw their way to go so far as even this in the way of associating the Deity with men's evil acts. Melancthon, for example, although he admitted that God sustains all things in action, would not allow that He aids or assists anything to happen which He has not willed, but, on the contrary, has forbidden (see his *Loci*, c. iii.). Later Lutherans were less scrupulous, and developed the doctrine to its full extent. They taught an immediate Divine influence at work in all the actions of all creatures; so that the act is at one and the same time the effect both of the primary cause and of the secondary: not partly of the one, partly of the other; but it is wholly due to both, though in a different way. With this reservation, however, that in men's evil deeds the old scholastic distinction held good: it is the *materia* only of the act, not its *forma*, in which God concurs.

With this conclusion, Reformed or Calvinistic divines substantially agreed. Their general position can be well seen, for example, in Turretin (cf. *Locus* vi. *Quaestio* 7). He recognises a concurrence of God in the "entitas actus"; *i.e.* in bringing to pass the material or physical change involved in the deed; for this in itself, apart from motive or the intention of a moral actor, is purely indifferent, devoid of ethical quality altogether.

The same deed may under different circumstances be either good or evil, or neither good nor evil, if it be brought about by a non-moral cause. On the other hand, what imparts to a bad action its quality of badness is the motive or intention of the human actor alone. Of the *malitia cum actu conjuncta*, God is neither the physical nor the moral cause. Yet, even so, it was held that every sin of man remains subject to the government of God's most holy providence, in so far as He (a) permits it to happen; (b) wisely checks or regulates it in its circumstances; and (c) powerfully overrules it so as in the end to subserve some good end of His own.

Even Turretin admitted, however, that we are unable to trace the mysterious conjunction of the Supreme and Absolute Cause of causes with the human creature to whom He has granted the privilege of free and responsible choice. The nearest we can come to a satisfactory definition on a matter which is beyond us, he finds in the simple proposition, that the Supreme Cause operates upon each secondary cause in a way appropriate to its own nature. In the human case, that means in a way of reason and moral suasion suited to our freedom of will. Yet, even so, the Divine action needs to be quite differently conceived of in the case of men's good works and of their evil.

The very close relation between this subject and the predestination doctrine with which theology occupied itself so keenly in that age, amply accounts for the attention paid to the Divine "concursum" in the acts of men. It was the very same interest which, it will be remembered, had led Zwingli in the preceding generation to the philosophical determinism unfolded in his *De Providentiâ Dei Anamnema* (1530). Only he went so far as to deny to the creature a real existence distinct from the Absolute Godhead, and to treat second causes—human will included—as only apparent, not real, causes. From such a reduction of providential control to mechanism and men to automata, Calvinists on the whole were careful to guard themselves. But with the decay of predestination as a dominant mystery in theology, "concursum," as an

attempt to define the mode in which the Divine will acts upon the human, fell naturally into abeyance.

A Calvinistic divine of last century, Charles Hodge the elder, went the length of objecting to the doctrine altogether (see his *Theology*, i. 603). If, he thought, God has made the human spirit a self-determining cause initiating change, then no further question can remain as to any share of the Absolute Cause in our exercise of that power. But, is that so? Whatever kind or degree of power you concede to a derived and dependent cause, it must surely bear some relation to that Ground of all existence and Cause of causes, in virtue of which alone it exists or has power to act at all. The question what that relation is, or how we are to conceive of it, is one which cannot cease to beset the speculative intellect. Whether we have not here touched a frontier of our knowledge in our present state, is quite another matter.

Fortunately the Churches escaped on the whole from being committed to such speculations of the schools—on the mode, I mean, as distinct from the fact of providential control. Curiously enough, Rome came nearer perhaps than any Protestant communion to giving sanction to a form of *concursus*. In the *Catechismus ad Parochos*, which enjoys a qualified authority as prepared under a decree of the Tridentine Fathers, it is said: “Quæ moventur, et agunt aliquid, intimâ virtute ad motum et actionem ita impellit [Deus], ut, quamvis secundarum causarum efficientiam non impediat, præveniat tamen, quum Ejus occultissima vis ad singula pertineat”; citing in support Acts xvii. 27, 28, and Book of Wisdom viii. 1. (See pars i. cap. ii. quæstio 22.) I do not recall any sentence in a Protestant standard quite parallel to this or going quite so far. But certainly the religious truth revealed in Scripture and involved in Christian faith, of God’s overruling care and direction of all events, received ample and formal expression in the Reformation symbols. It received it, however, in very different degrees in different documents. See on this the following Note.

NOTE L

PROTESTANT SYMBOLS ON PROVIDENCE

It is not a little surprising that a truth which the robust and childlike faith of Luther himself had grasped and fed on with singular delight throughout his own eventful career, and which Melancthon has expressed with beauty and force in his *Loci*, should have escaped distinct utterance in any Lutheran symbol. The sole exception is—if it be an exception—that from a practical point of view it is taught in Luther's two Catechisms, Major (part ii. art. 1) and Minor (ii. 1), though only in passing.

Of course, the Reformed Catechisms likewise teach it from the same religious standpoint, and with greater fulness. Consult, for example, the questions, three in number (Qu. 26 to 28) in the Palatine or Heidelberg Catechism. I quote the answer to Question 26 :

“That the Eternal Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, Who of nothing made heaven and earth with all that in them is, Who likewise upholds and governs the same by His eternal counsel and providence, is for the sake of Christ His Son, my God and my Father, in Whom I so trust as to have no doubt that He will provide me with all things necessary for body and soul ; and further, that whatever evil He sends upon me in this vale of tears, He will turn to my good ; for He is able to do it, being Almighty God, and willing also, being a faithful Father.” (The version is the one given by Dr. Schaff in his *Creeds of the Evangelical Protestant Churches*.)

For practical instruction nothing could be better than this. But in Reformed Creeds, as was natural, a more theological turn was given to the doctrine. It is viewed from two distinct points of view : teleologically, from the standpoint of the Divine decree ; and also theologically, in its connection with the Creator's perfection and universal activity. It is the latter which inspired the earliest of them, the First of Basle, otherwise called of Muhlhausen, written in 1534 by Oecolampadius. Art. II. runs thus :

"[Credimus Deum] et omnia sustentare et vegetare per Spiritum Suum, id est, virtute propriâ: ideoque Deum omnia, sicut creavit, providere et gubernare." (Compare the First Helvetic, Art. VI.)

From the other point of view—the teleological—it is lightly touched upon with similar brevity in the Scottish of 1560: "Be Whom [*i.e.* God] we confesse and beleve all things in hevin and eirth, as wel visibel as invisibel, to have been created, to be reteined in their being, and to be ruled and guyded be His inscrutable Providence to sik end as His eternal wisdom, gudness, and justice hes appoynted them, to the manifestatioun of His awin glorie."

The Westminster is the latest in a series of four Confessions in which Providence gets a chapter to itself. By this time, difficulties in the doctrine, especially (*a*) the place to be assigned to second causes or the means through which Providence works, and (*b*) the relation of the Divine action to human sin, had attracted more notice, so that they seemed to demand some answer even in a public symbol of the Church's belief. This was first attempted by the Gallican of 1559 (Art. VIII.), then more fully by the Belgic of 1561 (Art. XIII.). Both are well expressed and in close agreement. They both recognise the difficulties of the doctrine, but lay stress on its consolatory value as assuring the believer of his Father's care. Both reject the inference that it makes God the author of sin, while owning that the subject is above human understanding.

The Second or Later Helvetic of 1566 has a long chapter on the subject (cap. vi.); but its length is due to its full quotation of Scriptural texts, for the points which it makes are just two: (*a*) a brief statement of Divine Maintenance and Government, and (*b*) a vindication of the use of means to the exclusion of fate in these terms:

"Interim vero media per quæ operatur divina providentia non aspernamur ut inutilia, sed his hactenus nos accomodandos esse docemus"; supported by the further proposition: "Deus enim Qui cuilibet rei suum destinavit finem Is

et principium et media per quæ ad finem usque pervenitur, ordinavit."

In the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England (1562), the doctrine of Providence is not so much as mentioned; save that the predestination of the elect to salvation is made the subject of an article:—a special department only of the general doctrine which, as it hangs together with the economy of grace in the application of redemption, finds its proper site at a different portion of the theological scheme. Between the Thirty-nine Articles and the Westminster come the "Irish Articles of Religion," drawn up probably by Ussher, and adopted in 1615. Although there is still no article devoted to it, yet the Providence of God is briefly alluded to in the article on Creation, as continuing and ordering all things. But the universal "counsel" or decree by which He has ordained whatsoever comes to pass, receives a more careful statement as the starting-point for a full and elaborate chapter on Predestination. On this last point, then so keenly debated, the Westminster Divines were content to follow the Irish Church nearly word for word. (The two have been set side by side for comparison in a note to Professor Mitchell's Baird Lectures for 1882, *The Westminster Assembly*, London, 1883, pp. 381-384.). But the brief reference to the general rule of God in Providence which Ussher had inserted under his rubric, "Of Creation," they could afford to omit in the parallel chapter of their Confession (chapter iv.), because they designed to follow that chapter up with another devoted to the subject of Providence alone. It was well they did so; for in the seven paragraphs of this chapter v., which were drafted with extreme care, the student of the history of doctrine will find the most exhaustive statement of seventeenth-century theology on the whole subject to be met with in any authoritative document. With a few notes on these paragraphs, summing up in my own words the sense of each of them, I may conclude.

§ 1. *Providence is the carrying into execution of the Divine Purpose concerning the World.*

The term "counsel," here substituted for "decree" used

in chapter iii., is a rendering of *βούλη* as discriminated from *θέλημα*. The latter pointed to the freedom of Divine volition, the former to its deliberateness as a purposed plan. (Compare Tittmann, *De Synonymis Novi Testamenti*, p. 124 ff.) The suggestion here is that God's will is not arbitrary. His wise and holy ends—both the final end of the whole, and the subordinate ends attained by its subordinate parts as means to the whole—are taken into account.

§ 2. *Alike in its totality and in its constituent parts this Purpose, being an act of the Supreme Will, must be, in so far as God is concerned, unchangeable.*

But this certainty of accomplishment (= futurity) does not involve the necessary character of each event when viewed in relation to its immediate or secondary cause. For while some second causes in nature do act with the necessity of a machine, the human will does not. It acts with moral freedom, and therefore, from our point of view, contingently. The difficulty of this problem, though it cannot be solved, is relieved for faith by saying that the free acts of the human creature are contemplated and provided for in the plan of God itself. Each creature therefore acts according to its nature.

§ 3. *The effective agency of second causes of all kinds is recognised.*

In theological language second causes are simply "means," through which as His instruments God works out His Purpose. Their real efficiency as "causes," in the strict philosophical meaning of that word, though obviously taken for granted by these divines, did not need to come into view, except in the case of man. But it is by "making use" of them that He brings His ends to pass, and usually in no other way. For all that, His freedom of action is not in bondage to the means He chooses ordinarily to employ, but His sovereignty as a Personal Agent must be safeguarded.

§ 4 *defines the relation of God to sin, avoiding two extremes :* on one side, His implication in the guilt of moral evil ; on the other, the sinner's independence of Divine control, as if by sinning man could balk the Divine design. This double risk

it is attempted to obviate in the way then usual : (1) by limiting the decree in relation to sin to a decree of permission ; but (2) by defining such permission as not "naked" or alone, but as accompanied by two positive limitations, which are carefully stated : (a) God "bounds" the sin ; that is, through His providence and grace He sets a limit to the lengths bad men can go in carrying out their evil intention into evil deed ; and (b) God "orders" the sin to His own good ends, that is, He so inweaves men's evil acts into His plan that they become means to good results not contemplated by the doer of them.

§ 5 *deals with a special case, that of sins into which good men are suffered to fall.* Of these the final end is affirmed to be their own moral profit in humility, trustfulness, and vigilance.

§ 6 *deals with a second special case, much discussed at the time—the hardening of bad men in sin.*

The Divine act of "hardening" is analysed into three items : (a) withdrawal of gracious aid, and (b) withholding of it ; and (c) placing the man in circumstances which, if well employed, might lead to repentance, but which, when ill employed, only confirm the evil habit and deteriorate the character.

§ 7 *reverts to the final end of God's whole providential design,* which is revealed in Scripture to be the "Church" as the supreme manifestation of the Divine glory, to which everything else is contributory.

The phrase used in this brief paragraph, "after a most special manner," although common in old divinity, is by no means a happy one. In substance, however, the paragraph agrees with recent thought in regarding the "Kingdom of God" (taken by us in a wider sense than the word "Church") as the goal of Providence. It has been said to be a defect in the older theology to overlook the Christological reference of Providence as taught by St. Paul. In the main, the allegation is just. This aspect of Divine teleology has of late received decidedly more attention. Yet this closing part of the fifth chapter may pass for proof that to some extent it was already recognised in the seventeenth century.

NOTE M

CREATION IN VIEW OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE HOLY TRINITY

CHRISTIAN Theology has to link the Divine relations to the world as its Cause and Final End, with the peculiar Christian mystery of a threefold mode of Divine Existence. The essence of Deity being numerically one, yet subsisting from eternity not otherwise than as a Trinity of Hypostases, it is held to follow, first, that in all Divine forthgoing activities (*acta ad extra*) all the Three concur or unite ; and yet, secondly, that Each of the Three concurs in a mode peculiar to Himself—one which agrees with His peculiar “property” (*proprietas*) in the Trinity.

Accordingly, the fundamental causal relationship of God to the creature must be supposed common to the Three ; since what constitutes the ground of creaturely existence is the one absolute self-existence of the Divine Being and the One indivisible will-power by which the Divine intention to create is realized. Our relationship, therefore, of dependence upon God as caused upon Causer is for religious experience single and indivisible. We are created by, and we hang continually upon, the one will-act of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. Yet this common relationship is in each case modified (certainly on the Divine side of it, possibly in our own experience as well, when we are well instructed) by those internal relationships which, as we gather from revelation, distinguish the mode of existence of the Blessed Three among Themselves. Thus (1) the entire Divine activity in originating, conserving, and developing the creatures is properly derived from the Father as its starting-point or ultimate source, beyond which our thought cannot travel. (2) It is brought about, mediately or instrumentally, through the Son as Utterance both of Divine Intelligence and of Divine Volition : *σοφία* and *λόγος* in one. Through Him as Personal Word of the Father is expressed, first, the archetypal idea of the universe as it dwells in the eternal Mind of Deity ;

and next, the creative *fiat* of the Eternal Will, by which all things are made and maintained in being. (3) Lastly, it is effected through the abiding presence of the Holy Spirit with the creature, as that Personal Forthgoing from Father and Son of the Divine Life and Love, resting upon and informing all creation, so that by His abiding influence the Divine Idea receives objective realization.

Mutatis mutandis: a similar triplicity in mode of operation can readily be traced in the Divine Work of Providence; common though it be to the Father of Whom, the Son through Whom, and the Spirit by Whom, all events in the world's history are overruled and guided to their final end.

NOTE N

OF BEAUTY IN NATURE

WHEN referring in the text to Divine reserve in the works of Nature, I have made no express allusion to the question how far Nature reveals its Author's love of the beautiful. This is a side of the Divine perfection to which comparatively minor attention seems to have been devoted by theologians since Christianity supplanted Grecian cults. On the other hand, most lovers of art, recognising that it has always drawn its whole inspiration from nature and found in natural objects all its exemplars, have been too much fascinated by the contemplation and admiration of the physically beautiful in the works of God, to admit the idea that the world might have been even more perfectly lovely than it is. Yet rich as the earth is in forms and hues of loveliness, full of them through all its most recondite or minute recesses, so that its Maker's taste impresses one as no less marvellous than either His might or His wisdom—I am yet struck with this, that, so far as I am aware, it nowhere furnishes us with objects of beauty solely for the sake of the pleasure they afford. Is there anywhere in nature anything answering to what we term "pure art"? Or only that applied art which ornaments what is fashioned for other reasons—for

reasons of utility? Artistic decoration of that sort is certainly endless and of infinite variety, no less than of exquisite and inimitable perfectness. And it has been discovered in places where no human eye could ever before have beheld it, as if to tell us that it is for the delight of Another Artist than man that it exists. But lavish as is the Creator's bestowal of beauty and deep as His joy in it may be presumed to be, is it not bounded, like every other natural revelation of His attributes, by notable limits? Not only is beauty invariably (as I suggest) an accompaniment of the useful, in a multitude of cases it is also its minister. If it be true that the bright colours of flowers, for example, or the plumage and song of the male bird, serve Nature's purposes by attracting insects for the fructification of the one, or by ingratiating the female in the other case, then beauty is put to use. In other instances, I think the naturalist can account for forms that are not at all graceful or for hues that are not attractive, because the necessities or the convenience of the creature calls for them. The processes of decay are rarely fair to see, are in most instances attended by sights and smells that only disgust. That is to say, beauty has been sacrificed wherever utility called for the sacrifice. Apparently, then, there is in our world no attempt to make the beautiful a supreme aim, or an aim equally important with the useful; not even to treat it as a distinct or separate end sought purely for itself. Therefore there can be no full revelation given in Nature of such love for beauty and delight in it for its own sake as inspires the human artist. God has only breathed that at length out of His own fulness into the soul of man. To the inner eye of men who bear His likeness He sometimes grants visions, or at least divinings, of an ideal loveliness never realized on earth, fair as the earth is.

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